The truth at any cost lowers all other costs — curated by former US spy Robert David Steele.
Maurice Botbol was among the first professional observers to notice the conflict between the secret intelligence world's view of open sources as “Open Sores,” and the competing view of open sources as both complementary and often sufficient. Below is his presentation to OSS '97. His most trenchant observations are regretably not included in the document. Click on his photo to reach his publishing company.
Temporarily two documents, move past Dick Kerr who has his own page, this document is being split up and will be properly mounted in the very near future.
Dick Kerr, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Intelligence (DDI), was among hte most personable and approachable intelligence leaders in retirement. Like Jim Schlesinger, who nailed it in the 1970's, he understood the problems, but “The Borg” has a life of its own absent a forced paradigm shift.
Whenever we get depressed about the inability of large organizations to “hear” we just remind ourselves that no one listens to Brent Scowcroft or Paul Strassmann either despite their stature as intellectual giants.
Strassmann is an enterprise unto himself after decades of being a CIO for Xerox, DoD, and then a reprise at NASA for Sean O'Keefe. His books are among the most vital for executives seeking to actually understand the business value of computing. Below is his presentation to OSS '96.
For a time it appeared as if the US IC might actually listen, and a short standard briefing emerged that appeared to capture the essentials. Below is the outline as it appeared in the Proceedings for OSS '96.
Something of a renaissance man, Mort Zuckerman is active across real estate, the media (US News & World Report), the talk shows, and the Smithsonian cultural circuit. Below is his hard-hitting commentary as presented at OSS '96. Read this carefully. See especially the use of the word “manic.” The US Government is not trained, equipped, or organized to be intelligent. The consumers of intelligence do not represent the public as much as they do the recipients of the public's largesse, and do not know how to do intelligence in the public interest. The secret intelligence community refuses to create a strategic analytic model, and continues to be driven by budget, technical, and bureaucratic consideration–inputs–rather than desired outcomes.
The Brown Commission and the Future of Intelligence
A Roundtable Discussion
On 1 March 1996, the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (the Brown Commission) issued its report to the President and to Congress. On 26 March, Studies in Intelligence board members Brian Latell, Robert Herd, John Wiant, and Bill Nolte met at the Commission's offices in the New Executive Office Building with Ann Z. Caracristi, a member of the Commission; Staff Director L. Britt Snider; and staff members Douglas Horner, Brendan Melley, Kevin Scheid, and William Kvetkas. What follows is an edited transcript of the discussion with them, reviewed in advance by the participants.
Continue reading “Reference (1996): The Brown Commission and the Future of Intelligence”
