NIGHTWATCH: Focus on Pakistan’s 20-Year Bluff

08 Wild Cards
0Shares

Note to analysts:  Analysts new to this problem need to take this aboard. Pakistani and Indian officers obey or they get cashiered, if not executed. The ability of the Pakistani security authorities to round up and arrest more than half the membership of the Quetta Shura, fled to Karachi, indicates the Shura members always were under positive surveillance and tracking by Pakistani intelligence.

The thesis that rogue officers supported the Afghan Taliban against orders is jejune and ludicrous! The Pakistan and Indian Armies do not promote individual judgment; they are not like the US or NATO armies.

Nightwatch and old hands never credited the argument that rogues in the Pakistani security services were helping the militants – Taliban or al Qaida. That is not how the Pakistan Army works.

The strategic direction in Islamabad has changed and now the Pakistani intelligence and security services are showing they knew where these thugs were all along and could have rounded them up at any time, had they received orders to do so.

Phi Beta Iota: What is truly extraordinary about the above is the reality that no one in the US intelligence community recognized or was willing to speculate that the US policymakers were being “played” by Pakistan.  Evidently we do not do offensive countersurveillance on the Pakistani ISI, and NSA evidently does not have a grip on their internal communications in languages we cannot speak, hence Pakistani ISI and military were able to bluff the US for two decades.

Original NitchWatch Report Below the Fold

Continue reading “NIGHTWATCH: Focus on Pakistan's 20-Year Bluff”

Journal: Grand Strategy, Gaza In, Israel Out

Uncategorized
0Shares
Chuck Spinney

Linked below is a very long, but I believe critically important analysis of the blowback effects of Israel’s bloody invasion of Gaza, which began in Dec 2008 and ended days before President Obama took office.  The author, Norman Finkelstein, is the son of Holocaust survivors, and the bête noire of the worldwide Zionist establishment, especially in the United States and Israel.  He has written widely on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the contemporary politics of the Holocaust.

“Blowback” is a term coined by historian Chalmers Johnson to describe the unintended and counterproductive grand-strategic effects of aggressive strategies.  Grand strategy can be thought of as the way in which your strategic actions:

  • Pump up your own resolve and increase your country’s internal political cohesion
  • Drain away your opponent’s resolve and weaken his political cohesion
  • Reinforce commitments of your allies to your cause and and make them more empathetic to your success
  • Attract the uncommitted to your cause and make them empathetic to your success
  • Isolate your adversary and induce his allies to stop supporting him
  • End conflicts on terms on favorable terms that do not sow the seeds of future conflicts

Continue reading “Journal: Grand Strategy, Gaza In, Israel Out”

Worth A Look: Posted from the Past Including Jack Davis on Leadership in Intelligence Analysis

Analysis, Reform
0Shares

1993 War and Peace in the Age of Information–Superintendent’s Guest Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

1994 ACCESS: The Theory and Practice of Competitor Intelligence (Journal of the Association for Global Strategic Information, July 1994)

1994 Private Enterprise Intelligence: It’s Potential Contribution to National Security (Canada, 29 October 1994)

1995 Open Sources and the Virtual Intelligence Community (with MC&G Emphasis)

1995 The Global Information Explosion: A Threat to National Security? (National Defense University, 16 May 1995)

1997 VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution Through Information Peacekeeping (Author’s Final, 1 April 1997)

1998 Open Source Intelligence Overview (Australia)

1999 Relevant Information and All-Source Analysis: The Emerging Revolution

1999 Virtual Intelligence: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution through Information Peacekeeping (Journal of Conflict Resolution, Spring 1999)

2002  Reference: Jack Davis Leadership in Intelligence Analysis (August 2002)

Sherman Kent Occasional Papers by Jack Davis

Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning

Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process

Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities

Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis

Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?

Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence

Sherman Kent’s Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations

Handbook: Human Terrain Team Handbook (10/2008)

HUMINT, Military, Stabilization & Reconstruction
0Shares
Document Online
Cryptome on HTT

Phi Beta Iota: Although we assume there must be some isolated success stories, we have not heard any.  The Human Terrain Team (HTT) is nothing more than Civil Affairs done properly, and from all accounts, from the most vicious to direct observation, HTT is a badly managed, badly conceptualized, badly staffed program that is a cancer on the good name of Civil Affairs.  The program should be terminated at the same time that the Army Civil Affairs Brigade is made OpCon to a new Stabilization & Reconstruction (S&R) Field Activity with a brigadier general in command and a ban on all lawyers and security officers–both S&R and Civil Affairs should be honest enterprises in which those in touch with the public do not need clearances.

MILNET Headlines, 3 March 2010

Uncategorized
0Shares

Animals at War:  Bomb Dog Suffers from Stress

Bad Business:  Microsoft CEO: Google Merits Regulatory Scrutiny

Bad Government I:  Politically Correct Killing?

Bad Government II:  Obama Now Selling Judgeships for Health Care Votes

Bad Government III:  White House Land Grab

Bad Government IV:  How Reconciliation Works in Congress

Bad Judgment:  JFK tower allowed a kid to direct air traffic

Bad Law I:  Twelve Years under the DMCA

Bad Law II: Why DRM doesn’t work

Counter-Terrorism-Russia: Russia’s Terror-Fighting Trains Back on the Rails

Cyber-Security:  DoD Requires Hacker Certification

Cyber-Security:  Nation's cybersecurity suffers from a lack of information sharing

Global Inter-Dependence:  Monitoring Federal Networks, Global Supply Chain

U.S. Military Online:  Inside the Ring: Hacker Training

U.S. Military Online: ‘America’s Army’ Blurs Virtual War, Militainment

Review: Improving CIA Analytic Performance–Four Papers by Jack Davis

3 Star, Decision-Making & Decision-Support, Intelligence (Government/Secret)
0Shares
Amazon Page
3.0 out of 5 stars Misappropriated without Attrribution–Free Online, March 4, 2010

One Star for lack of ethics on the part of the publisher. Beyond five stars for content, free online as with all of Jack Davis's stuff.  Upgraded to 3 stars for proper pricing (after Amazon's cut, publisher only makes roughly 3 dollars per book, which is totally fair).

This product was misappropriated from Jack Davis, dean of the intelligence analysis scholar-practitioners. While materials created within the US Government by US Government employees are generally not copyrighted because the taxpayer funded their creation, they are a) available free online; and b) generally considered off-limits to sleaze-bag publishers that troll for stuff (this happens to all of us, in my case with my monographs for the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), all free online).

It's nice that Jack's work is respected and made available on Amazon, a truly global service.

It is very troubling that Jack Davis, who just asked me to find out who did this, has not been contacted by the publisher and offered both courtesy copies of his own work, and some modest recognition.

Continue reading “Review: Improving CIA Analytic Performance–Four Papers by Jack Davis”