I recently secured from those who study conflict in Europe several recommendations for core readings, and this book was in their top three, along with Monty Marshall's “Third World War” and the edited work, “Human Security and The New Diplomacy.” All three are excellent.This book is most helpful in that it actually studies conflicts in the Third World, and ends up with documented conclusions or in some cases speculations about:
1) why subjective factors including culture sometimes allow the defeat of forces whose numbers, lethality, and wealth would normally be expected to be invincible;
2) how “absorbtion” through training and leadership are at least as important if not more important than the actual provision of arms;
3) how seapower and airpower play out differently in the Third World than in conventional battlegrounds;
4) what lessons might be drawn from the Third World regarding the design and acquisition of weapons technology, both in the offense and in the defense;
5) the critical importance of economic, social, and cultural factors in determining the outcomes of otherwise high-tech wars;
6) the relative absence of decisive victories, making military power relatively meaningless unless it is accompanied by “peace in force” and the follow-on civil affairs, law enforcement, agricultural and other infrastructure, investments; and
7) “pain thresholds” as a critical factor.
While well foot-noted, the book lacks a bibliography and the index is average to below average–not only lacking substance but being hard to read with 8 point font size. These are shortcomings that should be corrected in the next edition. The book is recommended, and should be standard reading in all conflict courses.
Balanced Deep Trustworthy View of Policy-Intelligence Gaps,
February 8, 2002
George W. Allen
This book is destined to be a classic. There is no other person who spent over 17 years focused on intelligence about Viet-Nam, and very rare is the person who can say they have spent over 50 years in continuous intelligence appointments, 20 of them after retirement. It is a personal story that I consider to be balanced, deep, and trustworthy. While it has gaps, these are easily addressed by reading, at least on the intelligence side, such books at Bruce Jones' “War Without Windows”, Orrin DeForest's “SLOW BURN”, Douglas Valentine's “The Phoenix Program”, Jim Witz's “The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War”, Tom Mangold & John Penycate's “The Tunnels of Chu Chi”, and the Viet-Nam portions of Jim Bamford's “Body of Secrets.”I mention these books in part to emphasize that George Allen has produced a book that will stand the test of time and should be regarded as an exceptional historical, policy, intelligence, and public administration case study. It is truly humbling and sobering to read such a calm, complete, and broad treatment of the history of both American intelligence in relation to Viet-Nam, and the consistent manner in which policy-makers refused to listen to accurate intelligence estimates, while their Generals and Ambassadors steadfastly “cooked the books.” The manipulation of truth from the Saigon end, and the refusal to listen to truth on the Washington end, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, Vietnamese, Loatian, Cambodian, and American, as well as allied nationalities.
This book is gripping. I could not put it down. It is one of the most serious personal accounts I have ever read where the vivid realities of intelligence, ignorance, and policy come together. The author excells at painting the details in context, and his many specific portraits of key individuals and situations are superior.
This book is relevant to today's war on terrorism. Many of the same issues prevail–rather than enumerate them, I will give this book my very highest mark, and simply say that you cannot understand intelligence, or the intelligence-policy relationship, without having absorbed all this author has to say.
He's hit it out of the park. Every voter who wonders what it will take to hold politicians accountable for “due diligence” in decision-making, needs to read this book.
Although their references lean toward “the usual suspects” among the beltway bubbas, and none of the authors demonstrate real access to the various hacker groups with deeper insights than any government bureaucrat will ever achieve, this is without question one of the best sets of articles, put together by two people I view as being the most capable in this area of inquiry, and therefore I recommend it very strongly as a starting point.As with most publications by RAND it lacks an index, for which I deduct one star. The value of an index does not appear to be appreciated by those who publish these taxpayer-funded collections, and I continually lament the myopia that prevents the publishers from making such a useful collection even more valuable by taking the time to create an aggregate index.
I hope this is the last of the theoretical volumes. While it has some operationally-oriented contributions, one of the best being by Phil Williams on Transnational Criminal Networks, it is too theoretical overall, and much too US-centric. There are French, Nordic, and Singaporean, and Australian authorities, to mention just a few, that the editors must now make an effort to bring into a larger dialog. At the same time, it is now vital that we get on with much deeper study and discussion of the actual networks and specific practices–we must do much more in documenting the “order of battle” for netwar. One article, for example, lists a sample of Arabic web sites but goes no further–I would have liked to see some discussion of the 396 terrorist, insurgent, and opposition web sites, including the “Muslim Hackers” who asked for a clerical ruling on whether the Koran encouraged hacking as a means of war (it does, according to the same people that support bin Laden's views), and I would like to see much more integration with the investigative efforts of both law enforcement authorities and private sector security and fraud authorities. I am especially disappointed that all of these authorities appear to be largely oblivious to or at least not making substantive reference to the ten-year-long track record compiled by Winn Schartau and his InfoWarCon speakers and web site, an event that is arguably the only serious international venue for addressing these issues in a serious manner, with a commensurately valuable web site.
There is one other major gap in this book's approach to networks and netwars. With the exception of Paul de Armond's article on netwar against the World Trade Organization, there are no references to intelligence failures and intelligence requirements vis a vis this threat domain. The editors and authors need to establish intelligence concepts and doctrine for this threat.
This book represents the very best that DoD money can fund in isolation, and therein lies the problem. What few taxpayer funds are spent by DoD in addressing such important matters and not being spent wisely because there is no serious commitment to creating a data warehouse of all studies related to networks and netwar; there is no commitment to accessing and understanding the considerable lessons learned outside the somewhat nepotistic DoD network of standard experts; and there seems to be no commitment to creating a center of excellence that can nurture *public* understanding and new *public* standards for protecting both our critical infrastructure and the vital data that circulates on that infrastructure.
The editors and the authors are of the very highest caliber. They are also operating in a vacuum. I for one would like to see them get serious funding, to include the establishment of a public international center of excellence on netwar, with branch offices in London and Singapore.
We are losing the Third World War, between governments and gangs, in part because the military-industrial-congressional complex continues to define security in terms of very expensive mobility and weapons systems–communications, computing, and intelligence are an afterthought, and the authors are quite correct in the aggregate when they suggest that we are our own worst enemy in failing to redirect substantial funds toward cyber-war and cyber-peace. The editors and authors could be very helpful if they address in their next volume, both an intelligence order of battle against which capabilities might be created; and specific proposals for establishing international, national, and state & local capabilities. What should they be, what will it cost, who should manage them? “It ain't real until its the budget.” The authors are gracious to a fault, but it is clear from their work in the aggregate that they share a concern with our lack of preparedness for a 9-11 level of effort against our financial, transportation, power, and communications networks. They merit the greatest of respect and a full hearing from the public.
This is a very impressive book, perhaps one of the best all-around books on Afghanistan, yet when I finished it I had the strongest feeling that it had been a rather antisceptic review. Eurudite, one of the best outlines I have ever seen for examining a truly chaotic situation, everything falling into place from chapter to chapter–yet at the end of it I simply did not have the guts of the matter in my hands.I found the answer in other materials, including a special project to map all of the existing tribes, sub-tribes, and individual leaders where they could be identified. The project required monitoring of local radio stations in various languages, some of which did not have print media. At the end of it all what came across was massive–massive–chaos in a medieval environment where everyone, without exception, regards every foreign power–and especially the superpowers–as an intruder, and every other Afghan as someone to be killed, exploited, or followed, depending on the situation.
This is a very fine book, but when one examines the list of organizations (14) and key individuals (16), what comes across is antisceptic simplicity. This is not a criticism of the author, the research (virtually every English-language reference of note), or the conclusions–all fit well within a very thoughtful approach to describing this failed state called Afghanistan. What jumps out at me is the fact that we do not have the access to the same story as told in Russian, Chinese, Dari, Farsi, Pashto, Urdu, Hindi, and we have done nothing to actually get below the state level–what I call “two levels down”–to the sub-tribe level.
As the world gets more complex, as “wild cards” such as Omar bin Laden cause massive dislocations within major developed countries, not just in isolated failed states, it seems to me that we do not have the sources and tools in hand to get a truly comprehensive coherent view of any particular situation. I would go so far as to say that each book such as this can only be considered a calling card–an audition–and that a real understanding of the Afghan situation could only emerge from a multi-national effort that brings together such talented authors, across cultural and national lines, and gives them the kind of collection, processing, modeling, and operational intelligence support that are normally reserved for just a few great nations. In brief, what we understand about Afghanistan is now too important to be left to a single author or a single perspective–and certainly too important to be left to a single failed intelligence community that thinks only in English.
Historical Pessimism Absent Recommendations for Change,
November 12, 2001
Martin van Creveld
Anything Martin van Crevald writes is a five, and this book, although over-priced (…), is as as good as history can get. His notes are world-class, including a highly relevant note in the final chapter, to wit, that according to Soviet General Lebed's 1997 public statement that, “out of 100 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs manufactured for the Soviet Union's special forces, two-thirds could no longer be accounted for.”To begin with, Van Crevald damns the state for its consistent increase of taxes and its decrease in public services. The state has become, in a word, incompetent and archaic–its grossly over-funded militaries are increasingly helpless in the face of covert and guerrilla violence, at the same time that states are spending more and more on police forces and less and less on a rapidly growing politically deprived disenfranchised underclass.
He ends, as a historical purist, without making recommendations for change. Indeed, he quotes Mao Tse Tung, “The sun will keep rising, trees with keep growing, and women will keep having children.”
In many ways Van Crevald's book serves as a capstone to the fifty or so books I have reviewed in the past year, most of them about strategy, threat, intelligence, and the so-called revolution in military affairs, for what I take from this work is that the state does have an extremely important role to play in assuring the common security and prosperity of the people, and we abandon the state at our own peril.
Every nation, but especially the most prosperous nations that have allowed virtually out of control immigration and set no real standards for citizenship, must very carefully examine its policies and premises, both with regard to what constitutes citizenship and loyalty, and what services it must offer to preserve and protect the commonwealth.
I am told that the FBI was prevented from searching the homes of several of the suspects in the weeks prior to the 11 September attacks, because we have granted to our visitors–illegal as well as legal–all those rights that might better be reserved for proven citizens. Van Crevald's work is not, as some might take it, the death knell for the state, but rather the bath of cold water for the statesmen–and for those citizens who care to instruct their politicians on our demand for renewed focus on resurrecting the connection between citizenship, taxation, representation, and security.
Most Miss Point: Book Excells At Highlighting Our Weaknesses,
>November 3, 2001
Wesley K. Clark
Every citizen should read this book so they can instruct their elected representatives and vote for military reform. As things now stand, we will lose the war on terrorism over time because of the perennial flaws in our system that this book identifies.Don't Bother Us Now. The U.S. political system is not structured to pay attention to “early warning”. Kosovo (as well as Croatia and Serbia beforehand and later Macedonia) were well known looming problems, but in the aftermath of the Gulf War, both Congress and the Administration in power at the time said to the U.S. Intelligence Community, essentially: “don't bother us anymore with this, this is inconvenient warning, we'll get to it when it explodes.” We allowed over a hundred thousand to be murdered in genocide, because our political system was “tired.””Modern war” is an overwhelming combination of micro-management from across the varied nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; a reliance on very high-tech weapons with precision effect that are useless in the absence of precision intelligence (and the lawyers insist the intelligence be near-real-time, a virtual impossibility for years to come); and an obsession with avoiding casualties that hand-cuffs our friendly commanders and gives great encouragement to our enemies.
Services versus Commanders. The military services that under Title 10 are responsible for training, equipping, and organizing the forces–but not for fighting them, something the regional commanders-in-chief must do–have become–and I say this advisedly–the biggest impediment to the successful prosecution of operations. The detailed story of the Army staff resistance to the use of the Apache helicopters is the best case study I have ever seen of how senior staff generals with political access can prevent operational generals with field responsibilities from being fully effective. In combination with the insistence of the services that forces be held back for Korean and Persian Gulf threats that might not be realized, instead of supporting a real war that existed in Europe, simply stated, makes it clear that there is a “seam” between our force-creating generals and our force-fighting generals that has gotten *out of control.* The fog of war is thickest in Washington, and the greatest friction–the obstacles to success in war–are largely of our own making.
Lawyers, Fear, and Micro-Management. Just as we recently witnessed a lawyer overruling the general to avoid killing the commander of the Taliban, General Clark's war was dominated by lawyers, a fear of casualties, and micro-management, from Washington, of his use of every weapons system normally left to the discretion of the field commander. This has gotten completely out of hand. Within NATO it is compounded by multi-national forces whose commanders can refuse orders inconsistent with their own national view of things, but reading this book, one is left with the clear understanding that General Clark was fighting a three-front war at all times: with the real enemy, with the media, and with Washington–his NATO commanders were the least of his problems.
Technology Loses to Weather and Lacks Intelligence. Throughout the book there are statements that make it clear that the U.S. military is not yet an all-weather military, and has a very long way to go before it ever will be. Aligned with this incapacity is a high-technology culture that suffers from very weak maintenance and an almost complete lack of intelligence at the level of precision and with the timeliness that is needed for our very expensive weapons to be effective. Nothing has changed since MajGen Bob Scales wrote his excellent Firepower in Limited War, pointing out that artillery still cannot be adequately supported by the intelligence capabilities we have now.
Strategic Mobility Shortfalls, Tactical Aviation Constraints. Although General Clark judges the air war to have been a success, and an essential factor in facilitating “coercive diplomacy”, he also communicates two realities about U.S. military aviation: 1) we do not have the strategic aviation lift to get anywhere in less than 90-180 days, and his request for a 75 day mobilization was not possible as a result; and 2) our tactical aviation assets are so specialized, and require so much advance preparation in terms of munitions, route planning, and so on, that they cannot be readily redirected in less than a full day. A full day. This is simply outlandish.
We Don't Do Mountains. No statement in the book hurt me more than one by an Army general telling General Clark that his plans for the ground campaign could not be supported by the U.S. Army because “we don't do mountains” This, in combination with the loser's attitude (no casualties) and the general reluctance of the services to put their high-tech capabilities like the Apache at risk in a real war, sum up the decrepitude of the U.S. military leadership and the Revolution in Military Affairs-Andrew Gordon in Rules of the Game has it exactly right-the post Viet-Nam and post Cold War era has left us with a bunch of high-tech chickens in control of military resources, and we need to find ourselves some rat-catchers able to redirect our military toward a lust for man to man combat in every clime and place-and the low-tech sustainable tools to do the job.
General Clark's concluding words, on page 459: “In Kosovo my commanders and I found that we lacked the detailed prompt information to campaign effectively against the Serb ground forces. Most of the technologies we had been promoting since the Gulf War were still immature, unable to deal with the vagaries of weather, vegetation, and urban areas, or the limitations of bandwidth and airspace. The discrete service programs didn't always fit together technically. And (sic) the officers who operated the programs were not qualified to work across service lines and did not understand the full range of national capabilities. I worried about the nature of Joint skills even among senior officers.” Are we ready? No.
I remember being shocked when a book published by a former prisoner of war revealed all of the CIA's sources and methods for secret writing–one reason terrorists and others make photo-copies of incoming and outgoing correspondence these days….
This book provides an excellent overview of sensitive sources and methods used by the U.S. military to intercept and locate electronic transmissions. It specifically “blows” a cover company, two specific kinds of aircraft, and several U.S. Special Operations Forces standard operating procedures. I suspect that NSA and the CIA Centers dealing with terrorism and with crime and narcotics are having the same difficulties recovering from this book that NSA had when President Reagan inadvertently revealed in public that he was receiving transcripts of Politburo cell phone conversations made while in transit, from their car phones.
Having said that, I find that the author has performed very responsibly as an investigative journalist, and that his story is superior in every respect. I even find that he has withheld some key information out of respect for his sources,and that there are many lessons to be learned from this book about how we might improve our transnational campaign against non-state forces that have vastly more money, ruthlessness, and sheer people power than we do.
I like and recommend this book–it is a real-world story, well-researched and well-told.
