Pakistan:Update. A local court ordered Musharraf remanded in custody for 14 days, pending further proceedings in the murder case connected with the Red Mosque.
Comment: At the time the remand order was made, the Islamabad High Court rejected a petition for Musharraf's name to be added to the Exit Control List, which would prevent him from leaving the country. That is a strong indicator that the murder charges will be dropped because the government wants Musharraf to return to self-imposed exile. He will not stand trial, but he must leave Pakistan. He remains under house arrest in his villa which the courts designated a temporary sub-jail.
Since 9/11, two consecutive U.S. administrations have labored mightily to help Afghanistan create a state inhospitable to terrorist organizations with transnational aspirations and capabilities. The goal has been clear enough, but its attainment has proved vexing. Officials have struggled to define the necessary attributes of a stable post-Taliban Afghan state and to agree on the best means for achieving them. This is not surprising. The U.S. intervention required improvisation in a distant, mountainous land with de jure, but not de facto, sovereignty; a traumatized and divided population; and staggering political, economic, and social problems. Achieving even minimal strategic objectives in such a context was never going to be quick, easy, or cheap.
Eikenberry, Obama, and General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan, March 2010. (Pete Souza / White House)
Of the various strategies that the United States has employed in Afghanistan over the past dozen years, the 2009 troop surge was by far the most ambitious and expensive. Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was at the heart of the Afghan surge. Rediscovered by the U.S. military during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterinsurgency was updated and codified in 2006 in Field Manual 3-24, jointly published by the U.S. Army and the Marines. The revised doctrine placed high confidence in the infallibility of military leadership at all levels of engagement (from privates to generals) with the indigenous population throughout the conflict zone. Military doctrine provides guidelines that inform how armed forces contribute to campaigns, operations, and battles. Contingent on context, military doctrine is meant to be suggestive, not prescriptive.
Broadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation government able to deliver essential human services. Field Manual 3-24 also makes clear the extensive length and expense of COIN campaigns: “Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources.”
The apparent validation of this doctrine during the 2007 troop surge in Iraq increased its standing. When the Obama administration conducted a comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review in 2009, some military leaders, reinforced by some civilian analysts in influential think tanks, confidently pointed to Field Manual 3-24 as the authoritative playbook for success. When the president ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan at the end of that year, the military was successful in ensuring that the major tenets of COIN doctrine were also incorporated into the revised operational plan. The stated aim was to secure the Afghan people by employing the method of “clear, hold, and build” — in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy. With persistent outside efforts, advocates of the COIN doctrine asserted, the capacity of the Afghan government would steadily grow, the levels of U.S. and international assistance would decline, and the insurgency would eventually be defeated.
Blindly following COIN doctrine led the U.S. military to fixate on defeating the insurgency while giving short shrift to Afghan politics.
A recent move by social media monitoring firm DataSift has Business2Community contemplating “The Stratification of Social Media Listening.” DataSift is now working with Tumblr to distribute that site’s content to subscribers, and writer Mike Moran takes the occasion to discuss ways social media monitoring has changed since he began working in the field five years ago. At that time, he says, it was all about crisis management, and SalesForce’s Radian6 was a central player. Moran writes:
“Salesforce’s purchase of Radian6 is still the biggest deal ever in this business. But the Radian6 purchase was the last gasp of the fully integrated software stacks in social listening. Top to bottom, you bought it all from one vendor. Radian6 crawled the blogs, screen-scraped the message boards, contracted with Twitter for the firehose. Radian6 analyzed the data. Radian6 presented the dashboard of streaming messages and the dashboard that aggregated the metrics.”
Lately though, Moran tells us, media monitoring has been moving away from the centralized to the stratified. Companies now have the option of straying from their Radian6 (or similar) structure to embrace other tools, like Tableau for their analytics dashboard, or Clarabridge or Lexalytics for text analytics. He expounds:
“Which brings us to today’s DataSift-Tumblr announcement. Why should you care? Because this stratification of social media listening is truly allowing the best solutions to be brought together out of component parts. Cloud computing allows us to quickly and cheaply cobble together these pieces into what our clients really need.”
Moran goes on to note that this departure from the integrated stack opens a myriad of possible advantages. Off-the-shelf solutions are no longer enough to stay competitive, he insists; to excel in social media monitoring now calls for a customized approach. That sounds like a lot of work to me. Organizations should not overlook the cost of added hours when considering their options.
I've waited two days with this story waiting to see if it was picked up. It was not. Think about what President Carter is saying, and ask yourself: Why didn't this story get coverage.
Phi Beta Iota: The actual unemployment rate in the USA is 22.4%. Only 47% of adults have a full time job, all others are either juggling two or more part time jobs without benefits, or unemployed. If the government cannot tell the truth about anything, we can hardly expect it to actually work in the public interest.
Peace Talks and Security. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Thursday said his government is sincere about holding peace talks with the Taliban. He made the statement in response to the interview by rebel chief Hakimullah Mehsud who complained no serious steps had been taken to open a dialogue. Speaking after a security meeting in Peshawar, Sharif said progress was being made on the issue of opening negotiations.” Sharif provided no details, however.
Pakistan:Musharraf update. Pervez Musharraf was arrested one day after having been granted bail.
“We have put General Musharraf under house arrest in a case involving a military operation on an Islamabad mosque,” Muhammad Rizwan, a senior official of the Islamabad police told reporters. “We will present him before a court on Friday.”
I've been grappling with a simple question. Is the use of national interest, as the basis of security and foreign policy, a dumb idea in the present context?
National interest is a construct from the realism school of policy. Realism is simply a case by case analysis of the costs and benefits of actions relative to the interests of the state, without reference to ideology or ideals (capitalism, communism, religion, etc.).
Realism assumes that the world is an anarchic, in a Hobbsian dog eat dog way, and that nation-states need to be selfish in order to survive.
Of course, things have changed since that formulation was developed. In particular, we're now living in a world that is:
