I will not replicate all that is at www.oss.net and to a much lesser extent, www.earth-intelligence.net, but do want to recognize a handful of extraordinary individuals by isolating their especially meritorious contributiions to the long-running debate about national intelligence reform and re-invention.
Depuis quelques années, l’Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) a créé un fort engouement au sein des institutions européen – nes comme de beaucoup d’États membres. L’OSINT, c’est le renseignement sur sources ouvertes. C’est-à-dire la capacité pour un analyste de produire du renseignement, avec toute la valeur ajoutée induite à partir d’informations ne provenant pas de sources secrètes mais de sources non classifiées. L’imagerie satellite commerciale achetée pour le Centre satellitaire de Tojerron (EU SatCen) : OSINT ! Les divers systèmes de veille utilisés par la plupart des services pour faire de la recherche d’information sur Internet : OSINT ! Les multiples experts, d’origine académique ou non, s’exprimant sur leur sphère d’intérêt de manière publique ou pouvant être interviewés : OSINT encore ! Avec l’explosion des nouvelles
Abstract: The development of open sources as a viable source of inputs for intelligence efforts has been gaining in popularity. Both national intelligence agencies and business/commercial organizations have been ramping up their open source intelligence (OSINT) efforts, attempting to add even greater value to the overall intelligence endeavor through its utilization. This progress has occurred while both intelligence practitioners and their organizations wrestle with the challenges that arise from gathering and fusing the information flowing from this channel with flows coming from better established means.
This paper will focus principally on the challenges and opportunities that OSINT entails for the business/competitive intelligence (B/CI) analyst and consider its impact on the analysis process itself. Using research gathered from studies of scores of global enterprises, it will describe the current state of the art in analysis efforts of OSINT in business/commercial enterprises, examine the planning and execution challenges organizations are experiencing associated with effectively using and fusing OSINT, and provide guidelines associated with the successful use of OSINT within a number of leading private sector enterprises.
In the context of the Police Reform Agenda, the NIM is ‘A Model for Policing' that ensures information is fully researched, developed and analysed to provide intelligence which enables senior managers to:
Unfortunately for the Obama regime, this report says, and the reason for another “tragic event” needing to happen, is that the “official story” about the Sandy Hook Massacre, like nearly all such events before it, is beginning to break down in the light of critical scrutiny and analysis.
Cambridge, Mass. — IN the last week, the American public has been reminded of the Central Intelligence Agency’s contradictory attitude toward secrecy. In a critique of “Zero Dark Thirty,” published last Thursday in The Washington Post, a former deputy director of the C.I.A., Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., defended the use of waterboarding and said that operatives used small plastic bottles, not buckets as depicted in the film, to carry out this interrogation method on three notable terrorists. On Sunday, The New York Times reported on the Justice Department’s case against a former C.I.A. officer, John C. Kiriakou, a critic of waterboarding who faces 30 months in prison for sharing the name of a covert operative with a reporter, who never used the name in print.
The contrast points to the real threat to secrecy, which comes not from the likes of Mr. Kiriakou but from the agency itself. The C.I.A. invokes secrecy to serve its interests but abandons it to burnish its image and discredit critics.
Over the years, I have interviewed many active and retired C.I.A. personnel who were not authorized to speak with me; they included heads of the agency’s clandestine service, analysts and well over 100 case officers, including station chiefs. Five former directors of central intelligence have spoken to me, mostly “on background.” Not one of these interviewees, to my knowledge, was taken to the woodshed, though our discussions invariably touched on classified territory.
Somewhere along the way, the agency that clung to “neither confirm nor deny” had morphed into one that selectively enforces its edicts on secrecy, using different standards depending on rank, message, internal politics and whim.
I am no fan of excessive secrecy, or of prosecuting whistle-blowers or leakers whose actions cannot be shown to have damaged American security. The C.I.A. needs secrecy, as do those who place their lives in the agency’s hands, but the agency cannot have it both ways.
