Biography & Memoirs – Page 10 – Public Intelligence Blog

2005/11/242009/12/04

Review: Character Is Destiny–Inspiring Stories Every Young Person Should Know and Every Adult Should Remember (Hardcover)

Righteous Good Stuff, Best with a Grain of Salt,

November 24, 2005

John McCain

I admire John McCain, his honorable service, and his character, which appears strong and constant. This book leaves me with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it is a fine selection of representative short stories, and anything which furthers enduring values, and especially the Golden Rule (do unto others as you would have them do unto you) is of urgent meaning to a country that suffers from what authors now call a “cheating culture.”

Where my mind wanders away from giving this book five stars is in the “white lie” and “lie by omission” arena. As we all now recognize that Karl Rove cheated John McCain out of the South Carolina election, and that Dick Cheney lied to Congress and the public and John McCain probably knew it, I come down wondering to myself why McCain chose to lie down for the extremist Republicans when he would not do so for his Vietnamese torturers? Why did he not declare himself an Independent, join with John Edwards, and found a new party?

Also, since Senators are too busy to write books, this book was clearly written by Mark Salter. Why not have him be the author, with John McCain writing the Foreword? Another little “white lie” that troubles me.

This is a fine book. It can and should inspire others. However, it should also inspire Senator McCain himself to look deeply, and decide if–as Eisenhower once was forced to decide–is he an American first, or a Republican first? From where I sit, he is sacrificing the Republic's character to preserve an inherently evil aspect of the extremist Republican party.

Character is easy to demonstrate against an obvious enemy. It is more difficult to display when you are betrayed by our own, the enemy is within your close circle of political alliances, and you are forced to choose between We the People, and the entrenched interests that own Congress and the White House.

Character is indeed destiny, and I for one pray that John McCain will rise above the Republican Party and focus on being an American first. John McCain and John Edwards, with a coalition cabinet declared in advance–that would be character. Anything else is business as usual.

This book comes at a good time, and its greatest value may be in giving John McCain, as prompted by Mark Salter, an opportunity to review the cards he holds and the cards he wishes to discard from his very full deck.

2005/10/232009/12/04

Review: My FBI–Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror (Hardcover)

4 Star, Biography & Memoirs

5 for Khobar, 3 for Omissions or Misdirection, 4 on Balance,

October 23, 2005

Louis J. Freeh

This book needs to be taken with a heavy dose of salts, for there are portions that are misleading. I refer particularly to the statements with respect to computing power. What the author does not tell us is that Congress *did* give the FBI a ton of money for computer upgrades, but he allowed his Assistant Directors to steal most of it for other projects, and then failed miserably in contracts management with beltway bandits who knew they would not be held accountable for failure. Freeh also avoids telling us that during most of his tenure, and up until very recently (this is less his personal problem than an inherent pathology in the FBI culture) more intelligence people QUIT every month than could be hired. The FBI environments are not well-suited for objective intelligence analysis or counter-intelligence, and certainly not for counter-terrorism either.

The books gets four stars over-all because of one exceptional aspect: the authoritative account of what we knew about the Iranian responsibility for Khobar Towers, when we knew it, when the President (Clinton) knew it, and when Lake and the others knew it. For this alone Clinton, Albright, and Lake, in particular, should be held accountable, for that specific attack on U.S. soldiers was the opening shot in the Iranian covert war against the United States. The Clinton team chose to focus on Saudi contributions to the Clinton library rather than defending America, setting the stage for equal dereliction of duty by the Bush team.

Freeh's book does earn four stars from me, and merits special recognition as a small part of the mosaic of truth that is emerging long after the 9-11 cover-ups and the complete refusal of Washington stake-holders to acknowledge any of the recommendations of either the Aspin-Brown Commission or the 9-11 Commission or the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. In the former case (Aspin-Brown) legitimate and heavy recommendations were made and ignored. In the latter cases, the recommended reforms are lipstick on the pig. Nothing has changed, we will get hit again.

I recommend that Freeh's book be read together with Stansfield Turner's very new publication, “BURN BEFORE READING,” because the two together persuade me that intelligence, like Justice, needs a Supreme Court and leaders appointed for life that are beyond the manipulative powers of the White House or the pork barrel politics of Congress. The Bush White House, like the Clinton White House, but for different reasons, chose to betray all Americans and ignore the clear and present danger of the Iranian attacks on the U.S., the Saudi support for global radicalization of Islam, and the Pakistani nuclear program. Today, Hamas and Hezbollah–creatures of the Iranians–not Al Qaeda–are the greatest threats to the destabilization of South Asia, Latin America, and portions of Africa, and despite the heroic efforts of the Special Operations community, it is not possible for them to be successful in the absence of honest adult leadership in Washington that demands a 24/7 full court press from ALL the instruments of national power.

2005/09/252009/12/04

Review: Time Present, Time Past–A Memoir (Hardcover)

4 Star, Biography & Memoirs

Thoughtful and Depressing–American Does Not Elect the Smart Ones,

September 25, 2005

Bill Bradley

Bill Bradley and John McCain may go down in history as the two smartest men who should have been President, but could not get elected. This is an extraordinarily thoughtful book, and it makes one almost cry out in despair. America has given up the idea of an informed democracy led by informed representatives of the people, and as the author concludes his book, given over all the power to two kinds of technocrats: political technocrats like Karl Rove who will do anything to get their man elected, including unethical misrepresentations against Republicans like John McCain, never mind Democrats; and corporate technocrats, who will kill off the middle class and increase the working poor in the name of corporate bottom lines that pass off the social and economic costs to the very taxpayers being disenfranchised.

The current Congressional and Executive systems do not work as intended. Congress has become insular and corrupt, and the Executive–at the political level–has become ideological and corrupt. Bill Bradley's writing makes it clear that there are solutions, but men like Bill Bradley will not get elected–nor even heard–until sufficient catastrophe befalls America and the people rise up in desperation to reclaim their heritage.

The index is helpful in looking up specific views of the author, e.g. on health care, national security, etcetera.

The New American Story
Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming

2005/05/032009/12/04

Review: Winning The Future–A 21st Century Contract with America (Hardcover)

4 Star, Biography & Memoirs, Future, Politics

Powerful Focal Point–Not Perfect But Best Available Vision,

May 3, 2005

Newt Gingrich

EDIT of 20 Dec 07: adding links.

The author provides a litmus test up front by which one can decide if they want to read the book–ten questions. I agreed with 94% of his propositions. The issues he has chosen to highlight here are not perfectly reasoned, but they are the best available and worthy of support.

In the one area where I have spent a lifetime, that of intelligence, Newt Gingrich is flawed on the one hand–suggesting that we need to triple the amount of money we spend on intelligence is certainly well-intentioned but understandably uninformed about the nuances of national intelligence–more money just makes these people worse [see my book On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World, with a Foreword by Senator Boren, and The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political–Citizen's Action Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs, & Corruption with a Foreword by Senator Roberts]–and brilliant on the other. When he writes so clearly about how we need to monitor all knowledge being created worldwide, with virtual real-time translations services, a Google for science & technology, and no publication overseas going more than ninety days without being translated into English, I am just blown away. This is what the national Open Source Agency recommended by the 9-11 Commission is supposed to do, but CIA is trying to “capture” that mission, which they have consistently screwed over since the end of World War II. Where it really matters, Newt Gingrich not only gets it, he is leading us. He also focuses on our lack of participation in global knowledge forums across all domains, and he champions nothing less than a global presence and global monitoring of all knowledge. This is *powerful* stuff.

I miss Ronald Reagan. No one now running as a Republican candidate, except Ron Paul, comes close. Somewhere in there, Newt Gingrich and Pat Buchanan have important roles to play. They have earned the right to share–but not monopolize–leadership in America.

2004/11/112009/12/04

Review: Inside CentCom–The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

3 Star, Biography & Memoirs, Congress (Failure, Reform), Empire, Sorrows, Hubris, Blowback, Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform), Iraq, Leadership, Military & Pentagon Power, War & Face of Battle

Puff Piece, Bland, Avoids Conflicting Facts & Big Picture,

November 11, 2004

Mike DeLong

On balance I found this book very disappointing. It reads more like “how I spent my summer vacation” (and like all school essays, avoids the negatives), and it also reads as if the author is either oblivious to or unaccepting of the investigative journalism reporting. I use Tora Bora as a litmus test. For this author to fail to mention that Secretary Rumsfeld authorized a Pakistani airlift that ultimately took 3,000 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters out of the Tora Bora trap, tells me all I need to know about the over-all balance in this account. It is a glossy rose-colored view more suited for Fox viewers than for any military or intelligence professional who is actually well-read across global issues literature. A great deal of important detail is left out of this 140-page double-spaced book (the additional 80 pages are largely useless appendices used to bulk up the book).

In no way does this diminish the personal accomplishments of the author. He was clearly a great general and a loyal hard-working individual within the military chain of command. The book does however trouble me in that it has a very tight narrow focus on military operations “as ordered,” and does not reflect the kind of geo-political awareness and nuanced appreciation of non-military factors–diplomatic, cultural, economic, demographic–that I want to see at the flag level. His treatment of Sudan in passing is representative: astonished delight that they are “helping” in the war on terrorism, and no sense at all of the massive genocide of the Sudanese government against its own people.

On the intelligence aspect, this book smells a bit. The general has not been close enough to CIA to know that agents commit treason, case officers handle them–calling a CIA officer an “agent” is a sure sign of ignorance about what CIA does and how it does it. He also claims, contrary to many open source reports as well as government investigations, that Guantanamo produced “reams of intelligence.” In my own experience, tactical combatants have very little to offer in the way of strategic third-country intelligence leads, and on balance, I believe that while the general may have been led to believe that Guantanamo was a gold mine, in fact it was a tar pit and a blemish on the US Armed Forces. The author continues to be a believer in the now long-discredited Chalabi-DIA-CIA views on the presence of weapons of mass destruction, to the point of still being in the past on the issue of the aluminum tubes.

There are exactly two gems in this book. The first deals with the problems we had in supporting our Special Forces in Afghanistan above the 12,000 foot level (actually, anything above 6,000 feet challenges our aviation). I ask myself in the margin, “why on earth don't we have at least one squadron of helicopters optimized for high-altitude combat operations?” The Special Air Force may claim they do, but I don't believe it. We need a high-altitude unit capable of sustained long-haul operations at the 12,000 foot level, not just a few modified Chinooks and brave Chief Warrant Officers that “made do.”

The second gem in the book is a recounted discussion on the concept of Arab honor and how US troops in Iraq should have a special liaison unit that approached the families of each person killed “inadvertently” to offer a profound and sincere apology and an “accidental killing fee.” This resonates with me, and I was disappointed to see no further discussion–evidently the general heard and remembered this good idea, but did nothing to implement it.

I have ordered a copy of the Koran and will read it, because I respect this officer's account of how much good it did him in understanding his mission and the context for the mission (aided by a regular discussion of the contents with an Islamic practitioner).

Bottom line: great officer within his scope, moderate author within his mandate, the book is at about 60% of where I would expect to be given this officer's extraordinary access.

2004/10/112009/12/04

Review: Unfit for Command–Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry

5 Star, Biography & Memoirs, Leadership, Politics

If 5% is true, it's over–wake up call for future wanna-bees,

October 11, 2004

John E. O'Neill

I agonized over this book. It is assuredly a destructive mean-spirited, politically-motivated revenge sort of book, and one is tempted to put it in the fire bin with the grossest sort of pornography, satanic writings, and other forms of trash without which we can do quite nicely (see my review of “Forbidden Knowledge”).

However, as a retired Marine, as a crusader for Dean (one of the 20% of the moderate Republicans ready to jump ship), and as a proponent for public intelligence as a means of keeping honest both the secret intelligence producers and their White House masters, I have to come down in favor of this book for two simple reasons:

1) If just 5% of this book is true, and I think at least 50% is, then Kerry–whatever his merits–took conniving and mis-representation to levels never before achieved, and is, as the book suggests, unfit for command. When I look at the genuine bleedling and pain that goes with most purple hearts (Zinni and Franks, for example), the blatant gamesmanship that this book documents, against the medal created by George Washington for the heroes of Valley Forge and other key battles, just makes my blood boil.

2) This book–and the many books dissecting Bush and Cheney–should also serve as a wake-up call for wanna-be Presidents. Hilary will never be President–the Secret Service retirees will surely publish what they know.

There are two bottom lines here: morality matters as a fundamental aspect of character and consistency; and there are no secrets anymore whenever more than one person is engaged in acts that are ultimately not in the public interest.

As we go into the election, we have more than one evil to contend with. Kerry is unfit to command; Bush picked or got hijacked by some truly dangerous neo-conservatives and inherently dishonest corporate cronies; and the Republican and Democratic party leaderships have both conspired to keep the best men (John McCain and Howard Dean) away from the candidacy, while illegally blocking the Green and Reform Presidential candidates from sharing the debate forum on television (see my reviews of three books: Running on Empty, Doing Democracy, and Gag Rule).

This book is a form of “capstone” that represents rock-bottom in American politics. It makes it clear that we are all voting for the least of all weevils (pun intended), and that this is one little weevil that should not make it to the White House. It makes me angry that this great Nation should come down to this. It makes me angry that we get the government we deserve, and the books we deserve, and this book captures all of that, America at its most base–this book *is* America, consequently every American should be ashamed that we have allowed it to get to this abyssmal point.

2004/08/292009/12/04

Review: American Soldier

4 Star, Biography & Memoirs, Military & Pentagon Power, War & Face of Battle

Earnest Officer Covers Bush, Rose-Colored Glasses, Useful,

August 29, 2004

General Tommy Franks

Edit 20 Dec 07 to add links.

Tellingly, the book opens with Sun Tzu on the importance of the art of war to the state, and fails to reflect, at any point in the book, the more vital Sun Tzu observation that “the acme of skill is to defeat the enemy without fighting.”

The author is justifiably proud of being able to take down Iraq with half the troops and half the armor and artillery needed in Gulf I. If you read this book in conjunction with Stephen Flynn's book on “America the Vulnerable,” where he cries out for 16,000 more Customs inspectors, you can see US national security is “inside out & upside down”–in the 21st Century we need half the uniformed military troops and half the military “hard power” acquisition, but we have failed to understand that we need ten times the manpower and ten times the acquisition within homeland security–we are still lying to America about this contradiction, one reason why I chose to tie these two books together with complementary reviews–Flynn is nothing short of brilliant as a counterpart to Franks.

Among the little gems in this book:

Franks got purple hearts in Viet-Nam only for the wounds that sent him to the hospital–minor wounds not requiring evacuation were ignored. What a contrast with Kerry! Page 114.

In the 1970's, when the information revolution was just started, artillery units did not have their own communications. Franks rightly earned a reputation as an innovator by buying CB radios such that his artillery pieces moved as if they could read the mind of the operators they were supporting. Today, not only has the information revolution largely passed by the intelligence community, but the “rest of government” including state and local law enforcement, and private sector partners vital to national security, are in precisely the same position, in the year 2004, as was military artillery 30 years ago. Page 125.

When General Franks was selected in the early 1990's to lead the creation of the 21st Century force, I find it absolutely riveting and fundamental that intelligence was not one of the domains or building blocks of the Army (one reason why the Stryker fraud was so easily perpetuated on Congress and the public). Page 173.

As of 2002-2003, Service “parochialism”, Service chiefs and staffs out only for themselves and their service, and completely unwilling to work jointly or even worse, procure systems and capabilities that worked jointly, remained the single largest cancer within DoD. Page 207, page 288, and passim.

Bin Laden's attack on the Cole “had the force of a cruise missile.” Page 220. See my review of Paul Williams, “Osama's Revenge”, where the bottom line is that individuals now have the power to deliver both nuclear and cruise missile effects inside of America, but our national security investments and priorities remain “upside down” and fail to protect us from an “inside out” perspective.

Both defense department and U.S. intelligence community counterintelligence and intelligence relevant to force protection failed miserably in the closing years of the 20th century. We were blind in part because we relied on Yemen to tell us about threats, rather than being able to penetrate groups in Yemen directly–hence the “surprise” of the USS Cole attack being so successful and so unconventional. Page 224.

Throughout the book there are references to capabilities that avoid discussing time lag issues–cruise missiles that take 2-6 hours to get to the target, B-2 bombers that take 40 hours to get to the target, all easily detectible. In my view, General Franks paints an overly positive picture of our “hard” capabilities, in part because he glosses over or ignores time-space-detection-avoidance issues that are vital. Pages 245, 259, and passim. This also applies to the movement of Special Operations Forces into denied areas. Page 296.

Rumsfeld evidently believed that invading Afghanistan would “finish” Bin Laden. How wrong was he? Page 285.

Franks and the U.S. leadership evidently believe that Special Operations Forces are “hidden” at K-2 Air Base in Uzbekistan. I personally think they will be rolled over and massacred at some point in the near term (2-4 years). Page 286.

Franks is brilliant in his creation of a Lines of Operations versus Target Slices conceptualization, this is the single best page in the book, a real keeper. Page 339, illustrated 340.

Franks fell for the myth that money will buy loyalty and action among the tribes of both Afghanistan and Iraq, a completely erroneous view. Page 332. He also fails to mention that Rumsfeld allowed 3,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda to be evacuated from the Tora Bora trap by Pakistan, with Rumsfeld's active permission (out of naiveté). Page 377.

Troubling to me is Franks' blindness to the cost, both in dollars and in opportunity cost (time, space, pol-econ, etc.) of using very expensive and very ineffective hardware to achieve marginal results. His approach to warfare is almost mechanical in nature, eager to send waves of aircraft against Stone Age tribal positions, without regard to cost and effect. Pages 379-381.

Regional commanders-in-chief need to manage U.S. Intelligence Collection requirements, priorities, and capabilities. This one hit me with “wow” force. I actually agree, provided that the regional CINCs become inter-agency in nature. We are at war forever, and placing clandestine and technical collection as well as open source intelligence collection assets under CINC operational control makes sense to me, especially if DoD finally steps up to the plate and creates an intelligence component commander [this does NOT undermine the need to move NRO, NSA, and NGA out of DoD and into the DCI's management authority.] Page 234. Later on he alludes to the need for CINC budgets, and I agree–we need to change Title 10, and strike a better balance between acquisition and budget authority for type and regional commanders. Page 397.

My summary: Intelligence failed, heavy metal military did what it was asked to do under solid operational leadership, we are still losing strategically and in the long-term.

Better books:
The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose
Battle Ready
The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)