The “humanitarian” drumbeat for launching yet another Middle Eastern war against the Assad regime in Syria is increasing. Here are three reports that may help you think about the war question:
Aron Lund describes the situation in Syria, with special attention to the evolving decentralization of Assad regime into a loose confederation of pro-regime militias, with overlapping but sometimes competing agendas. While most readers are probably familiar with the confused nature of the competing rebel militias, the militiaization of the Assad regime and what it means for his ability to control events (like the employment of chemical weapons)is not well understood and almost never discussed in the mainstream media.
Although I lean toward McAdams argument, I submit that it does not really matter, because if Lund’s analysis is half-way close to being correct, the rational case against intervention wins hands down, for one simple reason: Questions of war or peace should not be determined by the arrogance of ignorance.
Syria:Update. UN Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon said on Monday. “I just spoke to my Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, Ms. Angela Kane, who is now in Damascus to oversee the investigation. The first day of investigation was carried out by Dr. Sellstrom and his team,” said Ban in a statement issued by his spokesperson.
“What I am told at this time is that their vehicle was attacked by an unknown sniper, but despite such very difficult circumstances, our team returned to Damascus and replaced their car and proceeded to a suburb of Damascus to carry on their investigation.”
According to the statement, during their first day of investigation, the UN experts “visited two hospitals,” “interviewed witnesses, survivors and doctors” and also “collected some samples” at the site of the latest alleged use of chemical weapons on Aug. 21 in the suburbs of Damascus.
Special comment. The question whether Syria used some form of chemical weapons against the opposition has moved beyond the domain of intelligence judgment into the domain of forensic science. Stentorian statements about blame before the facts are adduced are imprudent except as political theater. Now is the time for proof, not for bombast. It is time for patience while science does its work.
Inferences of guilt derived from judgments about how Syrian leaders should behave if they wanted to prove they did not execute a chemical attack indulge the most basic and persistent reason for US intelligence analytical failures: mirror imaging, i.e., the notion that Syrian leaders would act the way Americans might act under similar circumstances. Arabs seldom behave the way Americans behave.
The initial burden of proving an accusation always is on the party that makes the accusation. In this instance it is the Syrian opposition, whose evidence to date in the public domain falls short of establishing a prime facie case that a weapon of mass destruction was used. Something happened, but what remains to be determined.
The mainstream press has insisted that the Syrian government must prove it did not execute a chemical attack. However, elementary evidence law courses all over the world teach that it is impossible to prove a negative. Everyone knows that! Somehow the mainstream press persists in getting this entirely wrong.
The open source evidence and Feedback from Brilliant, Genuine experts on chemical warfare and its effects reinforce the NightWatch judgment that Readers should retain healthy skepticism about what took place east of Damascus on 21 August and who was responsible.
Expert feedback asserts without qualification that neurotoxins, such as Sarin, are not evident, despite the bombastic allegations of the Syrian opposition on 26 August. Feedback from experts also indicates that crowd control agents would explain the symptoms, casualties and other evidence in the public domain.
Meanwhile, Syrian government forces are continuing operations to clear the eastern suburbs of Damascus with success.
25 August 2013
Syria:Update. International news outlets predict US missile attacks against Syria. The overwhelming consensus is that Syria used chemical weapons of some sort, but the evidence in the public domain that supports this judgment is weak.
The government in Damascus has agreed to allow the UN inspection team to visit the site. The mandate of the 20-person team is to determine whether chemical weapons were used in the latest incident as well as in three others. The mandate does not include an assignment of blame.
Comment: Doctors without Borders reported 3,500 patients were treated for symptoms of chemical exposure at their three hospitals, of whom 350 or so died. The humanitarian organization did not say whom they thought was responsible.
Afghanistan-Pakistan: President Karzai flew to Islamabad to hold meetings with the new government in Islamabad. Karzai is seeking Pakistani assistance in facilitating talks with the Afghan Taliban.
Comment: Karzai's instincts are accurate in focusing on Pakistan. Without Quetta and continuous Pakistani official protection, the Afghan Taliban leadership would have had no place from which to operate. Pakistan has placed no restrictions on Mullah Omar except to focus on undermining US and NATO operations in Afghanistan and leave Pakistan alone. Omar and the Pakistani government have both been faithful to the agreement.
President Karzai's visit is nearly a last ditch effort to get help from Pakistan by reaching out to the new government in Islamabad. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif cannot control the Pakistani Taliban and has made no policy statements about controlling the Afghan Taliban leaders. They have lived with impunity, comfort and freedom of movement and communications in Quetta since 2001. Nawaz Sharif has shown no inclination to change Pakistan's permissive policy towards the Afghan Taliban leaders.
A direct appeal to a new prime minister after years of frustration in dealing with the former government is worth a try. Nevertheless, the prospects for greater cooperation are vanishingly small. After 12 years, the conclusion is inescapable that Pakistani intelligence and security agencies never have had any intention of arresting or restraining Mullah Omar and his Quetta Shura advisers. They have enjoyed more and more effective protection than Osama bin Laden.
Thus, Pakistani policy has ensured that NATO forces would win every battle, but ultimately lose the war when the Afghan Taliban returned to power in Kabul. That is the only outcome that would guarantee that Afghanistan would remain pro-Pakistan in the larger strategic struggle between China with its proxies – Pakistan and the next Afghan government – and India, standing alone. Under any other outcome, Afghanistan would remain neutral or pro-India. Pakistan, including the Nawaz Sharif government, will not tolerate either other outcome.
As many of you know, just few months I had the chance to co-host the first Open Source Hardware Documentation jam in New York. It was an event dedicated to grow more interest from the Open Source Hardware community and the community at large to the topic of documentation, especially thinking about how this enables replication, reuse, integration among the different projects around.
Few days ago, as I was browsing, I discovered, thanks to Alessandro Ranelluci who posted it on the Facebook wall of the italian fabber community, that Gary Hodgson, a very active british developer and hacker, now living in Germany, is working on a very interesting project that deserves more attention and contribution. So I decided to interview Gary to introduce you to the Thing Tracker Network.
This brief reviews the extant literature on complex emergencies (CE); it proposes a revised definition of what constitutes a CE, to include its causes and constituent parts; it provides a framework to distinguish CE’s from other ongoing conflicts; and it provides ways to respond to them.
The U.S. knew Hussein was launching some of the worst chemical attacks in history — and still gave him a hand.
The U.S. government may be considering military action in response to chemical strikes near Damascus. But a generation ago, America's military and intelligence communities knew about and did nothing to stop a series of nerve gas attacks far more devastating than anything Syria has seen, Foreign Policy has learned.
In 1988, during the waning days of Iraq's war with Iran, the United States learned through satellite imagery that Iran was about to gain a major strategic advantage by exploiting a hole in Iraqi defenses. U.S. intelligence officials conveyed the location of the Iranian troops to Iraq, fully aware that Hussein's military would attack with chemical weapons, including sarin, a lethal nerve agent.
The intelligence included imagery and maps about Iranian troop movements, as well as the locations of Iranian logistics facilities and details about Iranian air defenses. The Iraqis used mustard gas and sarin prior to four major offensives in early 1988 that relied on U.S. satellite imagery, maps, and other intelligence. These attacks helped to tilt the war in Iraq's favor and bring Iran to the negotiating table, and they ensured that the Reagan administration's long-standing policy of securing an Iraqi victory would succeed. But they were also the last in a series of chemical strikes stretching back several years that the Reagan administration knew about and didn't disclose.
U.S. officials have long denied acquiescing to Iraqi chemical attacks, insisting that Hussein's government never announced he was going to use the weapons. But retired Air Force Col. Rick Francona, who was a military attaché in Baghdad during the 1988 strikes, paints a different picture.
“The Iraqis never told us that they intended to use nerve gas. They didn't have to. We already knew,” he told Foreign Policy.
The event has been reported here if you’re interested to the results (a couple of reports here 
