Fixed 23 July 2013
The below reference and article was drafted by Robert Steele with some editorial assistance from Mark Lowenthal, who was briefly an employee of OSS before jumping to SRA International. The article draws on the experience of the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC) that was established by General Al Gray, USMC, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, largely to support expeditionary acquisition. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are all “big system” services, and while the Army has begun to learn how to “eat the tail” and reduce the logistics footprint (as well as the ground convey exposure and expense), the reality is that DoD acquisition remains totally hosed today, and 20,000 new people (as planned by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) are not going to be effecive for three reasons:
1. DoD makes policy without regard to strategy or intelligence
2. DoD acquires systems without regard to strategy, lacking a strategic analytic model
3. DoD is long over-due for massive changes to Title 109 such that we have four proponents for Big War, Small War, Peace War, and Homeland Defense (each of the Services could be redirected appropriately) but–big but–the regional combatant commanders become BOTH the hubs for Whole of Government inter-agency planning, programming, and budgeting AND the primary proponents for what is needed in their theaters.
Should it not be crystal clear, the “butts in seats” approach in which contractors cost the taxpayer 250% of their salary is not sanctioned by this early article on how to fix intelligence support to acquisition. Small cells, a global grid of multinational sharing and sense-making partners, and the ability to “know who knows,” to apply strategic analytic tradecraft, and to produce “just enough, just in time, just right” Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) that either stands on its own or radically enhances all-source intelligence production, are the way to go. No one now providing OSINT under OMB Code M320 understaqnds how to do that.
Without the leadership of then Capt Patrick Tyrrell, RN OBE, these handbooks would not exist today. He started the ball rolling, BGen Jim Cox, CA, then NATO and SHAPE Deputy J-2 organized a lecture to all the flag officers in charge of military intelligence, and finally directed SACLANT, then led by General William Kernan, USA, to create these first multinational doctrinal guides. Under the direct supervision of Admiral Sir William Pewone, RN, this was done over the course of two years. Below is the white paper and lecture that started it all.
Mats Bjore, along with Arno Reuser, Steve Edwards, Joe Markowitz, is one of a tiny handful of “originals” who have striven to create the discipline of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) that has now morphed into M4IS2 (Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing and Sense-Making). Collective Intelligence, Cognitive Science, and Civil Affairs as well as Civil Society are all congregating outside of government “control.”
In 1991 the Marine Corps sought to change the National Intelligence Topics (NIT) away from their heavy emphasis on the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, and toward the emerging threats in the Third World, including non-state actors. The effort died in staffing. This is the sole surviving documentation from that effort.
In DIA OSINT is treated as an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), distributing money to the standard suspects without any form of strategic guidance, operational harmonization, or tactical effect. DIA does not “do” OSINT because neither the DIA leadership nor the so-called leadership of the intelligence directorate at DIA, where the Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office (DIOSPO) is left in deserved obscurity (five “managers” in three years is worse than a joke, it is reprehensible) have the foggiest notion of OSINT as an integrated discipline in its own right. The newly-selected incumbent is under protest (to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) since DoD and DIA have demonstrated they lack integrity in hiring on process or merit to this specific position), and Congressional investigations at the Appropriations Committee level are being inspired. In USDI OSINT is treated as a data-mining technical function, and document exploitation (which requires distributed human translation in 183 languages) is explicitly excluded at the same time that DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is handicapped by individuals who have no idea what the fifteen slices of HUMINT–much less what comprises effective clandestine, covert, defensive, and offensive counterintelligence–and have absolutely no inclination to manage them as a coherent whole. Defense intelligence has followed “central” intelligence over the cliff.