2006 Robert Steele: Reinventing Intelligence

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REINVENTING INTELLIGENCE

Robert David Steele

America is spending $70 billion a year on what it calls “Intelligence,” and for that amount of money we are successfully stealing 5% and ignoring 95% of the information relevant to our national security and prosperity.  We are long over-due for a reinvention of national intelligence.

Without belaboring the point, we would observe that secret intelligence has proven both ignorant, and ignorable.  Technology is not a substitute for thinking, satellites are not a substitute for foreign language and area skills.  Collection without sense-making, both automated and human, is both wasteful and falsely reassuring.

Analysis by loyal citizens who were hired not for their depth of knowledge but because they could be “cleared” by security officers with a high school education (i.e. the candidates did not spend a lot of time overseas and are “easy” to validate)—and particularly analysis limited to secrets in isolation from historical or cultural context such as can only be found in open sources of information in foreign languages—is pathologically misleading.  It should come as no surprise, then, to find that our national intelligence community is not only ignorant of reality, but easily ignorable by policymakers as well.  Only public intelligence briefings can inoculate public policy against false politically-motivated claims that suggest secret intelligence validation when in fact no such validation exists.

This also imposes extraordinary additional costs on the individual tax-payer.  Inadequate intelligence is at the root of three great drains on the U.S. Treasury: 1) it fails to blow the whistle on defense waste, where 90% of the acquisition dollars are spent on high-end systems relevant only to state-on-state warfare, which is 10% of the actual threat; 2) it fails to make the case for peaceful preventive measures or investments, including agricultural, cultural, diplomatic, educational, and information-sharing investments; and 3) it fails to identify and help collect the $600 billion a year in tax avoidance, corruptly-mandated subsidies, and illicit trade not subject to taxation—funds that could finance a reduction of the national debt, critical social programs cut to finance the war on Iraq and a bloated defense bureaucracy, and most especially—a completely new and modern approach to national education at all levels, embracing both life-long education and distance learning as well as new programs that combine social and economic internships with school learning.

As we enter the fifth year of a global war on terror, much of it of our own making from decades of virtual colonialism and predatory immoral capitalism, it is essential to point out that the end of cheap oil, the end of free clean water, the rise of pandemic disease, the proliferation of a cheating culture in America concurrent with uncontrolled illegal immigration, the reduction of scholarship and the increase of obesity, all, in combination, do not bode well for the Republic, nor for its allies.  Absent the re-emergence of engaged informed citizens, the Republic is at risk of dissolution.  Two complicatory revolutions have taken place in the past five years, and neither the policymakers nor the public have acknowledged them.

First, the Internet and hand-held devices have enabled all individuals to learn as much as they wish to from open sources in all languages.  The publics of the world are no longer ignorant of global realities.  This means that the five billion people at the Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) are now the world’s one remaining super-power.  We can empower them with wealth—we cannot kill them all before they overwhelm us directly or consume the finite resources of the Earth indirectly.

Second, the rise of suicidal terrorism, popularized by Iran and its off-spring Hamas and Hezbollah, who also pioneered Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), has established a new balance of power.  It is America that is on the run, from the “death of a thousand cuts” that can be applied with impunity to oil, water, and electricity connection points in Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.  Al Qaeda will win this war by raising the price of oil to $300 a barrel, and there isn’t a thing we can do about it with our present penchant for governance by ideological fantasy.

All of our money is invested in the four secret “pillars,” or collection stovepipes, and virtually no money—quite seriously—no money of significance, is invested in either the open source intelligence foundation of this intelligence temple, nor in sense-making and mature analysts.  We continue to hire young people rather than world-class experts, in part because world-class experts have complicated backgrounds and our security officers are unable to cope.  We lack knowledge of history, culture, and all manner of foreign languages and local area understanding.

In today’s world it is not possible to win against asymmetric opponents unless you play by new rules.  The “old school”—government bureaucrats accustomed to unlimited budgets and secret methods not subject to accountability for failure, would try to bribe a player (HUMINT), put a “bug” in the dug-out (SIGINT), “sniff” the direction and speed of the ball (MASINT), or take a satellite picture of the field every three days (IMINT).  The new craft of intelligence tells everyone they are part of the team, and if they catch the ball it is an out.  OSINT harnesses what everyone sees and knows.  It changes the rules of the game.

We must reinvent intelligence.  Fortunately, this is happening outside of the government.  Collective Intelligence, also known as “Smart Mobs” or “The Wisdom of the Crowds,” is ascendant.  This New Craft of Intelligence recognizes that history matters, that cultural and biological diversity matter, that sharing information rather than stealing secrets is the primordial principle, and that sustaining the Earth is so complex as to demand a World Brain—a coming together of all men and women of good will to re-establish Communitas, eliminate war and waste and the contrived concept of scarcity, while creating sustainable stabilizing indigenous wealth everywhere.

Information can be used to deter and resolve conflict, and to create wealth.  This is not, however, primarily the provenance of governments.  Governments can serve as the catalysts and benefactors for what I call the Open Source Information System – External (OSIS-X), but governments are primarily the beneficiaries of contributions from what I have named the seven tribes of intelligence, each with its own unique direct and tacit knowledge to share: government, military, law enforcement, business, academic, ground truth (non-governmental and media), and civil (citizens, labor unions, religions).  We need information-sharing agreements among these tribes.

As we enter the Age of Intelligence, we must realize that Weberian bureaucracy is now dead.  The old justification for bureaucracy, to pigeon-hole knowledge, is not just passé, it is pathologically passé.  We have built Iron Curtains between nations, Bamboo Curtains between Industries and Organizations, and accept Plastic Curtains between Individuals.  The Internet has changed that.  It is now possible to share knowledge securely and with both financial and moral integrity, across all boundaries.  It is now possible to achieve what the Swedes call Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing (M4IS), and it is this concept, along with Collective Intelligence, that assures us of a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs in the near term future, of a bottom-up revolution.

“A Nation’s best defense is an educated citizenry.”  Thomas Jefferson said that.  Not only was he right when he said it, but today, at the dawn of the Age of Intelligence, his words must lead us to realize that today U.S. “intelligence” is upside-down and inside- out.  It is upside-down because it relies on satellites in outer space rather than human eyes on the ground; and it is inside-out because it tries to divine intelligence unilaterally, without first asking the seven tribes of our coalition partners what they might provide.  We must have access to all information, in all languages, all the time: Information Operations (IO) must now integrate but subordinate secret intelligence within a larger frame of public reference.

The only hijacked airplane that failed to hit its target on 9/11 was the one where citizens, armed with open source information, took direct action.  This is the model for our future, for the threats that face us, as well as the opportunities, do not lend themselves to pre-planned centrally-controlled government direction.  Only a Smart Nation, a nation in which each person is both a collector and consumer of intelligence, able to share information intelligently and in real time, will survive the tribulations to come.

Reinventing intelligence requires that we invest heavily in understanding the history of all peoples; that we acknowledge the current perspectives of all faiths and tribes; and that we plan for a future of what Stewart Brand calls “The Long Now,” with intelligence supporting the principles of longevity, maintainability, transparency, evolvability, and scalability.

We may not be interested in reality just yet, but reality is most assuredly interested in us  St.

ACRONYMS

CIA                        Central Intelligence Agency, combination of HUMINT and all-source analysts

DO                          Directorate of Operations, today the National Clandestine Service

FBIS                       Foreign Broadcast Information Service, within CIA, modest open source monitoring

HUMINT              Human Intelligence, generally clandestine or covert

IED                         Improvised Explosive Devices

IO                           Information Operations

IMINT                   Imagery Intelligence, relying exclusively on expensive secret satellites

M4IS                      Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information Sharing

MASINT               Measurements & Signatures Intelligence, very esoteric

NGO                       Non-Governmental Organizations, custodians of 80% of what we need to know

NRO                       National Reconnaissance Office, builder of the satellites

NSA                        National Security Agency, responsible for secret eavesdropping of voice and data signals

OPG VPN              Operational Planning Group Virtual Private Network

OSINT                   Open Source Intelligence, using only legally and ethically accessible information

OSS                        Office of Strategic Services (WWII), Open Source Solutions (modern)

SIGINT  Signals Intelligence, relying heavily on expensive secret satellites and ground stations

UN                          United Nations, reliant heavily on direct observation and OSINT

REFERENCES

http://www.oss.net/BASIC  Open Source Intelligence Familiarization Documents (Page of Hot Links)

http://www.oss.net/MIOC   Concept for a Multinational Information Operations Center (MIOC)

http://www.oss.net/IO              Briefing on Modern Information Operations IO) and the Available Book

http://www.oss.net               OSINT in 30,000 pages from 1992 to date.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Robert David Steele Vivas is today the CEO of OSS.Net, Inc., a veteran-owned small business incorporated in the Commonwealth of Virginia.  Since 1988 he has focused on the need to reinvent intelligence by first establishing the separate discipline of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and then by focusing on sense-making through a new craft of intelligence that fully integrates history, culture, and all that can be known or intuited by the “seven tribes.”  Born in New York, he spent 20 years overseas as the son of an oilman, half in Latin America, half in Asia including four years in Viet-Nam.  He completed his undergraduate education at Muhlenberg College, specializing in political science, with a thesis on home-host country issues with multinational corporations.  His first graduate degree is from Lehigh University, specializing in international affairs, with a mini-thesis on the origin and purpose of the state, and a graduate thesis on predicting and analyzing revolution.  Steele joined the United States Marine Corps in 1974, serving on active duty as an infantry officer including a Marine Expeditionary Force deployment (32 ships) during which he served as S-1/Adjutant for a 1,500 man Battalion Landing Team.  Joining the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1979, he went through accelerated training and served three back-to-back tours in Latin America as a clandestine case officer, including one tour as one of the first officers focused full-time on terrorism.  He returned to serve three Headquarters tours in counterintelligence, advanced information technology and advanced technical (satellite) program evaluation.  While in the CIA, he completed a second graduate degree with the Extension Program of the University of Oklahoma, specializing in public administration, with a thesis on strategic and tactical information management issues for national security.  He also completed the Naval War College non-residence program, earning a diploma with distinction.  Having remained a Reserve officer with twice annual active duties as a Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) specialist, he helped draft the Marine Corps Intelligence Plan (MCMIP).  Invited to resign from the CIA, he became the founding Special Assistant and concurrently the Deputy Director of the Marine Corps Intelligence Command (then Center).  He wrote the first official appeal for a national OSINT program in 1988, and spent four years trying to heal national intelligence from the inside, finally resigning on 1 April 1992 to campaign independently.  He is the author of three books, ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World; THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: Personal, Public, & Political; and INFORMATION OPERATIONS: All Information, All Languages, All the Time.  He is also a contributing editor of PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future.  His next book will define the remainder of his life and is tentatively entitled INFORMATION PEACEKEEPING: Empowering the Poor to Save the World.  Recognition includes minor CIA, Department of State, and Department of Defense awards, and Pi Alpha Alpha (honor society for public administration).  He has been twice-named to the Microtimes 100 (industry leaders and unsung heroes creating the future), and was featured in Year in Computers 2000.  Alvin Toffler calls him “the rival store” in War and Anti-War, where OSINT is depicted as the foundation for the future of intelligence.  He is an elected member of the Silicon Valley Hackers Conference, and speaks to the Hackers on Planet Earth and 2600 Society in New York every two years.  As a hobby, he reads, and is the #1 Amazon reviewer for non-fiction books about national security and global issues.  He is married to Kathy Lynette Steele nee Jones, a CIA veteran from West Virginia.  They have three children—a techno-artist, a reader, and a wide receiver—and re-affirmed their marriage in 2006.

Reference: Online Language Overview

Cultural Intelligence
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Author’s Note: This is an on line version of a paper that Mike Bergman recently released under the auspices of BrightPlanet Corp The citation for this effort is:

M.K. Bergman, “Tutorial:  Internet Languages, Character Sets and Encodings,” BrightPlanet Corporation Technical Documentation, March 2006, 13 pp.

Yoshiki Mikami, who runs the UN’s Language Observatory, has an interesting way to summarize the languages of the world. His updated figures, plus some other BrightPlanet statistics are:

. . . . . . .

Category Number Source or Notes
Active Human Languages 6,912 from www.ethnologue.com
Language Identifiers 440 based on ISO 639
Human Rights Translation 327 UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Unicode Languages 244 See text
DQM Languages 140 Estimate based on prevalence, BT input
Windows XP Languages 123 From Microsoft
Basis Tech Languages 40 Based on Basis Tech’s Rosette Language Identifier
Google Search Languages 35 From Google

Online version

Review: Faith of My Fathers (2005)

4 Star, Biography & Memoirs
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4.0 out of 5 stars 5 for inspiration, 3 for lack of detail, 4 overall,

March 22, 2006
Thomas Madell
I was feeling depressed about the future of the USA and took the afternoon off, using this movie as a break. It really inspired me. See my review of the book for all the detail that this movie fails to provide. Bottom line is that the movie does NOT do justice to McCain's captivity and honor in captivity, but for a DVD it is absolutely great and there is nothing about it that I really want to criticize. They probably could not get Henry Kissinger to dye his hair or wear a wig, the most significant thing left out of this film is that Kissinger was offered a chance to take McCain back with him, and turned it down, as he should have. Duty, Honor, Country is not just for Army officers, but for all of us. However, at this terrible time in our country's history, the movie also reminded me of the dishonor to their oaths to the Constitution that our senior generals displayed in failing to resign and protest publicly when their sound advice was ignored in the run up to the war on a web of lies from the White House, and a compliant Congress. The dishonor of the Pentagon and the White House put people like John McCain into captivity, and today the same dishonor is killing thousands of Iraqis as well as US troops who strive to “do their duty.”

The bottom line is clear: if the public does not do ITS duty in protesting illegal wars and lies in place of intelligence, then we dishonor the Constitution and we dishonor the brave men and women who risk everything for their country. Shame on us, and God Bless the individuals in the Armed Forces.

On McCain, only he can come to terms with what I believe was his knowing abandonement of 1500 POWs known to be in Viet-Nam and being held for ransom. See the following three books for documented background:

Kiss the Boys Goodbye: How the United States Betrayed its Own POWs in Vietnam
An Enormous Crime: The Definitive Account of American POWs Abandoned in Southeast Asia
Is Anybody Listening?: A True Story About POW/MIAs In The Vietnam War

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Review: The Five Love Languages–How to Express Heartfelt Commitment to Your Mate (Paperback)

5 Star, Consciousness & Social IQ
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5.0 out of 5 stars Required Gift for “Hard” Men,

March 19, 2006
Gary Chapman
I freely confess to being what Peter Drucker calls a “mono-maniac,” which is a person who has reached a point in life where one really big issue drives them and all that they do. As I think back on a life as a Marine Corps infantry officer and a clandestine case officer (spy), I really wish that stuff like this was covered at every life stage–from Family Life in high school to Life 101 in college to “tradeoffs and compromises” in Officer Candidate School and at The Farm.

As someone who is at the top of their professional game, and with what may well be one of the lowest “social IQS” around, I absolutely recommend this book, and its children-oriented companion, as gifts for those you care about how might be, like me, too focused on the “hard” world and not paying enough attention on the home front.

It is a simple formula, easy to understand, easy to apply, and the book is a “soft” equivalent of a “2 x 4” hit on the head of a jackass–once the message is received, I think it does have some positive effect.

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Review: The Five Love Languages of Children (Paperback)

5 Star, Consciousness & Social IQ
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5.0 out of 5 stars Essential Gift for New and Long-Standing Parents,

March 19, 2006
Gary Chapman
It's never too late to get with the program. See my primary review of “The Five Love Languages” for additional details. This author has a simple formula, easy to understand and easy to apply. This book is the best possible gift for both new and long-standing parents, especially in this age to two-income families, striving to fit too much into each day, and in the face of the Internet and television as a corosive alternative to parenting. I'm no saint–barely competent as a parent–this book is in my case a badly needed intervention. It took three children for me to figure this stuff out. Buy five copies and gently make a difference to five families.
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Review: Information Operations–Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power (Issues in Twenty-First Century Warfare) (Paperback)

4 Star, Information Operations
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4.0 out of 5 stars Outstanding First Cut, IO as Inter-Agency & Long-Term Continuity Glue,

March 17, 2006
Edwin L. Armistead
This is a first rate effort, but it is incomplete and overly U.S. centric. A new expanded edition is needed soonest.

For myself the best chapters were on “Intelligence Support: Foundations for Conducting IO” and “Information Projection: Shaping the Global Village.” Other chapters on the language of IO, information protection, related and supporting activities, and implementing IO were good.

The most important point in this book from my point of view was its observation that modern war is only 15-25% military action, and the rest must be a unified national campaign that leverages all sources of national power **for which IO is the glue that provides the inter-agency coherence.** These authors understand and teach, very ably, how IO is at the heart of managing complex coalition contingency operations.

The book over-all shows a real appreciation for the role that must be played by non-military agencies, coalitions, and private sector organizations including religions, academics, and business as well as media personalities.

The discussion of the “information battlespace” is useful, as are the illustrations. There is an excellent “strategy to task” section helpful to anyone actually implementing IO.

The authors are to be commended for emphasizing that knowing the enemy is not enough–you must know yourself and be firmly grounded in reality rather than ideological fantasy, if the IO message is to have traction. The authors also address, diplomatically but directly, the limitations of the traditional insular military planning process (especially the secretive intelligence process), and clearly articulate the need for open processes that can embrace and leverage varied communities of interest, non-US as well as US.

The authors also raise an extremely important issue to which they cannot provide an answer, but which must be resolved sooner than later: the urgency of being able to educate Americans about global realities and threats, without being accused of propagandizing Americans. [This is one reason why Congressman Simmons, on both the House Armed Services Committee and the House Homeland Security Committee, is so important–he understands that the state intelligence centers and networks we are advocating can serve two functions: as bottom up dot collectors, and as disseminators of real world open source intelligence to the state and local publics.]

One minor nit: the authors assume that because most of the 9-11 hijackers had Saudi passports they were Saudi. My understanding is that they were a mixed bag with passports of convenience from Saudi Arabia for those who were not Saudi.

The book concludes with cursory attention to Russian, Chinese, and Australian IO doctrine and practices, and does not address Iranian, Indian, Pakistani, and Venezuelan-Cuban IO, which are of considerable importance.

The book, very understandably, does not spend a lot of time on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) or the need to properly monitor all information in all languages all the time, but the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence has clearly articulated the need to do “universal coverage, 24/7, in all languages, at the neighbood level of granularity” (this is an abdiged paraphrase) and DoD appears well on its way to doing just that. I recommend that this book be read in conjunction with Max Manwaring and John Fishel's Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs Series) with Max Manwaring's edited work on The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century which emphasizes key moral messages; and my own IO book, Information Operations: All Information, All Languages, All the Time which focuses exclusively on information peacekeeping or the foreign language content side of IO, and has a comprehensive annotated bibliography. Specialty books that I recommend to IO practitioners include Larry Beinhart's Fog Facts: Searching for Truth in the Land of Spin Robert Cialdini's Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (Collins Business Essentials); Robert Parry's Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & ‘Project Truth' and John Hasling's The Audience, The Message, The Speaker with Public Speaking PowerWeb.

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Review: Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs Series) (Hardcover)

5 Star, Asymmetric, Cyber, Hacking, Odd War, Insurgency & Revolution
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5.0 out of 5 stars Top Ten Book. Moral Legitimacy, Inter-Agency Unity of Effortt, Deep Language & Cultural Skills,

March 17, 2006
John T. Fishel
Max Manwaring is one of my heroes, and it upsets me to see the publisher do such a lousy job of posting information about this book, which is a gem. This book was a classic when it was first published, and it is even better now that it has been updated and the SWORD model slightly refined. Along with The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century and Max's other edited work, which I cannot find on Amazon, “Environmental Security & Global Security,” this book is about all any professional needs for a good clear appreciation of how to address low intensity conflicts, complex emergencies, and operations other than war.

The authors understand what Will and Ariel Durant emphasized in their summative The Lessons of History when they said that morality is a strategic value. The heart of this book is about the non-negotiable value of moral legitimacy to govern as the precursor to addressing root problems and preventing terrorism and instability. Winning uncomfortable wars is an IO/psychological and sociological challenge, but you cannot win them, regardless of how much might, money, or message you put on target, if you are not moral in the first place (and if your supported government is not moral).

The other two core messages in this book focus on the urgency of unity of effort across all agencies and the coalition, and the desperate need for LONG-TERM operations with LONG-TERM funding and LONG-TERM commitments from the leaderships of the nations as well as the United Nations and other NGOs. The authors are damning of both the US Congress and the UN for failing to be serious about budgeting for long-term stabilization and reconstruction operations.

The SWORD model has seven parts: unity of effort; legitimacy of the coalition and the supported government; interdiction of support to the belligerents; effective supporting actions by the coalition; military actions by the coalition; interactions between the coalition and the belligerents; and finally, actions tailored to ending the conflict.

Ambassador Corr could easily be credited with being the third author. His forward provides a sweeping review of history while his conclusion emphasizes that we cannot win without first having “a deep understanding of the cultures and languages…”

A few case studies round out the book. Colombia, where my mother was born, has long been one of Max's special interests. His identification of the three wars (narcos, insurgents, and paramilitaries) reminds me of Tony Zinni's elegant distinctions among the six Viet-Nam wars a) Swamp War, b) Paddy War, c) Jungle War, d) Plains War, e) Saigon War, and f) DMZ War.

Max is far more polite and diplomatic than I am, but his message is clear: US policy is in la-la land when it comes to crop eradication. On pages 197-198 he points out that farmers make four times more from narcotics than from the next available legal crop, and that they are trapped in circumstances where even if they had a profitable legal crop, there is no credit, there are no roads, there is no market, there is no security, for them to evolve legally. Credit, roads, market, security–for the LONG TERM.

Another book that really drives home the ineptitude of our short-term interventions is the one by William Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict Two other nuanced books I recommend with this one are Robert McNamara and James Blight's Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century and Jonathan Schell's The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People.

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