Without the leadership of then Capt Patrick Tyrrell, RN OBE, these handbooks would not exist today. He started the ball rolling, BGen Jim Cox, CA, then NATO and SHAPE Deputy J-2 organized a lecture to all the flag officers in charge of military intelligence, and finally directed SACLANT, then led by General William Kernan, USA, to create these first multinational doctrinal guides. Under the direct supervision of Admiral Sir William Pewone, RN, this was done over the course of two years. Below is the white paper and lecture that started it all.
1996 Donnelly (US) Open Source Intelligence in the Information Age: Opportunities and Challenges
Academia, Historic ContributionsThe educational system is in complete disarray and producing masses of mediocrities. Occasionally, however, a student overcomes the inherent liabilities of a factory/rote learning system and excels. This paper from a Georgetown student of D.r Loren B. Thompson is worthy and was included in the Proceedings of OSS '96.
1996 Roger (AU) Open Source Strategies for Law Enforcement
Historic Contributions, Law EnforcementPaul Roger entered mid-career working the Hong Kong Organized Crime target with a special focus on the triads. He mastered the art of working with indigenous street-level sources while leveraging back office colonial processing power. In Australia he invented “time travel” and this was the most provocative element of his OSS '96 presentation, below. We have failed to study the history of organized crime such that we can stop it in its tracks as it migrates from Italy to Scotland, or Latin America to West Africa.
1996 Strassmann (US) U.S. Knowledge Assets: Choice Traget for Information Crime
Commerce, Commercial Intelligence, Government, Historic Contributions, Law EnforcementWhenever we get depressed about the inability of large organizations to “hear” we just remind ourselves that no one listens to Brent Scowcroft or Paul Strassmann either despite their stature as intellectual giants.
Strassmann is an enterprise unto himself after decades of being a CIO for Xerox, DoD, and then a reprise at NASA for Sean O'Keefe. His books are among the most vital for executives seeking to actually understand the business value of computing. Below is his presentation to OSS '96.
1996 Steele (US) Standard Briefing for US Intelligence Community
Briefings & Lectures, Collective Intelligence, GovernmentFor a time it appeared as if the US IC might actually listen, and a short standard briefing emerged that appeared to capture the essentials. Below is the outline as it appeared in the Proceedings for OSS '96.
1996 Information Peacekeeping: Innovative Policy Options
Briefings & Lectures, Communities of Practice, Peace IntelligenceThis was a very original piece of work and a major step forward in the thinking on this topic. It would lead to a publication for the U.S. Institute of Peace in 1997. It is appropriate at this juncture to credit Dr. Professor Doug Dearth, long-time course coordinator for the National Senior Intelligence Officers Course at the Joint Military Intelligence Training College, and Col Al Campen, USAF (Ret), the father of DoD C4I as a concept, and long-time publisher for the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA). Alone among thousands, these two officers recognized the value of this thinking, and pressed for finished work in the form of articles and chapters, and then books. Their three books on CYBERWAR were a gift to national policy-makers that has never been properly acknowledged.
1996 Zuckerman (US) Economic Intelligence and the National Interest
Commerce, Commercial Intelligence, Government, Historic ContributionsSomething of a renaissance man, Mort Zuckerman is active across real estate, the media (US News & World Report), the talk shows, and the Smithsonian cultural circuit. Below is his hard-hitting commentary as presented at OSS '96. Read this carefully. See especially the use of the word “manic.” The US Government is not trained, equipped, or organized to be intelligent. The consumers of intelligence do not represent the public as much as they do the recipients of the public's largesse, and do not know how to do intelligence in the public interest. The secret intelligence community refuses to create a strategic analytic model, and continues to be driven by budget, technical, and bureaucratic consideration–inputs–rather than desired outcomes.