A very early and largely academic-historical-philosophical discussion of the changing nature of the relationships between humans, computers, and war. Written prior to the Silicon Valley explosion, and thus still very concerned about the military dominance of information technology. A good alternative overview.
This is an even-tempered book, combining a good primer of the nature of the intelligence process with some analytically-oriented thoughts on needed improvements. Their appendix listing things that can go wrong at each step of the intelligence cycle is of lasting value, as is their glossary. Their forthcoming book, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age (Yale, April 2000) will assuredly be a major contribution.
Strategic, Cultural Intelligence, Knowledge Policy,
April 7, 2000
Adda B. Bozeman
While reading this book, every intelligence professional should feel like a bashful second-grader shuffling their feet while being kindly reprimanded by their teacher. This book, a collection of essays from the 1980's, is the only one I have ever found that truly grasps the strategic long-term importance of intelligence in the context of culture and general knowledge. The heart of the book is on page 177: “(There is a need) to recognize that just as the essence of knowledge is not as split up into academic disciplines as it is in our academic universe, so can intelligence not be set apart from statecraft and society, or subdivided into elements…such as analysis and estimates, counterintelligence, clandestine collection, covert action, and so forth. Rather, and as suggested earlier in this essay, intelligence is a scheme of things entire. And since it permeates thought and life throughout society, Western scholars must understand all aspects of a state's culture before they can assess statecraft and intelligence.” The 25-page introduction, at least, should be read by every intelligence professional.
One of Two Required Intelligence Books for ANYONE,
April 7, 2000
Miles Copeland
This is one of my two required readings for any aspiring intelligence officer or student of intelligence (the other one is by Allen Dulles, “The Craft of Intelligence.” An absolute gem across the board, providing insights into both capabilities and culture. This is really the only down-to-earth book that combines “a day in the life of a spy” with a serious practical discussion of just how and why spies do what they do. It is fun and easy to read, and offers some real world annecdotes that do not violate security but offer instead glimpses of the joys, the insanities, and the terror (10% of the time) or boredom (90% of the time–such as spending hours if not days waiting for a senstive asset to show up) that characterize the life of a spy.
To his credit, Copeland understood very early on that the spy world was missing out on what is known today as Open Source Intelligence (see my own book, “The New Craft of Intelligence” or view the 30,000 free pages at OSS.Net). The description on pages 41-42 (of the original hard-cover version) of how “Mother” concocted an entire network and got the head of Secret Intelligence to agree its production was worth $100,000 a year (big money in 1946), only to reveal that his source was actually five issues of The New York Times “demonstrated not only the naiveté of our nation's only existing group of espionage specialists but the value of ordinary New York Times reporting on matters regarded as being of high-priority intelligence interest.” Nothing has changed in 50 years. We still need our spies, but they need to be a bit more serious, a bit less white, a lot older, and much more focused. We lack–we need–men of the caliber of Dulles and Copeland today.
One of two required readings on intelligence for anyone,
April 7, 2000
Allen Welsh Dulles
This is the other required reading. This gem sits on my desk with my dictionary of difficult words and my synonym dictionary. We still do not have an equal to this book. Since Dulles testified to Congress that 80% of the raw material for finished intelligence came from public sources including diplomatic reporting, this book provides an interesting benchmark for understanding the rather pathological impact of technical collection on the larger process of all-source collection and analysis.
Loch is the dean of the scholars competent to address intelligence matters, and his experience as a member of the professional staff of both the Church Committee in the 1970's and the Aspin/Brown Commission in the 1990's uniquely qualify him to discuss and evaluate U.S. intelligence. His chapters on the ethics of covert operations and on intelligence accountability set a standard for this aspect of the discussion. This is the only book I have seen that objectively and methodically discusses intelligence success and failures in relation to the Soviet Union, with a superb three-page listing decade by decade being provided on pages 180-182.
This is an excellent elementary text for the average college student. Over-all it is strong on issues of analysis, policy, and oversight, and weak on collection, covert action, and counterintelligence. The chapter on collection has a useful figure comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the five collection disciplines, and but does not get into the detail that this aspect of the intelligence community-80% of the annual expense-merits.