Author: Robert Steele, then Special Assistant of the Marine Corps Intelligence Center
APOLOGY. When we changed providers for oss.net we lost some of the links. I have this somewhere. It was hugely substantive and part of my effort to redirect the US intelligence community but I was easily shut down by JCS, Big Army, and CIA, among others.
Free items that are still online include:
1991: Steele, Robert. “Intelligence Support for Expeditionary Planners,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 1991, pp. 73-79. and Steele, Robert. “Applying the ‘New Paradigm’: How to Avoid Strategic Intelligence Failures in the Future,” American Intelligence Journal, Autumn 1991, pp. 43-46.
1990: Steele, Robert. “Intelligence in the 1990’s: Recasting National Security in a Changing World,” American Intelligence Journal, Summer/Fall 1990, pp. 29-36.
1989: Gray, Al (Ghost-Written by Robert Steele), “Global Intelligence Challenges in the 1990’s,” American Intelligence Journal, Winter 1989-1990, pp. 37-41.
Consider my new book (2019):
I am sending copies to the White House and a few others, but expect no response. In a really weird way, it looks like I am going to have to run for President in order to achieve electoral, governance, and intelligence reform. It's an all or nothing proposition.
Always interested in consulting. I know how to fix it all for the greater good. We do not lack for intelligence, we lack for integrity and imagination.
Action Officer/Author: Robert Steele, then Special Assistant, Marine Corps Intelligence Center.
General Al Gray, USMC, then Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) created the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC) at the same time that he created the Marine Corps University (MCU). He was guided by the reality that the larger serices–the Army, Navy, and Air Force–devoted all of their attention to trainng, equipping, and organizing for “Big War” against the Soviet Union and China. He also recognized that there were many strategic assumptions in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), including the assumption, by the large services, that they would have lead times for deploying and employing forces abroad.
The Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC), today a Command, broke new ground, but failed to achieve traction despite strong support from the mid-career professionals. For example, the Marine COrps submission won the Joint National Intelligence Development Staff (JNIDS) competition one year with its proposal for a generic all-source analytic workstation, but they were over-ruled by a Navy Admiral who ordered them to do an anti-submarine problem instead. It is that lack of integrity that has incapacitated the intelligence and defense communities–both the Admiral who abused his position, and the JNIDS staff who allowed him to do so, lacked the kind of integrity that the Constitution calls for among its civilian and uniformed servants to the public interest.