1989 Webb (US) CATALYST: Computer-Aided Tools for the Analysis of Science & Technology

Analysis, C4/JOE/Software, Historic Contributions, Technologies, Tools
CATALYST Paper
CATALYST Paper

Short URL: http://tinyurl.com/CIA-CATALYST

When Diane Web reached the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR) at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), she entered what John Perry Barlow called in a Forbes article “the gulag.”  Gray desks and rotten tools–she had better computers and better analytic tools as a graduate student prior to joining the CIA.  With help from Dennis McCormick and under the oversight of Gordon Oehler, she devised CATALYST, shown below in obth the original version and the enhanced version that Robert Steele acreated on top of contributions from Bill Ruh (CISCO AON).  Click on the Frog to reach the SOCOM J-23 list of unintegrated softwares, and the DARPA STRONG ANGEL TOOZL initiative.  Although dated 1989, this was devised in 1984 and took the usual four years of editing at CIA before it finally got into the public domain.

SOCOM SW Cluster and TOOZL
SOCOM SW Cluster and TOOZL

Put bluntly, the USA will continue to be stupid at the strategic, operational, tactical, and technical levels because none of the money being provided by the taxpayer and spent by the so-called policymakers has any connection to reality understood in the context of access to all information in all languages all the time, a strategic analytic model for holistic analysis of all ten threats to humanity acorss all twelve policy budget and behavior domains; and a toolset for multinational, multiagency, multidisciplinary, multidomain information sharing and sense-making (M4IS2).

Original Concept
Original Concept
New Cloud Concept
New Cloud Concept

Reference: Mapping Hypertext (1989)

Analysis, Analysis, Augmented Reality, C4/JOE/Software, Collective Intelligence, Geospatial, Historic Contributions, info-graphics/data-visualization, InfoOps (IO), IO Mapping, Journalism/Free-Press/Censorship, Maps, Methods & Process, Monographs, Open Government, Policy, Reform, Research resources, Strategy, Tools
Book Home Page

Title Pages

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Appendix

This is the seminal work in what the author has long named “information mapping.”  Posted as a public service with permission of the author, under Creative Commons license.  No commercial exploitation is permitted without documented consent of the author.

Book intended to be read two pages at a time.  The author suggests printing by the chapter, and then reading with even pages to the left and odd pages to the right, two pages at a time.

Visit the author’s HOME PAGE.

Reference: 1989 USMC CLIC CIA DIA Aborted Baby

Uncategorized

Shortly after this message that began connecting the dots for a “break-out” to create the inter-agency generic all-source fusion workstation. the MCIC IT budget was hijacked by DIA to test “small DODIIS”, and an Admiral  over-turned the JNIDS VI award to MCIC, but kept the malfeasance secret for a year so we could not get CMC to restore the win.  On such “administrative” decisions does a Nation turn.  It’s time (2010) to restore integrity to all that we do, at every level, every day.

Graphic: 1989 USMC JNIDS VI Workup

Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis, Geospatial, ICT-IT, Innovation, Leadership-Integrity, Processing, Strategy-Holistic Coherence

PDF USMC Winning Submission to JNIDS*

*3 years after the fact, too late to fix, USMC was told that it had won, but the Admiral in charge of JNIDS said “We are a Navy shop, we will do a Navy problem.” This is emblematic of the pervasive corruption across DoD at every level across every mission area.

Reference: 1989 USMC Work-Up for JNIDS VI All-Source Fusion Analytic Workstation

DoD

Reference 1989 Analyst 2000

Director of National Intelligence et al (IC)

Analyst 2000 was a special working group that included Dr. Mike Leavitt and Andy Shepard, who wrote 1992 Shepard (US) Intelligence Analysis in the Year 2002 and is today (2010 ADDNI/[    ].  We don’t have this today because from the White House to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to today’s Director of National Intelligence (DNI) there has been zero strategic r5equirements manager or budget management.

1989 General Al Gray on Global Intelligence Challenges

About the Idea, Historic Contributions, Insurgency & Revolution, Intelligence (Government/Secret)
General Al Gray, USMC
Click for PDF

General Gray was known as a warrior, but he was also an intelligence professional and uniquely among all the flag officers I have ever known, an inspiring educator.  He created not just the Marine Corps Intelligence Center, but the Marine Corps University, new forms of informal research to empower younger officers and explore the “edges” beyond the conventional comfort zone.  He was, in brief, a warrior-scholar who epitomizes all lthat should be good in our leaders.

Global Intelligence Challenges of the 1990’s

As conceptualized and ghost-written by Robert Steele, then the second-ranking civilian in the very small USMC intelligence community.

1988 Generic Intelligence Center Production Requirements

Memoranda, Technologies, White Papers
Generic Requriements
Generic Requriements

The Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC), today a Command, broke new ground, but failed to achieve traction despite strong support from the mid-career professionals.  For example, the Marine COrps submission won the Joint National Intelligence Development Staff (JNIDS) competition one year with its proposal for a generic all-source analytic workstation, but they were over-ruled by a Navy Admiral who ordered them to do an anti-submarine problem instead.  It is that lack of integrity that has incapacitated the intelligence and defense communities–both the Admiral who abused his position, and the JNIDS staff who allowed him to do so, lacked the kind of integrity that the Constitution calls for among its civilian and uniformed servants to the public interest.

Supplemental Observation

Ethics, Military

In DIA OSINT is treated as an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), distributing money to the standard suspects without any form of strategic guidance, operational harmonization, or tactical effect.  DIA does not “do” OSINT because neither the DIA leadership nor the so-called leadership of the intelligence directorate at DIA, where the Defense Intelligence Open Source  Program Office (DIOSPO) is left in deserved obscurity (five “managers” in three years is worse than a joke, it is reprehensible) have the foggiest notion of OSINT as an integrated discipline in its own right.  The newly-selected incumbent is under protest (to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) since DoD and DIA have demonstrated they lack integrity in hiring on process or merit to this specific position), and Congressional investigations at the Appropriations Committee level are being inspired.  In USDI OSINT is treated as a data-mining technical function, and document exploitation (which requires distributed human translation in 183 languages) is explicitly excluded at the same time that DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is handicapped by individuals who have no idea what the fifteen slices of HUMINT–much less what comprises effective clandestine, covert, defensive, and offensive counterintelligence–and have absolutely no inclination to manage them as a coherent whole.  Defense intelligence has followed “central” intelligence over the cliff.

Supports Handbook: Joint Operating Environment 2010