When Diane Web reached the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR) at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), she entered what John Perry Barlow called in a Forbes article “the gulag.” Gray desks and rotten tools–she had better computers and better analytic tools as a graduate student prior to joining the CIA. With help from Dennis McCormick and under the oversight of Gordon Oehler, she devised CATALYST, shown below in obth the original version and the enhanced version that Robert Steele acreated on top of contributions from Bill Ruh (CISCO AON). Click on the Frog to reach the SOCOM J-23 list of unintegrated softwares, and the DARPA STRONG ANGEL TOOZL initiative. Although dated 1989, this was devised in 1984 and took the usual four years of editing at CIA before it finally got into the public domain.
Put bluntly, the USA will continue to be stupid at the strategic, operational, tactical, and technical levels because none of the money being provided by the taxpayer and spent by the so-called policymakers has any connection to reality understood in the context of access to all information in all languages all the time, a strategic analytic model for holistic analysis of all ten threats to humanity acorss all twelve policy budget and behavior domains; and a toolset for multinational, multiagency, multidisciplinary, multidomain information sharing and sense-making (M4IS2).
This is the seminal work in what the author has long named “information mapping.” Posted as a public service with permission of the author, under Creative Commons license. No commercial exploitation is permitted without documented consent of the author.
Book intended to be read two pages at a time. The author suggests printing by the chapter, and then reading with even pages to the left and odd pages to the right, two pages at a time.
Shortly after this message that began connecting the dots for a “break-out” to create the inter-agency generic all-source fusion workstation. the MCIC IT budget was hijacked by DIA to test “small DODIIS”, and an Admiral over-turned the JNIDS VI award to MCIC, but kept the malfeasance secret for a year so we could not get CMC to restore the win. On such “administrative” decisions does a Nation turn. It’s time (2010) to restore integrity to all that we do, at every level, every day.
*3 years after the fact, too late to fix, USMC was told that it had won, but the Admiral in charge of JNIDS said “We are a Navy shop, we will do a Navy problem.” This is emblematic of the pervasive corruption across DoD at every level across every mission area.
Analyst 2000 was a special working group that included Dr. Mike Leavitt and Andy Shepard, who wrote 1992 Shepard (US) Intelligence Analysis in the Year 2002 and is today (2010 ADDNI/[ ]. We don’t have this today because from the White House to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to today’s Director of National Intelligence (DNI) there has been zero strategic r5equirements manager or budget management.
General Gray was known as a warrior, but he was also an intelligence professional and uniquely among all the flag officers I have ever known, an inspiring educator. He created not just the Marine Corps Intelligence Center, but the Marine Corps University, new forms of informal research to empower younger officers and explore the “edges” beyond the conventional comfort zone. He was, in brief, a warrior-scholar who epitomizes all lthat should be good in our leaders.
The Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC), today a Command, broke new ground, but failed to achieve traction despite strong support from the mid-career professionals. For example, the Marine COrps submission won the Joint National Intelligence Development Staff (JNIDS) competition one year with its proposal for a generic all-source analytic workstation, but they were over-ruled by a Navy Admiral who ordered them to do an anti-submarine problem instead. It is that lack of integrity that has incapacitated the intelligence and defense communities–both the Admiral who abused his position, and the JNIDS staff who allowed him to do so, lacked the kind of integrity that the Constitution calls for among its civilian and uniformed servants to the public interest.
In DIA OSINT is treated as an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), distributing money to the standard suspects without any form of strategic guidance, operational harmonization, or tactical effect. DIA does not “do” OSINT because neither the DIA leadership nor the so-called leadership of the intelligence directorate at DIA, where the Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office (DIOSPO) is left in deserved obscurity (five “managers” in three years is worse than a joke, it is reprehensible) have the foggiest notion of OSINT as an integrated discipline in its own right. The newly-selected incumbent is under protest (to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) since DoD and DIA have demonstrated they lack integrity in hiring on process or merit to this specific position), and Congressional investigations at the Appropriations Committee level are being inspired. In USDI OSINT is treated as a data-mining technical function, and document exploitation (which requires distributed human translation in 183 languages) is explicitly excluded at the same time that DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is handicapped by individuals who have no idea what the fifteen slices of HUMINT–much less what comprises effective clandestine, covert, defensive, and offensive counterintelligence–and have absolutely no inclination to manage them as a coherent whole. Defense intelligence has followed “central” intelligence over the cliff.