Winslow Wheeler: “Defense” Budget – the Full Enchilada

03 Economy, Budgets & Funding, Corruption, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, IO Impotency, Military, Office of Management and Budget, Officers Call
Winslow Wheeler

Last Monday, after the Pentagon released its 2013 budget materials, just about every news article I read inaccurately reported the totals.  These articles did not just miss some significant bits not in DOD's press release; they ignored another $380 billion in spending for US national security spending if you take the time to parse through OMB's far more complete and accurate budget materials.

AOL Defense ran my explanation; it is at

Which Pentagon Budget Numbers Are Real? You Decide!

How do I get to a $1 trillion US small “d” defense budget; real it below:

The Real “Base” Pentagon Budget and the Actual “Defense” Budget

Winslow T. Wheeler

When the Pentagon released its budget materials and press releases last Monday, the press dutifully reported the numbers.  The Pentagon's “base” budget for 2013 is to be $525.4 billion, and with $88.5 billion for the war in Afghanistan and elsewhere added, the total comes to $613.9 billion.  (See the two DOD press releases ONE and TWO).

Indeed, if you plowed through the hundreds of pages of additional materials the Pentagon released Monday, you would come up with little reason the doubt the accuracy of those numbers as the totality of what Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta was seeking for the Pentagon.  It would also seem reasonable that those amounts constitute the vast majority of what America spends on “defense,” defined generically.

You would be quite wrong to think so.

Continue reading “Winslow Wheeler: “Defense” Budget – the Full Enchilada”

Dolphin: How Are Terrorists Like Submarines? How is the US IC Like the Maginot Line?

Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, IO Impotency

Richard Wright's contribution is more interesting to me since the origins of the entire effort to develop this high value targeting was undertaken by General Dell Daily at the Naval Post Graduate School.  I knew the research team, there were joint to the bone.

Unfortunately the IC as a whole has tried to automate the process, move it to mainstream and dilute it beyond belief.

Attached are a couple of articles regarding the effort….

2012-02-20 Manhunting Small Worlds

2012-02-20 Manhunting A Methodology for Finding Persons of National Interest

See Also:

Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945

Summary review of book below the line.

Continue reading “Dolphin: How Are Terrorists Like Submarines? How is the US IC Like the Maginot Line?”

Richard Wright: Tactical Intelligence Killing Strategic Intelligence

Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, Government, Intelligence (government), IO Impotency, Military

Richard Wright

The Triumph of Tactical Intelligence

The Andrew J. Bacevich article, “Slouching Toward Persistent War” (NYT 19 Feb 2012) points among other things to the rise of Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the instrument of choice to carry out clandestine warfare against individual and groups designated enemies of the U.S. (or close U.S. allies i.e. Israel). It also cited the rise of Michael Vickers to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as further evidence of the growing importance of SOF.

Vickers is a ten year veteran of the U.S. Army Special Forces and then served three years at CIA as principal logistic manager for support going to the anti-Soviet Taliban resistance fighters in Afghanistan. These experiences along with a PhD apparently were felt to qualify Vickers to head up DOD intelligence.

What Bacevich failed to take note of was a new and successful tactical concept that was developed by the U.S. Forces, mainly Army and Marine infantry, in the course of the counter insurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This concept has been the subject of a careful study by two researchers at the Institute of National Strategic Studies of the DOD’s Defense University: Dr. Christopher Lamb and Mr. Evan Munsing produced a study titled, “Strategic Perspectives entitled “Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation.”  In the study they examined the repeated successes of the High-value Target Teams in eliminating al Qaeda and insurgent Taliban leaders.  The secret according to the two authors was the combination of special operations forces fighters with military and civilian intelligence analysts into tightly net teams in which immediate tactical intelligence was essential to guiding the fighters to their targets. This apparently was not a case of intelligence support being provided by folks sitting far from the action phoning in information, but of intelligence support being very much part of the operation itself with the war fighters. CIA has increasingly become part of this new concept and the move of General David Petraeus to be Director of CIA may reflect this involvement of the agency with real time support to military operations.

Of course this also means that the probability is that CIA will continue to ignore strategic intelligence or what Robert Steele describes as Whole of Government Decision-Support and also multinational information-sharing and sense-making.  In other words, CIA has become MIA (pun intended).

See Also:

PREPRINT FOR COMMENT: The Craft of Intelligence

Marcus Aurelius: 10 Years Along, Still No Intelligence…

10 Security, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, IO Impotency
Marcus Aurelius

Washington Post, February 19, 2012. Pg. B7

Book World

When Spies And Gadgets Come Up Short In The War On Terror

By Dina Temple-Raston

INTEL WARS The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror. By Matthew M. Aid, Bloomsbury, 261 pp., $28

When American aid worker Jessica Buchanan and her Dutch counterpart were freed from a makeshift Somali pirate camp last month, the helicopter flight to the safety of a U.S. military base in East Africa was a brief one. The Black Hawk lifted off under cover of darkness and flew straight to the East African nation of Djibouti, landing at a small American base called Camp Lemonnier.

Matthew M. Aid’s new book, “Intel Wars,” reveals that the base is more than just a dusty, desert lily pad from which to launch covert missions. It is also home to the kind of U.S. intelligence assets that have transformed the way the United States is battling terrorism around the world. Camp Lemonnier, just a small compound next to the Djibouti airport, has a U.S. Air Force/CIA Predator drone detachment and a listening station that, one intelligence official told me, “allows us to blanket Somalia with surveillance.”

According to “Intel Wars,” Somalia is only the beginning.

Camp Lemonnier allows the United States to track “the movement of illegal narcotics between Yemen and Somalia,” the Lord’s Resistance Army in southern Sudan and small guerrilla groups in Ethiopia. Aid says that for the past two years, U.S. intelligence has used Lemonnier to detect “the presence of foreign Muslim fighters claiming allegiance to al-Qaeda fighting alongside Janjaweed militia groups against local separatists” in Darfur, Sudan. The breadth of intelligence Lemonnier provides goes a long way toward explaining how U.S. Special Forces were able to find two lone aid workers and rescue them from that pirate camp in Somalia.

Every chapter in the book is braided with intelligence nuggets. Aid weaves together original reporting, volumes of unclassified documents and his expertise. The book's chapters on Afghanistan and Pakistan are particularly engrossing, although they don't put the intelligence community in a particularly good light.

Aid writes that after 10 years of war in Afghanistan, the United States still doesn’t understand the enemy. “We did not know how many Taliban we were fighting, where they came from or why they were against us,” the late Richard Holbrooke, President Obama’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told Aid in 2010. “Intel did not even have a good bio for Mullah Omar,” the Taliban leader, and “we did not even know who was on our side and who was on theirs.”

Continue reading “Marcus Aurelius: 10 Years Along, Still No Intelligence…”

Marcus Aurelius: SOF, Syria, and Pandora’s Box

02 Diplomacy, 07 Other Atrocities, 10 Security, 11 Society, Corruption, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, Government, IO Deeds of Peace, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence
Marcus Aurelius

SmallWarsJournal.com, February 17, 2012

This Week at War: The Toughest Op

By Robert Haddick

In my Foreign Policy column, I discuss whether Admiral William McRaven's request for greater operational freedom for Special Operations Command will extend to an unconventional warfare campaign in Syria.

This week, the New York Times reported on a draft proposal circulating inside the Pentagon that would permanently boost the global presence and operational autonomy of U.S. special operations forces. According to the article, Adm. William McRaven, the Navy SEAL who oversaw the raid that killed Osama bin Laden and who is now the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), is requesting additional authority and independence outside of the normal, interagency decision-making process.

After the successful direct action strike against bin Laden and SOCOM's important role in training allied security forces in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere, it is easy to understand how McRaven's command has become, as the New York Times put it, the Obama administration's “military tool of choice.” A larger forward presence around the world and more autonomy would provide McRaven's special operations soldiers with some of the same agility enjoyed by the irregular adversaries SOCOM is charged with hunting down.

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Journal: Anon 02 on The Craft of Intelligence

Blog Wisdom, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC)

Second Pass

The “tribes” metaphor does little for me.  I humbly suggest you lose it; it is neither explanatory nor usefully evocative (IMHO).

As to who does intelligence for Whole of Government, I submit that the WOG is not a monolith so, to answer your question, there are many forces and factions who provide intelligence to their favorite parts of government: there are industry associations, trade groups, lobbyists, media, academics, and pontificators as well as various organs of the departments and agencies, themselves.  Are many of them “ideologues?” Probably. Some more, some less, some admittedly so.  So what?  None are franchised to break U.S. law to get their information (including CIA et al) but they can pay for it or obtain it thought cunning and deceit (but not impersonating LEO’s, etc.).  CIA et al can keep sources and methods officially secret, but others can rely on confidential informants, shielded sources, lawyer/doctor privilege, and other various privacy categories.  CIA et al can keep products officially secret but others can restrict their intellectual property in various ways.

Our government can use information to inform its own decisions and influence foreign powers and their citizenry, but we are loath to permit our government to use its resources to develop information and “lobby” the U.S. public with that information …although it can use its resources to “educate” the populace …but the line often blurs, one man’s education is another’s unwanted interference: consider information on abortion and contraception, for example.  We can use USG resources to “educate” the Chinese vis a vis contraception, but not to “educate” certain religious institution’s membership.

Continue reading “Journal: Anon 02 on The Craft of Intelligence”

Journal: Anon 01 on The Craft of Intelligence

Blog Wisdom, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC)

Intelligence, as it has existed throughout history, can be described in terms of two related functions:

a) On behalf of the sovereign, obtain relevant and difficult-to-obtain information concerning grave threats.

b) Support the judgment of the sovereign concerning these grave threats.

In Byzantium, for example, the emperor was the sovereign and was perpetually threatened by enemy forces that his forces either could not defeat, or that would be unwise to defeat because doing so would weaken the empire and create opportunities for other enemies.  In this perilous situation the emperor posted soldiers, diplomats, and spies who were expert craftsmen.  They learned languages, developed deep relationships, and detected and understood threats.  Reports streamed to the emperor’s cohesive intelligence staff who pondered the situation and advised him on how to deflect conflict that would otherwise lead to ruin.  Sometimes this required aggressive or preemptory moves and decisions to invest in walls, standing troops, ships, battle plans, and so forth.  But often prudent judgment resulted in deception, compromise, conciliation, bribery, flattery, and so forth.

The functions of intelligence continued in the modern era but take on a very different appearance.  In the US after WW2, the sovereign was technically the people, but in practice was the government.  The grave threats continued to be great political powers, but the battlefield became somewhat more generalized (though no more complicated), requiring judgment on different ways to quell threats.  The nation’s prestige continued to be an important factor, but it could be developed in different ways, such as through developing a reputation for helping all through world regulatory institutions, concepts of human rights, free trace, and such.   Though this was not completely alien to Byzantium which burnished its reputation as a sophisticated culture and magnanimous power that was not threatening to others unless provoked, and that would be beneficial to trade with and ally with against others.

The other shift in the modern era has been in the means of obtaining information.  Through an astonishing array of technology, much more data are obtained, though relevant information can still seem elusive.

Very recently, the situation has shifted in ways that bring traditional assumptions into question, and that create challenges for the craft.  First, the sovereign is looking much more like the people and is event spilling over into a concept of the people beyond the borders.  There is an interest in peaceful global order and the demotion of governments to true stewards of the sovereign.  The people, because of modern communication and reframing of their role, are less compliant and obedient to sovereign representatives.  This combines with a very different appreciation of which threats are grave.  Tsunamis, including of the economic kind, and loss of food, water, and health, are just as real and ruinous as interstate conflict, which in many parts of the world has receded as a threat.  A lot of the information that was difficult to obtain is now not so difficult to obtain, and can be obtained differently.  What is relevant is changing, along with the threat.

The functions of intelligence continue and remain valuable, but it is evident that the terms under which it operates, or could operate, have changed greatly. Yet the institutions that were developed to fulfill the functions have barely recognized that the ground has shifted under them.  There are (five) principal ways that the institutions have not adapted:

1.  Mindless technical collection, producing data but not enough relevant information on the real threats to warrant the expense, especially since the information that would be obtained by these means is, in many ways, available through other means.

2.  Our understanding of the grave threats is not updated.  We direct vast resources against an irritating but relatively unimportant band of thugs, meanwhile the underpinnings of our society are eroding, in part because of our outsized exertions in pursuit of the thugs.

3.  The sovereign is mistaken to be the President.  Vast amounts of relevant information are not made available to the people, in the people’s interest, leading to poor understanding of the situation and poor judgment on the part of the people.

4.  Relevant information is available in the open.  that doesn’t always make it easy to obtain, but it is bypassed simply because the institutions are focused on difficult processes (i.e., secret means).  That is a misunderstanding of the function of intelligence.  Difficult to obtain information is the point, and that information should be obtained directly, which is now often from open sources, and increasingly from volunteer or crowd sources (the people serving themselves) that can be cultivated and organized more effectively at low cost (cell phones, internet, surplus cognition, etc.).

5.  The intelligence institutions have neglected support of judgment.  This is partly due to being disinvited to help shape the sovereign’s judgment, but that is also partly due to mistaking who the sovereign has become.  The people’s judgment is now being poisoned by ideologues who have filled the void.  The situation is not honestly and soberly appreciated.  Societal sense-making suffers due to the failure of the intelligence function and craft to support it.