05 Civil War – Page 94 – Public Intelligence Blog

Boats in Bangladesh. Photo credit: Ahron de Leeuw.

Home to well over one-fifth of the population, South Asia continues to be a hotbed of conflict and upheaval. Human rights abuses, the war in Afghanistan, and climate change all present critical challenges to the region and to U.S. foreign policy. In our new focus, FPIF contributors examine current obstacles and future solutions in South Asia.

U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan is built on two coups, one in Kabul and the other in Islamabad, writes Shibil Siddiqi in Obama's Surge and Pakistan.

The AfPak Train Wreck: Conn Hallinan says that the president's goals in escalating the war in Afghanistan are deeply flawed. Just ask the Russians.

Adil Shamoo, in Nation-Building in Afghanistan, writes that the United States can learn from the mistakes made in Iraq to craft a new approach for that country.

Robert Naiman, in ‘Legitimacy' in Afghanistan, points out that escalation has just brought more death and destruction. More escalation could close off opportunities for a political solution.

Much of the Afghanistan debate has been centered in the U.S. But what do Afghans think? Gabriela Campos interviews Mariam Nawabi in Underlying Causes of Security in Afghanistan.

2009/12/132009/12/13

Officers Call: A Conversation About Iraq II

02 China, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 05 Iran, 10 Security, Analysis, Ethics, IO Sense-Making, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence

Sir,

There's nothing inherently wrong with the analysis of Al Qaeda (I just glanced at it, if you wish I can read in detail today). The PROBLEM lies not so much in how we analyze support to terrorism (state, crime, other) but rather in the way we analyze (or rather do NOT analyze) EVERYTHING.

Here's what I have thrown together for you, in six pages with links.

Summary of Contents (OC Iraq II)

Why We Missed the Threat
Terrorism is Threat Number Nine Out of Ten
Terrorism is a Tactic, Al Qaeda an Interest Group
Without Legitimacy Forget About Stabilization
Rebalancing the Instruments of National Power
Three Things Secret Intelligence Cannot Do
Advise & Assist Transition to Exit Menu
- Strategic Communications
- Inter-Agency Professionals
- Regional Concordat
- Faith Brigades
- Redirect Funds Toward Waging Peace
- Contain Israel
- Make Nice with China

Officers Call on Iraq I

Semper Fidelis, Robert

2009/12/092009/12/16

Reference: General McCaffrey’s Trip Report on AF

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, Analysis, Budgets & Funding, Military, Peace Intelligence, Policy, Strategy

After Action Report–General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret)

Visit to Kuwait and Afghanistan 10-18 Nov 09

11 pages

Extracted points

01 Phenomenally useful report with too much cheerleading. This is a 10-year regional war, State Department and AID are pulling out for next several years (too dangerous), costing us roughly half per day what we paid for all of WW II per day. Allies not really showing up and being effective, less the British.

02 Talked to Generals, Ambassadors, and Ministers–no Captions, no village chiefs. Nothing in her on intelligence, glosses over the C4I and protocol issues (see Journal: Beyond Weber to Epoch B Leadership).

03 Achilles' heels are multiple: 90% of the logistics come through Karachi, Pakistan and then overland. Without fire support and aviation this war is lost. Taliban now up to battalion-sized operations and believe they have high moral ground and time on their side. 100% US movement by air. (See Review: Firepower In Limited War; aviation sounds like a repeat of Viet-Nam; only thing keeping logistics open are the same decision made by NVA in Viet-Nam and by Iran-Syria in Iraq: better to let the Americans bleed themselves to death than cut their main supply line.

Continue reading “Reference: General McCaffrey's Trip Report on AF”

2009/12/092009/12/09

Journal: US Begins Regional War on Pashtun

05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Government, Military, Peace Intelligence

Chuck Spinney sends:
In my opinion, this is an extremely important piece of writing and needs to be read very carefully. The author of this article built an international reputation for excellence during his reporting on the Iraq War, and now he is positioning himself to do the same on Afghanistan. Conflating al Qaeda with the Taliban will mutate the so-called war on terror into an Anti-Pashtun (AF-Pak) War, with unknowable ramifications that could very well make the lunacy of Mad King George's aggression in Iraq look miniscule in comparison.

Full Story Online

A Wider and Unnecessary War: The March of Folly

By PATRICK COCKBURN December 7, 2009

By treating Pashtun villagers as if they were all Taliban, and Taliban as being the equivalent of al-Qa’ida, Mr Obama is increasing, not reducing, the threat of terrorist attack on the US or Britain. He is providing the battleground bin Laden hoped for and, like President Bush before him, has jumped willingly into the al-Qa’ida trap.

. . . . . .

One of the most foolish and misleading claims by US and British generals is that fighting a guerrilla war can be successfully combined with dispensing aid and building bridges and roads. But, as one commentator puts it, such a mixture of Wyatt Earp and Mother Theresa is not feasible. Soldiers are trained to get what they want by force and that is generally what they do. Afghans whose families have just been killed by a bomb will not be conciliated by a fine new drainage system.

Other minefields face incoming American and British forces. The Afghan government is in many respects a criminal racket.

2009/12/082009/12/08

Journal: Questions on AF & PK, The Larger Question

03 Economy, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Civil Society, Ethics, Government, Media, Military, Peace Intelligence

What Congress Should Ask McChrystal

Phi Beta Iota: WIRED Magazine has put together a number of questions that ably illustrate the confusion in the public mind over why we are in Afghanistan and what that has to do with Pakistan. Based on the history of the Cold War, which appears to have been a Fity Year Wound, In Search of Enemies, or as General Smedley Butler, USMC (Ret) put it, War is a Racket, we have to wonder. When one combines the scandals associated with health care (50% waste according to PriceWaterhouseCoopers), the economy (a fraudulent Federal Reserve and phantom wealth leveraged by Wall Street to the detriment of the commonwealth), and all of the other pressing problems facing America, the larger question is not really about Afghanistan or Pakistan but rather about process. Is America a democracy? Is our policy process reasoned and informed? Is the public interest being served? Does the White House really understand The True Cost of Conflict/Seven Recent Wars and Their Effects on Society?

2009/12/032009/12/05

Journal: Notes on David Kilcullen to US IC

05 Civil War, 09 Terrorism

David Kilcullen spoke to NCTC and ODNI on Dec 2, unclassified, and spent a good deal of time talking about good and bad ways to measure counter-insurgency.

His remarks are at a level below the “global police action against the jihadist criminal conspiracy” (how Bacevich characterized on morning NPR interview, Dec 3).

Kilcullen is now with the Crumpton Group.

His book The Accidental Guerrilla–Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One remains his most easily accessible offering.

Some general points on counter-insurgency:

It is “an adaptation struggle”
Governments almost always win under two conditions: if they negotiate to end it, and if they are fighting to take back their own country (not in occupation/colony). (He was using Correlates of War data from Univ. of Indiana.)
Insurgency is actually stronger in many ways when smaller, and the remnant is really hard to stop. He was decorated for fighting 400 Malay insurgents 30 years after the war was supposedly won.
The ratio of troops to population that is in the manual is based on an irrelevant figure from an old Rand study. He tried to keep it out of the manual. He says you can do quite well with fewer troops. In Vietnam, we exceeded this ‘standards’ and still lost.

Some bad measures

Continue reading “Journal: Notes on David Kilcullen to US IC”

2009/12/012009/12/01

Journal: Why they hate us (II): How many Muslims has the U.S. killed in the past 30 years?

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Terrorism, 10 Security, Academia, Civil Society, Ethics, Government, Military

Tom Friedman had an especially fatuous column in Sunday's New York Times, which is saying something given his well-established capacity for smug self-assurance. According to Friedman, the big challenge we face in the Arab and Islamic world is “the Narrative” — his patronizing term for Muslim views about America's supposedly negative role in the region.

. . . . . . .

I heard a different take on this subject at a recent conference on U.S. relations with the Islamic world. In addition to hearing a diverse set of views from different Islamic countries, one of the other participants (a prominent English journalist) put it quite simply. “If the United States wants to improve its image in the Islamic world,” he said, “it should stop killing Muslims.”

Phi Beta Iota: The chart is below the fold, or at the Full Story Online

Continue reading “Journal: Why they hate us (II): How many Muslims has the U.S. killed in the past 30 years?”

Category: 05 Civil War

Reference: Foreign Policy in Focus–South Asia