1-7 Star Rating – Page 264 – Public Intelligence Blog

Helpful Reading, More Opinion than Research,

February 12, 2005

Winslow T. Wheeler

Edit of 10 Oct 08 to add comment pointing to author's really excellent and detailed summary of what is wrong with Pentagon today (including budget data), and more links.

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

What the author does in this book is focus on the failings of Congress. What the author does not do is provide a more documented analysis of why and how Congress has become disconnected from the people it is supposed to represent, or why the Executive does not balance Congress when the latter abuse their powers. The “balance of power” is in fact a “balance of pork privileges,” and it is this inability, as the author describes it, to focus on all the facts, in an objective way, in order to make the best application of the taxpayer dollar, that cripples Congress (and the Executive).

I've given the author four stars because I disagree with those who would demean his motives. What I read here is consistent with the other books I have read–and my own experience talking to generally witless under-educated staff (because I am not important enough to get to the few who are “top notch”). When the author open his book by pointing out that ***all*** watchdog or balancing elements–the media, the think tanks–have failed to hold Congress accountable, I must agree with him.

The most interesting “thread” within the book has to do with information–what information gets where, who sees it, what do they do with it. At the end, the author concludes, most Members are not doing their homework, and most staffs are too busy focused on inserting partisan advantage and localized pork to actually serve the people of the United States in an effective manner.

The book is unusual in being focused on national security and defense, where the author spent his entire career, and what jumped out at me is that Congress has no grand strategy–Congress, like the Executive, is fragmented into stovepipes and is not able to make thoughtful trade-offs at the big picture level between Diplomacy Information Military Economic (DIME) instruments of national power.

The author is severely critical, and rightly so, I believe, in lambasting the Members for abdicating their Constitutional power to declare war. On page 221 he says that it is clear that Members consider their re-election prospects more important than the need to stand tall and oppose a war they do not support.

The author ends by proposing 12 steps for Congressional reform, among the most important of which is exposure of the truth to the public: no more Congressional Record “revisions,” no more secret back-room meetings, no more fake camera shots showing Senators speaking to an empty room; no more lightweight partisan staff shuttling to jobs in the Executive they are supposed to help oversee; no more stone-walling of the press; and no more lobbyists with direct access–only constituents. These are all common sense suggestions that are helpful to the public interest.

The author's last two sentences of the book are most helpful of all: “There is really only one thing that will force members of Congress to perform as best as they are able. That is for the public to have the information to distinguish the good from the bad and the phonies from the sincere.”

Public information in the public interest…this is the key.

New Links 10 Oct 08:
The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
War is a Racket: The Antiwar Classic by America's Most Decorated Soldier
Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency

2005/02/122009/12/04

Review: The Sling and the Stone–On War in the 21st Century

4 Star, Insurgency & Revolution

Overall Excellent Primer,

February 12, 2005

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes USMC

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

In the context of the thousands of book on strategy, force structure, emerging threats, and so on, this is a solid primer and excellent work for both those who know nothing of the many other books, and a good place to start for conventional military minds ready to think more deeply about transformation.

This is an excellent book over-all. His two key points are clear: 4th Generation Wars take decades, not months as the Pentagon likes to fight; and only 4th Generation Wars have defeated super-powers–the US losing three times, Russia in Afghanistan, France in Viet-Nam, etc.

The author offers solid critiques of the Pentagon's mediocre strategy (Joint Vision 20XX) and its preference for technology over people, an excellent short list of key players in world affairs, interesting lists and a discussion of insurgent versus coalition force strengths and weaknesses in Iraq, and a brutal–positively brutal–comparison of the pathetic performance of “secret” imagery taking days or weeks to order up, versus, “good enough” commercial imagery that can be gotten in hours.

There are flashes of brilliance that suggest that the author's next book will be just as good if not better. He understands the war of ideas and talks about insurgent handbills as a form of ammunition that the US is not seeing, reading, or understanding; he points out that Al Qaeda is like a venture capitalist, franchising and subsidizing or inspiring distributed terrorism; and he is superbly on target, on page 39, when he points out that when Al Qaeda attacks in the US, the only thing that is “moving” is information or knowledge. Everything else they pick up locally–hence, US homeland security comes down to intercepting the information, not the players or the things they use to attack us.

The author is among those who feel that we must nail Egypt, Syria, and Iran, among others (I would include Pakistan), for exporting support to terrorism.

I have a number of underlinings and margin comments throughout this book, so it is by no means a light read. It is a very fine place to start understanding war in the 21st Century, and an excellent foundation for reading the more nuanced and broader works of GI Wilson, Max Manwaring, Steve Metz, Ralph Peters, and others.

Other seminal works in this area, with reviews:
Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs Series)
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods
The Tiger's Way: A U.S. Private's Best Chance for Survival
War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare
Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts That Will Shape the 21st Century

2005/02/122009/12/04

Review: Transformation Under Fire–Revolutionizing How America Fights

4 Star, Budget Process & Politics, Change & Innovation, Military & Pentagon Power

On target & useful–a master speaks,

February 12, 2005

Douglas A. Macgregor

I hold this author to a higher standard, for he is in the top rank of perhaps 10 people who really know what they are talking about with respect to transformation. I believe he is the single most important mind behind the Army's recent transition from 10 divisions to 40+ brigades as the basic form of organization. Where he falls short (and remember, this is a master who in falling short is still light years ahead of the others) is in not going far enough: in not carrying his ideas out to inter-agency collaboration and multi-national inter-agency planning and coalition operations.

He also fails to properly put the failings of the US Navy and the US Air Force in context. The US Navy today is a disgrace, largely incapable of moving anything or getting anywhere at flank speed, and the US Air Force is even worse off–incapable of lifting what needs to be lifted, when it needs to be lifted, in the distances and quantities that need to be lifted. Without a chapter on this joint “sucking chest wound,” the author's otherwise brilliant work loses much of its potential at the SecDef level.

This is a very serious book, not an essay. It is packed with substantive information, it is well-documented, and the footnotes are as useful as the main text.

The underlying theme in this book is that the Chief of Staff of the Army will not succeed until he breaks the back of the cultural mafia that persists–like the horse cavalry of old–in focusing on big units and expensive platforms. While the author is among the foremost and earliest proponents of small, fast, and many, it is clear to me that he does not consider the current Army to be moving in the right direction–a direction that he makes clear could lead to our achieving a sufficiency within months rather than years.

Perhaps the most revolutionary underlying theme in this book is that of how to deal with information. The author may well be the most intelligent helpful commentator I have read in this respect. On page 102 he focuses on the fact that “Command centers where information is collected and transmitted should not be information monopolies,” and he focuses throughout on the urgent need to use “commander's intent” (a concept of operations pioneered by Marine Corps Commandant Al Gray) and fluid lateral information sharing to increase situational awareness and agility at the tactical level.

Published in 2004 and not doubt polished in 2003, this book gives the US Army a failing grade for the future while noting that it could–with application and innovation, get back to the Honor Roll within months, rather than years.

I am a Marine and I discount the “hate and discontent” from disgruntled Marines writing reviews against this book. There is a big difference between Marines from the sea carrying out largely amphibious missions, and soldiers (and increasingly in today's army, contractors at a ratio of 1:1) in for the long haul. We need a 450 ship Navy, a 2 Berlin Airlift Air Force, a 45+ brigade Army, a 3 MEF USMC, a doubled Coast Guard, a tripled State Department, and a whole new focus on inter-agency and multinational armies and related peacekeeping cadres. It is not enough to fix Army–we need a grand strategy for using all of the instruments of national power over a 100 year timeframe. In this context, the book gets an A for giving Army the slap in the face it needs right now, and a C+ for missing the larger picture within which the Army, no matter how transformed, will fail because everything else in the USG is failing when it comes to coordinated sustainable inter-agency operations. Theater commanders and Army ground forces cannot win the war alone, nor can they make peace on their own.

One final word of praise: the author is an honorable man of great moral courage who speaks his mind in the public interest. Within the book he has harsh things to say about ticket-punching careerist officers, and think tank harlots who give their masters what they want, not what they need to hear. I salute and will follow any man such as this. We need more like him.

2005/02/122009/12/04

Review: The Trail of Painted Ponies, Collectors Edition

4 Star, Culture, DVD - Light

Delightful Overview of the Collection and How It Came To Be,

February 12, 2005

Rod Barker

I bought this book in paperback at the same time that I bought four horses from a store and then–using the book as a guide–ordered two more from the web site.

It tells a great story and is a pleasure to have.

My only complaint is that the book focuses on telling a story with larger photos of a very small number of the horses, and then gives each of the **many** other horses in the collection nothing more than a thumbnail, literally (twelve 1.5 inch bu 1.5 inch tiny tiny tiny photos).

I would strongly encourage the sponsors to do a new edition that gives a quarter page to each horse, and also specifies the material that the horse is made of–I find the ceramic glaze horses generally disappointing.

2005/01/312009/12/04

Review: Anti-Americanism

5 Star, America (Anti-America)

Sets New Standard For What Can and Should be Known,

January 31, 2005

Jean-Francois Revel

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

This author, this book, are extraordinary. His is the kind of intellect that Harry Truman had in mind when CIA was created, with its motto, from John 8:32, regarding the importance of truth. Get the facts. This author is a master of the facts, and I am somewhat ashamed, having fallen prey to “facts” from others, that I should have to learn these facts from a Frenchman.

On every page there is an eye-opener, and what I came to realize is that this author is demonstrating what public diplomacy *should* be in America–on every single page he compares and contrasts what anti-Americans are claiming against America, what the real facts are, and what the facts are for Europe, where it is oh so fashionable to be critical of America when in fact Europe has done far less for the world, and for its own people.

Four facts stand out that bear emphasis, for they represent what this author has done so well with this book:

1) Europe provides four times the subsidies for its farmers than does America for American farmers.

2) Africa has received the equivalent of a hundred Marshall Plans since World War II, only to squander them all in corruption.

3) The US Senate rejected the Kyoto Treaty under Clinton, not Bush, and Clinton's executive order leaving Bush holding the bag as a deliberate political gambit.

4) There is a one to one correlation between globalization and the improvement of the lot of the poor in the least developed countries.

Now, having “accepted” some of this author's fact, which correct “facts” I had previously accepted, what really hit home with me is that we need to get all these facts on the table, subject to the collective intelligence of the people, and we need to do a much better job of communicating the facts to both our own domestic public, and the international audience. “Public diplomacy” in America stinks, in part because Otto Reich thinks he can do public diplomacy by assertion rather than by demonstration. Facts–open source intelligence–is what will work. The Department of State is not doing its homework, precisely because it refuses to be serious about open sources of information and the process of distilling information into overt intelligence.

The book is sometimes tedious but always rewarding. It is here that I learn that the Algerian terrorists were frustrated in 1994 in their plans to hijack an airplane and fly it into the Eiffel Tower. It is here that I see, explained in excellent context, the term “hyperterrorism.” It is here that I see discussed as some length the “myth of Muslim moderation,” and where I also see a persuasive condemnation of multi-culturalism and bi-lingual education.

I recommend this book be read in conjunction with Lee Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History. Jean-Francois Revel helps us see the history of the past as we should: America with warts, but triumphant. Lee Harris helps us see the history of the future as we should: America at risk, unless it becomes ruthless at the same time that it faces reality.

This book has forced me to re-evaluate a great deal of what I took to be “scholarship” that I now realize needs to be subjected to much closer scrutiny. We need more facts on the public table. This book is a good starting point for all of us.

2005/01/302009/12/04

Review: Why Secret Intelligence Fails

4 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

Superb for the general audience, not for professionals,

January 30, 2005

Michael A Turner

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

On balance I like this book for the general audience–the author has a reasonable amount of experience, he has a very fine structure for discussing the subject, and it is a good alternative to my current favorite, Lowenthal's Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy(3rd Edition) This is, and I wish to be crystal clear here, a very fine option for undergraduate students. I strongly recommend this book for purchase by those with a limited knowledge of the world of intelligence, and for use as an undergraduate text.

It fails to satisfy at the professional level for two reasons: a lack of adequate attention to professional-level publications, and a lack of discussion of nuances vital to future success.

Despite its being published in 2005 and presumably rounded out in 2004, the author has failed to consult–this is quite an extraordinary lapse–*any* of the intelligence reform books of note, from Allen “None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam to Berkowitz' Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age to Johnson Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Intelligence and America's Quest for Security to Odom “Fixing Intelligence” to Treverton Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (RAND Studies in Policy Analysis) to Zeegart Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC…and many others. As I carefully reviewed each chapter, I could only lament the fact that each chapter would have been twice as excellent had the author taken the trouble to integrate key observations from the recent literature.

I was also struck by the author's excessive reliance on just two journals, “Studies in Intelligence” (the CIA in-house publication) and “International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,” for most of his references that were not largely dated books. Seymour Hersh of “The New Yorker,” Jim Fallows of “The Atlantic Monthly,” even Vernon Loeb, the only really focused Washington Post journalist covering intelligence, these are not cited.

Consequently, the professional with over ten years experience, and the academic scholar with over ten years alternative reading, need not spend time with this book. It is lacking in nuance–for example, the brief section on imagery intelligence does not discuss the findings of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Report of December 1999, and the section on open source intelligence–while dramatically superior to most publications–is seriously in error when it labels open sources “expensive” without reference to the $50 billion a year we are spending now on secret sources that fail to satisfy. The author, speaking from a limited perspective as an analyst who has never managed a major budget, does not seem to realize that open sources cost less than 1% of the total national intelligence budget while producing 40% or more of all useful information.

A future edition of the book would benefit from a chapter on different types of threats and what that implies in terms of collection and analysis challenges, and from a focus on sub-state threats, not just other governments. This is, I say again, a superb choice for undergraduate students and the public.

See my own books, especially THE SMART NATION ACT: Public Intelligence in the Public Interest, for where we need to be going while reducing the secret budget from $60 billion a year to $12 billion a year.

2005/01/302009/12/04

Review: Denial and Deception–An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11

4 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

Excellent Useful Single-Person Account Focused on CIA,

January 30, 2005

Melissa Boyle Mahle

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

This is a very personal story by a female case officer who served overseas, did some very hard time over the course of at least fifteen years with the Directorate of Operations, and has produced a very rare book, one that provides some useful documentation of the ups and downs of clandestine operations under five Directors of Central Intelligence (this would be even more impressive if the five had not all been appointed in the space of six years).

This is, without question, one of the best books available on the intimate subject of the clandestine culture, and it offers some lovely gems and personality assessments that intelligence professionals will appreciate more than the general public. I have taken one star off for lack of detail and context, but strongly recommend the book to anyone who has served in the clandestine service and wishes to be reminded of the dark years, and to anyone who has not served in the clandestine service, and wishes to have a small glimmering of the down side of it all.

Although the book does a good job of weaving a somewhat superficial (that is to say, the highlights, not the irrelevant) history of counter-terrorism with a history of bureaucratic mis-steps by a series of DCIs, and the book does a superb job of shredding both CIA lawyers and CIA security officers and CIA's complete lack of counterintelligence, this is primarily a book about the failure of the Directorate of Operations as a tribe, not about the failure of the US Government in the global war on terrorism.

In retrospect, 1983-1985 are the years when the USG and the IC should have gone to “General Quarters,” and 1992 was the year when Congress should have risen to its role and passed the Boren-McCurdy National Security Act of 1992. No one comes out of this book looking better than Senator Dave Boren (today the President of the University of Oklahoma) and Congressman Dave McCurdy, both from Oklahoma, both in charge of the respective committees on intelligence, and both bright men with good hearts who were unable to prevail against their less enlightened colleagues.

The author does an excellent job of capturing some of the really low moments in CIA's clandestine history (such as in the 1990's when case officers were advised to take out legal liability insurance, both to protect themselves from CIA witch-hunts and to protect themselves from witch hunts mounted by others against which CIA would not be helpful to them).

The author, who got into trouble over some Palestinian relations that led to her being fired, has *not* written a bitter or a revenge book. This is an excellent and useful book, and for those who wish to study the CIA's clandestine service and its ups and downs in the 1980-2005 timeframe, this is destined to be a core reference. It captures nuances and insights that are not available to outsiders in any other source.

I do, however, want to highlight the author's brief discussion of CIA Security and the shortcomings of CIA security, the excessive reliance by CIA Security on the polygraph (which both Ames and the Cuban agents that blew two of my classmates passed), and the “room from hell” that is created by CIA Security and CIA management for those who are “suspect,” more often than not without cause. I was stunned to learn that in the post-Ames environment 400 case officers (400–that is, by some accounts, at least 10% and perhaps as much as 30% of the entire case officer corps!) failed the polygraph as roughly administered by CIA Security, and were referred to the FBI for full field investigations. I cannot articulate the depth of my disdain for any CIA manager that would allow that to happen.

There is a great deal wrong at CIA, and I give the author top marks on her discussion of CIA's over-all attitude of denial and deception across two decades; and her helpful discussion of the culture of deceit and self-service that has prevented the clandestine service from adjusting to reality and being more effective in protecting America. However, as the author is careful to point out, CIA's failure take place in the context of the failures of the FBI, of the White House, and of other governments.

This is not a book I recommend for applicants to the clandestine service, mostly because I do not want to see them dissuaded from applying. The clandestine service is the last great adventure left in the U.S. government, outside of special operations, and no matter how screwed up it might yet be, there is no greater honor and no greater life-affirming engagement, than to be a case officer in the service of your country. Miles Copeland, Without Cloak or Dagger : The truth about the new espionage– remains my single best suggested work for applicants to the clandestine service.

And also the bad:
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA
None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam
Who the Hell Are We Fighting?: The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars

One last comment: over the next ten years I want to reduce the secret intelligence budget by 80%, down to $12 billion, and redirect the savings into national education and global connectivity for the five billion poor. You can learn more by seeking out information on collective intelligence, peace intelligence, commercial intelligence, gift intelligence, cultural intelligence, and Earth Intelligence. My first book, On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World remains the standard work on why this needs to be done.

Category: 1-7 Star Rating

Review: Wastrels of Defense–How Congress Sabotages U.S. Security

Review: The Sling and the Stone–On War in the 21st Century

Review: Transformation Under Fire–Revolutionizing How America Fights

Review: The Trail of Painted Ponies, Collectors Edition

Review: Anti-Americanism

Review: Why Secret Intelligence Fails

Review: Denial and Deception–An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11