References – Page 170 – Public Intelligence Blog

2010/01/062010/01/06

Reference: Guidelines for Relations between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments

Phi Beta Iota: See also the many superb references in the US Agency for International Development (AID) Development Experience Library. In our own experience encountering AID across Asia and Latin America, their capacity for ground truth and grass roots effectiveness is phenomenal, held back only by Congressional mandates that are politically motivated and operationally insane–such as the requirement to spend 75% of every development dollar via a US beltway bandit.

Reference: Jack Devine on Tomorrow’s Spygames

Articles & Chapters, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC)

cover devine — Jack Devine on Future of Spying

Jack Devine is the finest manager we have ever known, and the only one we know of who has never let a case officer miss a deadline without asking why. Former Acting Deputy Director of Operations while appointed as ADDO, former head of Latin America Division, he managed the Afghan Task Force whose outcomes are have been tactically and operationally successful and strategically painful. His signal idea in the above article is a Secretary of Intelligence. It's not a bad idea, if accompanied by legislation that gives the Secretary the powers that the Director of Naitonal Intelligence (DNI) does not have now, but a better idea would be a Secretary for Education, Intelligence, and Research, with CIA converted into Director of Classified Intelligence, a new Director of Open Source Intelligence, NSA becomes the all-souorce processing center, and the NRO gets folded into NGA at the same time that USGS is absorbed by NGA. The article also falls prey to the acceptance of glibness by others–cyberwar, for example, is not something we can just throw money at–there are not enough qualified cyber-warriors with US citizenship eligible for clearances to become competent in less than a decade–cyberwar is going to have to be a multinational endeavor, and the Chinese are twenty years ahead of us in both offense and defense. Reality can be such a pesky creature to deal with….

With a tip of the hat to the Association for Intelligence Officers (AFIO), which provided this in Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies (Fall 2009), pages 49-55 (7 pages). Although AFIO has not opened its doors to all multinational multifunctional intelligence professionals across the eight tribes of intelligence as we expect it to one day, its web site and publications are openly available and we encourage one and all to subscribe.

Reference: 73 Rules of Tradecraft (Dulles via Srodes)

Articles & Chapters, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC)

cover 73 rules — Allen Dulles on Tradecraft

See also: Review: Allen Dulles–Master of Spies by the same author of the above article, James Srodes.

2010/01/01

Reference: Afghanistan–The Other Side

05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, 11 Society, Peace Intelligence, White Papers

FYI … I just found this interesting report. While the report focuses almost entirely on the political perspective to this conflict, note how he claims the Taleban increases its cohesion by organizing itself in a decentralized way the marries centralized intent with high degree of autonomy at lower levels. He thinks it is paradoxical that this type of organization improves cohesion, but it is right out of the maneuver warfare tradition, and it is hardly paradoxical that this kind of organization increases the variety, rapidity, and harmony of its OODA loops at all levels organization. Nor should it be surprising, given the sluggish, rigid OODA loops that result our highly centralized, techno-intensive approach to command & control, that the Taleban seized and maintains the initiative, as acknowledged by General McChrystal in his report to President Obama in August. Chuck

35-Page Report includes Executive Summary, Introduction, Roots & Causes, Induced & Internal Factors, Pakistan Factor, Who Are the Insurgents, Talks or Reconciliation, Conclusion, and Recommendations.

High points:

1. Many actors, no strategy

2. Cannot reconcile extremists with corrupt government

3. Time for the UN to be the UN again and lead a 360 “all stakeholders” non-military convergence.

2009/12/302011/06/20

Reference: Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)

DoD, Methods & Process, United Nations & NGOs

The full title is “The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti). Although dated March 1997, this is a very fine contribution that maintains its relevance, not least because of its descriptions of both the functions and the effect of the functions in dealing with NGOs (like herding turkeys).

For best effect, also read Reference: Walter Dorn on UN Intelligence in Haiti.

2009/12/292010/09/03

Handbook: UN Peacekeeping Operations

Methods & Process, Military, Peace Intelligence, Stabilization, UN/NGO, United Nations & NGOs

Capstone document, 53 pages, entry point for everything else.

2009/12/292010/09/03

Handbook: Religious Affairs in Joint Operations

DoD, HUMINT, Military

This handbook is nothing more than a Chaplain's Rice Bowl. It has nothing to do with what we were hoping for, Religious Engagement. For that, see the two references below by Capt Doug Johnston, USN (Ret), still the Top Gun on the topic. JCS needs to completely rewrite this publication, triple it in breadth and depth, and get a grip on religious engagement tactics, techniques, and procedures before, during, and after operational engagement.

Review: Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft

Review: Faith-Based Diplomacy–Trumping Realpolitik

And:

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