Reference (2): United Nations Intelligence in Haiti

05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, 10 Transnational Crime, 11 Society, Analysis, Augmented Reality, Ethics, Government, Historic Contributions, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), IO Multinational, IO Sense-Making, Law Enforcement, Methods & Process, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence, Real Time
Peace Operations: Seeing

MajGen Eduardo ALDUNATE Herman, Chilean Army (Ret), served as the Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Force in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in the earliest rounds, and was instrumental in both sponsoring the Joint Military Intelligence Analysis Center (JMAC) concept in its first modern field implementation, but also in evaluating most critically both the lack of useful intelligence from allies relying on secret sources and methods that did not “penetrate” to achieve gangs and neighborhoods; and the astonishing “one size fits all” propensity of the allies to treat every “threat” as one that could be addressed by force.

His contributions are helpful in understanding the more recent failure of allied relief operations in Haiti that again assumed that the use of armed bodies would address the problem, without making provision for real-world ground truth intelligence (CAB 21 Peace Jumpers Plus) or intelligence-driven harmonization of non-governmental assistance (Reverse TIPFID).

See Also:

Reference: Walter Dorn on UN Intelligence in Haiti

Reference: Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)

2003 PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future

Books: Intelligence for Peace (PKI Book Two) Finalizing

Reference: Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping

Review: International Peace Observations

Search: UN intelligence peace intelligence