PRESIDENT OBAMA is doing the arithmetic of fighting in Afghanistan and figuring the odds of Pakistan pulling through. He must not only add up the numbers of soldiers he wants to hand over to his generals, but must also measure what is achievable against what his country has to spend in money and blood. General Stanley McChrystal?s requests echo those of Marshal Akhromeyev, who begged the Soviet Politburo for more soldiers for his war 20 years ago.
Military Refines A ‘Constant Stare Against Our Enemy'
The rapidly increasing surveillance power of unmanned aircraft gives U.S. officials an option beside s troops
By Julian E. Barnes November 2, 2009 Pg. 1
WASHINGTON — The Pentagon plans to dramatically increase the surveillance capabilities of its most advanced unmanned aircraft next year, adding so many video feeds that a drone which now stares down at a single house or vehicle could keep constant watch on nearly everything that moves within an area of 1.5 square miles.
The year after that, the capability will double to 3 square miles.
By FRANK RICHEXTRACT: The more rightists who win G.O.P. primaries, the greater the Democrats’ prospects next year. But the electoral math is less interesting than the pathology of this movement. Its antecedent can be found in the early 1960s, when radical-right hysteria carried some of the same traits we’re seeing now: seething rage, fear of minorities, maniacal contempt for government, and a Freudian tendency to mimic the excesses of political foes. Writing in 1964 of that era’s equivalent to today’s tea party cells, the historian Richard Hofstadter observed that the John Birch Society’s “ruthless prosecution” of its own ideological war often mimicked the tactics of its Communist enemies.
A good example of why learning from the past can be useful.
Full Story Online
October 31, 2009
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Chimera of Victory
By GIAN P. GENTILE
If history is a guide, then the recent suicide bombings in Baghdad show that the insurgency in Iraq is far from over. Contrary to much of what is written and said, victory is not near and the notion that the “surge” of troops was some great, decisive military action that set the stage for political reconciliation is a chimera.
It was a chimera for the French in Algeria that their bloody counterinsurgency there defeated Algerian nationalists. After the war, which lasted from 1956 to 1961, a myth started to build in the French Army and then found its way into American Army thinking, where it lives on today, that the French military operations defeated the insurgents.
One of the great things about being the touchstone for public intelligence is the contacts that are made by students, officers and enlisted personnel serving in the field, and so many others.
While we were in Denmark, an officer now serving in Iraq sent us some questions that we answered to the best of our ability. The questions alone are listed here. For the answers, click on the cover.
1. We never should have invaded Iraq. I have a less developed opinion on Afghanistan, but if I had to say one way or another, that was probably a mistake as well.
Do these mistakes fall solely on the Bush administration?
Was the administrating that incompetent or did they have an immoral and selfish reason such as fleecing the U.S.?
Was it shortsighted political gain objectives with an underestimation of the downside?
We will have at least double the amount of dead service members before these conflicts are over as were killed during the 9/11 attacks. I read somewhere that we have 75,000 amputees due to the two conflicts not to mention the amount of PTSD. Who has the blood on their hands? Certainly nobody is willing to admit mistakes.
I don't understand how Cheney can even think about spouting off after how the conflicts have gone. Where is the cost vs gain analysis?
2. Once we did invade, we didn't have a solid plan and we didn't bring nearly enough troops if we planned on staying. Was this mainly Rumsfeld's fault?
BRUSSELS – There are already more than 100,000 international troops in Afghanistan working with 200,000 Afghan security forces and police. It adds up to a 12-1 numerical advantage over Taliban rebels, but it hasn't led to anything close to victory.
London — THE highly decorated general sat opposite his commander in chief and explained the problems his army faced fighting in the hills around Kabul: “There is no piece of land in Afghanistan that has not been occupied by one of our soldiers at some time or another,” he said. “Nevertheless much of the territory stays in the hands of the terrorists. We control the provincial centers, but we cannot maintain political control over the territory we seize.
AFGHANISTAN isn't com pletely hopeless, just use less. It's a strategic joke with a bloody punch line. Even if everything went perfectly in Afghanistan — which it won't — the results would be virtually meaningless: Our mortal enemies (above all, al Qaeda) have dug in elsewhere, from Pakistan to Somalia. … From line doggies up to bird colonels (and even a few junior generals), there's a powerful sense that we're throwing away soldiers' lives for theories that just don't work. We enforce rules of engagement that kill our own troops to avoid alienating villagers who actively support the Taliban and celebrate our deaths. …
Iraq made sense to me. The stakes there were (and are) enormous. But Afghanistan's a strategic vacuum that sucks in resources and lives to no sensible purpose. By propping up President Karzai's government of thieves and attempting to force our vision on Afghanistan we've rescued a defeated Taliban from oblivion. So much for COIN theory.
Killing our nation's enemies always makes sense. Sacrificing our troops for the Pentagon's equivalent of Beanie Babies is despicable. Won't a single four-star general stand up and be counted?
