Marcus Aurelius: Special Forces Bypass Department of State?

02 Diplomacy, 10 Security, Ethics, Government, Military, Peace Intelligence
Marcus Aurelius

Do Special Ops Forces Have Too Much Autonomy?

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

New York Times, 15 February 2012

Special Operations forces have long enjoyed an elite position in the United States military, and achieved something like folk-hero status when Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan last May. The admiration is well-deserved, but an article in Monday’s Times drew attention to the power they’ve accrued of late, and raised questions about just how much independence they should have.

Carol Giacomo, who covers foreign affairs for the editorial board, says that the Obama administration has increasingly made Special Operations Forces its military tool of choice to handle threats overseas. It plans to rely on them even more widely as it draws down conventional troops from Afghanistan.

Eventually, Special Ops Forces will make up the bulk of any residual force left in Afghanistan, hunting down militants and helping train Afghan security forces. Administration and military officials are also talking about using them in regions where they have not operated in large numbers for the past decade, including Asia (the Philippines, specifically), Africa and Latin America.

The article on the front page of Monday’s Times reported that the top Special Operations officer, Adm. William H. McRaven, is now seeking authority to move his forces faster and outside of normal Pentagon deployment channels. The proposal has not been fully explained publicly but The Times reported that it would give him more autonomy to position his forces and their equipment where intelligence and global events indicate they are most needed.

Among congressional, staff—who have not yet been briefed on the proposal—there are questions about how such new authority might affect operations. “What problem are they trying to solve?” one aide asked. A Pentagon official, who spoke on background, insisted that Admiral McRaven “is not trying to fix something that’s broken. The proposal is anticipating what the future will be for these guys and getting ahead of it.”

The Pentagon official stressed that Admiral McRaven “is not looking for complete autonomy unanswerable to anybody” and that Special Operations Forces would still be ordered on specific missions by the regional four-star commander. But one concern is that the new plan would cut out the State Department. In the past, some ambassadors in crisis zones have opposed increased deployments of Special Operations teams, and they have demanded assurances that diplomatic chiefs of missions will be fully involved in their plans and missions.

The “global war on terror” has been used to justify a lot of things. But not everything changed on Sept. 11, 2001. Civilian control of the military is one thing that did not change. I can’t imagine a circumstance under which it should.

NIGHTWATCH Plus: Syria – Iran RECAP

02 Diplomacy, 03 Economy, 05 Iran, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Justice, 10 Security, 11 Society, Corruption, Government, IO Impotency, Military

Syria a Satellite of Iran? Nah….

NIGHTWATCH: Syria, Iran, and the Regional Context

NIGHTWATCH: US Invades Iraq, Creates first Arab Shi’ite State

NIGHTWATCH: Push-Back on US Across AF PK IR SY

Mini-Me: Smoking Gun Documents on Iran From Israel Mossad?

Josh Kilbourn: Dollar Disappearing, US Sidelined on Syria / Iran

Journal: Turkey’s Emerging Grand Strategy

Journal: Turkey Emergent

Journal: The Rise and Rise Further of Turkey (Along with the Collapse of Israel and the NeoCons)

Journal: Stupid Is As Stupid Does–Israel…Again

Journal: Nuclear War Against Iran…Again

Journal: Here’s a Great Idea–Lets Piss Off Turkey

Iran–and the USA–Blew Arab Spring, Both Irreleva

Iran–and the USA–Blew Arab Spring, Both Irrelevant

Chuck Spinney: Israel, Not Iran, is Central Threat in Middle East

Chuck Spinney: Middle East New Geopolitical Map

Chuck Spinney: Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis Reinstated

Chuck Spinney: Should We Fear Nuclear Iran or Nuclear Israel?

23 Worst Tyrants/Dictators (Yes, there’s more than 23) and Oops, there’s Saudi Arabia..

Phi Beta Iota:  Does not include relevant book reviews.

US Guarantees Israel’s Oil Supply At ANY Cost

02 Diplomacy, 03 Economy, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Corruption, Government

Did You Know That By Law The US Guarantees Israel’s Oil Supply – No Matter What?

…even if it causes US a DOMESTIC SHORTAGE???

I didn’t.

Money Trends Research, 12 January 2012

Under a 1975 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) the USA guaranteed all Israel’s oil needs in the event of a crisis. This Memorandum of Understanding is quietly renewed every five years. It commits U.S. taxpayers to maintain a strategic U.S. reserve for Israel, equivalent to $3 billion in 2002 dollars. Special legislation was enacted to exempt Israel from restrictions on oil exports from the USA. Moreover, the U.S. government agreed to divert oil from the USA, even if this causes domestic shortages. The U.S. government also guaranteed delivery of oil in U.S. tankers if commercial shippers become unable or unwilling to carry oil from the USA to Israel.

I wonder which israel-first bastard signed this memorandum . . .

Read full article.

Susan Lindauer: IRAQ – The Legacy of Deception and Its Costs

02 Diplomacy, 03 Economy, 09 Justice, 10 Security, 11 Society, Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, Ethics, Government, Military
Susan Linauer

IRAQ: THE LEGACY OF DECEPTION AND ITS COSTS

Susan Lindauer, Former CIA Back Channel to Iraq at the United Nations

Most Americans are astonished to discover that right up to 9/11, the CIA was developing a “Real Politik” vision of Iraq that recognized the fast approaching collapse of U.N. Sanctions. The CIA was preparing for Peace—with a ruthless determination that the United States would capture the lion's share of spoils from Iraqi Reconstruction contracts in any post-sanctions period.

German pilots transporting medical supplies and doctors into Baghdad International Airport at the end of the Clinton Administration had blasted the myth of invincibility surrounding sanctions. To this day, those pilots are anonymous—but they changed the equation in total. Their courage honoring the Berlin Airlifts in the Cold War was quickly copied. Across Europe and the Arab world, activists began to organize humanitarian flights into Baghdad. On the Security Council, France and Russia argued strenuously that the ban on air travel had been self imposed, and the no-fly zone could not prohibit humanitarian flights.

By this time, UN sanctions had killed over 1.7 million Iraqis; wiped out literacy in a single generation; and created artificial starvation in the world's second most oil-rich nation. Iraq's world class hospitals that once rivaled London and New York had been ravaged.  Sick of the misery, the global community refused to stay silent any longer.

The CIA saw the writing on the wall. International loathing for “genocide by sanctions” had reached such a peak of outrage that there was no possibility of re-crafting the hated policy. Secretary of State Colin Powell's vision of “smart sanctions” had come too late.

The CIA was determined to control the agenda for the advantage of the United States, however. And so quietly through my back channel, we undertook a proactive, covert dialogue over exactly what concessions Iraq would offer the United States, in exchange for lifting the sanctions. As a long-time opponent of sanctions myself, I was eager to get results.

Continue reading “Susan Lindauer: IRAQ – The Legacy of Deception and Its Costs”

Marcus Aurelius: The Future of Afghanistan – and US Policy

02 Diplomacy, 03 Economy, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Terrorism, 10 Security, 11 Society, Budgets & Funding
Marcus Aurelius

The Future of Afghanistan and U.S. Foreign Policy

Foreign Affairs Snapshot, December 15, 2011

In Afghanistan, even minimally accountable democracy may soon be beyond reach. If so, some form of constrained warlord rule will be the most that's achievable.

The Three Futures for Afghanistan

Snapshot, December 16, 2011

Success in Afghanistan would not be as difficult or expensive as it was for the United States to win wars in Europe or counter the communist threat. Given the risks and the opportunities ahead, an investment in South Asia is worth making.

The Case for Continuing the Counterinsurgency Campaign In Afghanistan

Snapshot, December 16, 2011

The drawdown in Afghanistan may be afoot, but racing for the exits will leave large parts of the country — especially around Kabul in the east — infested with insurgent havens.

A Shift in the Afghanistan Strategy

Letter From, December 1, 2011

The drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan will proceed rapidly through 2014. As a consequence, the mission will change sooner than many people expect, and that means the fledgling Afghan National Army has to take charge of the fight now.

Afghanistan's Lost Decade

Snapshot, December 15, 2011

Judged by any yardstick, Afghanistan has made little progress since 2001. The United States and its allies have bred an overly centralized and ineffective government in Kabul that is hooked on foreign aid and struggles against a resurgent Taliban. Without serious reforms, the next ten years could be worse.

Washington's Colonial Conundrum in Afghanistan

Snapshot, December 15, 2011

In Afghanistan, the United States faces a choice: either establish a permanent administrative and security presence, or stand back and risk the country becoming a haven for organized criminals and terrorists. Staying forever won’t work, so Washington must accept the risks of withdrawal.

An Absence of Strategic Thinking

Snapshot, December 16, 2011

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is driven largely by domestic politics. That is a privilege of a country that is both rich and safe. But the United States has security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan that, despite its best attempts, it will not be able to ignore.

Phi Beta Iota:  Nowhere in this edition of Foreign Affairs is there any reference to an over-arching strategic model that is reality-based and focused on the public interest.  Instead, what we have here are a variety of ideological viewpoints that are totally lacking in any sort of “true cost” accounting analytics.

NIGHTWATCH: Push-Back on US Across AF PK IR SY

02 Diplomacy, 04 Education, 05 Iran, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, 11 Society, Government, IO Multinational

In summary:  US took ten years to make an issue of two Pakistani fertilizer factories that are the primary source for all Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) killing and maiming in AF.  Taliban gets what it wants in AF school programs, Iran makes progress in AF, SY and on the side with Saudi Arabia.

Continue reading “NIGHTWATCH: Push-Back on US Across AF PK IR SY”

Chuck Spinney: Break-Up of Iraq, History of Oil Invasions

02 Diplomacy, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 05 Iran, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Justice, 10 Security, 11 Society, Blog Wisdom, Counter-Oppression/Counter-Dictatorship Practices, Cultural Intelligence, IO Deeds of War
Chuck Spinney

The below report by Patrick Cockburn, one of the best reporters now covering the Middle East, describes the growing tensions in Iraq over the question of sharing its oil wealth among its constituent regions.  Although his report is important in its own right, its contents become even more ominous when they viewed in a larger historical context:

The long view of history is likely to record the greatest ‘sins' of Iraq, Iran, and Libya prompting interventions by the West have been related to the control of oil — not nuclear weapons; not any communist leanings during the Cold War; not support of worldwide terrorism.

Each country committed the unforgivable sin of being governed at one time by nationalistic leaders who believed the oil under each country belonged to that country and should be controlled by the government of that country — therefore, these leaders had to be removed:

  • Iran – Mohammed Mosaddegh, a popularly elected Prime Minister of Iran and social reformer, removed by a CIA/MI6 coup in August 1953.
  • Iraq – Saddam Hussein, a murderous neo-Stalinist dictator and social reformer (e.g., major achievements in women's rights and education), removed by military force in 2003.
  • Libya – Muammar Qaddafy, a quirky tribal dictator and social reformer (e.g., major achievements in women's rights and education) removed by military force in 2011.
Click on Image to Enlarge

One short-term common denominator in these imposed regime changes was that the nationalist leader was replaced by a more compliant government that agreed to an opening of that country's oil fields to exploitation by privately owned western oil companies.

While history does not repeat itself, memories of the past condition events in the future.  Over the longer term, perceived wrongs are not forgotten, and such interventions can provoke blowbacks, which in turn provoke counteractions that enmesh the intervener in a welter of increasingly complicated conflicts.  In the case of Iran, for example, the 1953 coup eventually backfired in 1979, when  Reza Shah Pahlavi was overthrown by the Islamic revolution led by the Ayatollah Khomeini.  Khomeini then established a regime retook control of Iran's oil fields, among other things.  But the Iranian game is not over, and the historical pattern of move and countermove is in play, with the nationalist (Islamic) regime of Iran again in the West's crosshairs, allegedly because of its nuclear ambitions and support of international terror.  Nevertheless, the glittering temptations of re-privatizing Persian oilfields are lurking in the background, attracting the private oil capitalists of the West like flies to honey.

Finish long comment from Spinney, plus reference, plus See Also.

Continue reading “Chuck Spinney: Break-Up of Iraq, History of Oil Invasions”