1997 Creating a “Bare Bones” Capability for Open Source Support to Defense Intelligence Analysis

Intelligence (Government/Secret), White Papers
Bare Bones OSINT Cell
Bare Bones OSINT Cell

When Paul Wallner, on rotation from DIA to CIA, first attempted to establiksh an Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) concept of operations, this was the first paper delivered to him.  At the same time, he gave OSS a fair shot at business with ten trial weekly reports spanning everything from medical to regions to logistics.  What we did not discover until a few years ago is that a sergeant, then on reserve duty and billing himself as an OSINT expert, was throwing away our analytic summaries and loading the carefully sorted headines associated with each analytic summary into the DIA “bin” willy-nilly.  Our attempt to show DIA that OSINT could be done as a  low-cost out-sourced activity that did not require legions of contractors or “butts in seats,” died from this one specific pattern of misbehavior, a lack of intelligence and integrity on the part of one individual so shocking as to defy understuanding.  Neither Wallner nor Steele knew about this until years later.

Today “everyone has an OSINT cell” but there is no enterprise.  What is needed is an OSINT Center co-equal to the HUMINT/CI Center, with its own two-star commander, both reporting to the same three-star.  The OSINT Center should be a hub for a global grid that includes regional multinational information-sharing and sense-making activities that work predominantly at the unclassified level, and should include a massive processing center that exchanges real-time sense-making back out to all who provide data into the processing center at machine speed–the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, among others, would be immediately attractive allies.

OSINT is the primary means of achieving a “shared view of the battlefield” in operations other than war (OOTW), in stabilization and reconstruction operations, in humanitarian assistance operations, and in disaster relief operations.

OSINT should also be the foundation for both the defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the twin pillars of future integrated strategy,Whole of Government Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System WoG PPBS), and Multinational Peace & Prosperity Operations (MPPO) that leverage M4IS2 (Mutlinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multipomain Information-Sharing and Sense-Making).

Innovative Policy Options
Innovative Policy Options

Click on the frog to read the 1996 piece on “Information Peacekeeping: Innovative Policy Options.”  It is needed by the Secretary of Defense right now–today.

1997-1993 Presentations in Outline without Slides

Briefings & Lectures

1997

US

Presentation Steele DIA/JMITC: The Future of Intelligence

1995

US

Presentation Steele CENDI & COSPO As Catalysts for National Security & Competitiveness

1994

US

Presentation Steele Advantages of OSINT for National and Corporate Security

1993

US

Presentation Steele OSS ’93: Reinventing National Intelligence—Advantages of OSINT

1997 USIP Conference on Virtual Diplomacy Virtual Intelligence: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution through Information Peacekeeping

Articles & Chapters, Intelligence (Government/Secret), Intelligence (Public), Peace, Poverty, & Middle Class, Security (Including Immigration), Stabilization & Reconstruction, Truth & Reconciliation, United Nations & NGOs, Values, Ethics, Sustainable Evolution, Voices Lost (Indigenous, Gender, Poor, Marginalized), War & Face of Battle
Virtual Intelligence
Virtual Intelligence

Virtual Diplomacy Conference website down as they transition to a new system.  Link leads to the submitted author’s copy as accepted and published:  “Virtual Intelligence: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution through Information Peacekeeping.”  This was also subsequently published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution.

1997 Intelligence and Counterintelligence: Proposed Program for the 21st Century

Intelligence (Commercial), Intelligence (Government/Secret), Intelligence (Public), White Papers
21st Century Intelligence
21st Century Intelligence

This is one of two seminal documents in circulation in the Spring and Summer of 1997. The financial numbers in this document were vetted and modified as necessary by Don Gessaman and Arnie Donahue–they are suitable for a President or a Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and still valid today adjusted for inflation. The other is the study done by Boyd Sutton on The Challenge of Global Coverage (click on the frog to go directly to that study.  In both instances, because the recommendations were at odds with the conventional bureaucratic desire to increase secret technical intelligence capabilities, the reports were ignored.

Sutton on Global Coverage
Sutton on Global Coverage

1997 Davis A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes

Analysis, Analysis, Historic Contributions
Jack Davis
Jack Davis

PLATINUM Jack Davis, Virtual Dean of US All-Source Analytic Corps

For over three decades, Jack Davis has been the heir to Sherman Kent and the mentor to all those who would strive to be the world’s most effective all-source intelligence analysts.  As a Central Intelligence Agency analyst and educator, he combines intellect, integrity, insight, and an insatiable appetite for interaction with all manner of individuals regardless of rank and disposition.  He is the most able pioneer of “analytic tradecraft,” the best proponent for the value of human analysis over technical processing, and one of those very special individuals who helped define the end of 20th Century centralized analysis and the beginning of 21st Century distributed multinational multiagency analysis.

Note: Awarded in advance of IOP ’07 to celebrate Jack Davis’ 50th uninterrupted year as an all-source analyst and mentor to all analysts.

The Compendium is 45 pages in all and consists of a Foreword, Summary, and then ten Notes to Analysts:

Jack Davis
Jack Davis

Note 1:  Addressing US Interests in DI Assessments

Note 2: Access and Crediblity

Note 3: Articulation of Assumptions

Note 4: Outlook

Note 5: Facts and Sourcing

Note 6: Analytic Expertise

Note 7: Effective Summary

Note 8: Implementation Analysis

Note 9: Conclusions

Note 10: Tradecraft and Counterintelligence