Home > Asia > Afghanistan An Afghan construction worker places mud on a wall for a new building in a school in Taloqan, east of Kundus, April 23, 2009. (Kai Pfaffenbach/Reuters)
Obama's troop surge fails to address how to improve delivery of aid.
A dramatic shortage of program officers as well as auditors and investigators and poor security conditions on the ground have all conspired, the 128-page report concludes, to “significantly impair” the objectives of USAID’s mission, which is to provide economic development and humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan and around the world.
The failure of USAID to effectively monitor the development projects threatens to undermine the U.S. military’s new counterinsurgency strategy and troop surge, which is built upon the effective delivery of aid in the struggle against the Taliban for hearts and minds.
INTELLIGENCE is DECISION-SUPPORT. The process of intelligence is separate from whether the sources and methods are secret or not. There is nothing secret, unethical, or illegal about the process of intelligence as decision-support.
Original “Class Before One” (2010 Class 001 in Planning)
The author has produced a useful but slightly incomplete merger of information on the past decade of efforts to develop UN intelligence (decision-support) capabilities, within the prism of an imposed social science investigation construct which dilutes the practical value.
Kudos should be given to the UN’s Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) for producing what is perhaps the most comprehensive and frank assessments to date of the international community’s implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 and the measures adopted to combat international terrorism. Their report was presented to the Security Council by CTED Executive Director Mike Smith on December 16th and provides detailed information on what is actually being done, on the vulnerabilities, and on the technical assistance required. It provides a thematic overview of the laws and actions taken in the areas of enforcement, border control, countering the financing of terrorism, and international cooperation as well as a region by region assessment. Human rights considerations are also addressed. The report should be read closely.
How counterinsurgents manipulate insurgents’ disadvantage in their own favor would ultimately prove crucial. The task requires vision, will and capacity, but so far the state seems to lack effective strategy on this tactical front. The Taliban insurgency in the tribal areas has regional dimensions as well, with regional and global actors trying to secure their own interests in the area. But ignoring Pakistan’s concerns and regional interests would frustrate the counterinsurgency effort. Pakistan cannot snuff out the insurgency alone.
The study finds that British-Pakistanis are almost all Muslims and have a mainly rural background. Their first generation in Britain was very conservative and did not let the next generation assimilate and become part of British society. There is lack of political, social and economic awareness among British-Pakistanis, many of whom are still confused and divided, not only physically but mentally as well, between their adopted and native countries. Moreover, there are some radical elements amongst this population also. The socio-cultural and religious identities of the British-Pakistani community may become more crucial in their potential to evolve parallel closed societies within the mainstream host society if not brought into the mainstream immediately
First UN Joint Mission Analyses Centre Course (UNJMAC) ever held
The last seven days of October have been groundbreaking and interesting at Nodefic. A new course has been born and introduced to life.
Text: Maj Erik Haugstad
Tasked by the UN, and in close cooperation with other NORDCAPS countries, a pilot course for personnel going to serve in JMACs around the world has been conducted at Nodefic. Being a pilot course for the UN, this is of course the first time ever a course like this has been held in the world.
Knowing as much as possible about the area and environment, in which we are participating in a peace support operation, is of vital importance for the contribution of the International Society to succeed. This has been common knowledge throughout times. A slight rewrite of Sun Tzu’s “Know your enemy”, will lead us to the very same conclusion. For a long time, also reflected in the philosophy of integrated missions, the UN has recognized that the need for coordination and sharing of information is essential for operational efficiency and mission accomplishment. In the UN Missions we have for some time seen the gradual introduction and testing of the JMAC, Joint Mission Analyses Centre, concept.
Our UN JMAC Course, scheduled for November 3 to 14, has been postponed as requested by UN DPKO.
The course will instead be conducted from 9-20 March 2009 at our peacekeeping training centre in Oslo.
We will come back with invites and more information in due time.
