No word. No retraction from USA Today. No followup from USA Today or any other major media outlet.
“Just drop it. Who cares? It doesn’t fit with the official narrative. Let it go. Move on. We have a new story line. He never shot anybody in the parking garage. He walked into the building unhindered. So be it…”
When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008.
This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won. A companion volume, Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies, offers in-depth narrative overviews of each of the 41 additional cases; the original 30 cases are presented in Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies.
A predictive policing tool in use in the U.S. and abroad helps law enforcement predict crime in the same way that geologists predict earthquakes.
EXTRACT
Brantingham said that there are features in the environment that, by their nature, are prone to crime, much like faults are to earthquakes. “A shopping mall is a great example. It’s a standing crop of cars to be stolen or to be broken into. It’s not going anywhere. It’s like a big fault that produces earthquakes at a regular clip.”
Crimes also tend to produce “aftershocks,” as criminals tend to be creatures of habit and return to the same locations where they found previous success. “So you get these after-crimes that occur near in space and near in time to previous crimes.”
PredPol takes that information – what crime is being committed, when and where it happens – and applies mathematical algorithms, and uses it as the basis to forecast where crime will happen in the future. The concept grew out of using hot spots to track where crime is occurring (where you map crime over long intervals to see where it is concentrated to aid in the allocation of resources). But PredPol cuts down the reaction time to changes in crime patterns that might not be readily apparent by simply looking at hot spots marked on a map, thus allowing for a more real-time reaction to changes in the crime landscape.
The Pentagon’s main battlefield intelligence network in Afghanistan is vulnerable to hackers — both the enemy or a leaker — and the U.S. command in Kabul will cut it off from the military’s classified data files unless the Army fixes the defects within 60 days, according to an official memo obtained by The Washington Times.
The confidential memo says the Army’s Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) flunked a readiness test and does not confirm the sources of outside Internet addresses entering the classified database.