David Isenberg: Trillions Later, No Lessons Learned on Reconstruction Economics

Government, Ineptitude, Military
David Isenberg
David Isenberg

The Ghost of Contracting Past

Huffington Post,21 December 2012

A report was released earlier this week by the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary assessments that offers some useful observations on how well the United States has learned to effectively utilize PMSC. Sadly, it appears the U.S. has not yet absorbed the lessons it has learned at dear cost during the past decade, meaning it has used its contracting weapon badly.

They found that:

only a meager body of research exists on how U.S. resources in the form of wartime contracts can be used most effectively to rebuild a war-torn economy. Consequently, if the United States embarks on another attempt at nation building, it may again be found ill prepared without a more concerted research effort into the economic reconstruction aspects of warfare, often referred to as expeditionary economics. Despite the U.S. military's long history of engaging in reconstruction, expeditionary economics remains relatively less understood than other aspects of war.

Put more simply, after thousands of American lives lost and at least a couple of trillion dollars, we deserve more at this point than a Dummies Guide to Contingency Contracting.

In their report “Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics,” senior fellow Todd Harrison and research assistant John Meyers assess the U.S. Expeditionary Economics effort employing four case studies: Iraq's State-Owned Enterprises, Local-First Programs, the National Solidarity Program and Commander's Emergency Response Programs.

Read full article.

 

NIGHTWATCH: From 1979 to 2012 – No Improvement in DoD Response to Ambassadors and Embassies in Extremis + EE21 RECAP

Corruption, Government, Ineptitude, Military
Click on Image to Enlarge
Click on Image to Enlarge

Ambassador Dubbs was killed in Afghanistan in 1979, not 1988. Thus there has been no improvement in US crisis management responses for rescuing a US ambassador in trouble between 1979 and 2012.

NIGHTWATCH KGS Home

See Also:

Graphic: Benghazi Fiasco Master Post with Links to All Posts, Map of DoD Assets Ordered to “Stand Down,” + RECAP

Continue reading “NIGHTWATCH: From 1979 to 2012 – No Improvement in DoD Response to Ambassadors and Embassies in Extremis + EE21 RECAP”

NIGHTWATCH: Benghazi – The Official Cover-Up

Corruption, Government, Idiocy, Ineptitude, Military
Click on Image to Enlarge
Click on Image to Enlarge

Special NightWatch Comment: The most important finding of the Accountability Review Board (ARB) on the Benghazi tragedy is that al Qaida is alive and well and living in Benghazi. The rest is pretty much well known, with a few exceptions.

As harsh as the words of the ARB Report seem about high level failures in the State Department, no one is held accountable. The Board found that mistakes were made. The report is essentially a white wash. Three people at State resigned today, but that is not the same as facing legal proceedings for civil or criminal negligence in wrongful death. The Board gave everyone a pass.

A few things that are confusing in the Benghazi report.

1.The Board found that the ambassador was responsible for mission security and he should have pushed harder for improvements. The implication is the ambassador ultimately was responsible his own death. Hmm….The ambassador made at least three pleas for improved security, including the last on the day of his demise. Other parts of the report make clear that no amount of pushing to improve security would have made a difference with senior State Department leadership.

2.The Board found that mistakes were made. The use of passive voice means the Board refused to find anyone, except the dead ambassador, to blame for the mistakes. The message is that things went wrong; people were murdered, but it was no one's fault. This is the core of the whitewash. This viewpoint evades questions of causality, incompetence, negligence and blame.

Continue reading “NIGHTWATCH: Benghazi – The Official Cover-Up”

Thomas Briggs: Comments on the US Secret Super Cloud — Dead Since 1995 — With Two Thoughts from Robert Steele

Cloud, Corruption, Government, Idiocy, Ineptitude, IO Impotency
Thomas Leo Briggs
Thomas Leo Briggs

Thomas Leo Briggs is a retired CIA operations officer with 3 years military experience in US Army military police, 3 years as a Special Agent in the Drug Enforcement Administration and 26 years in the CIA.  He tried to make use of computer capabilities to aid and assist humint operations in a variety of ways throughout his last 18 years as an operations officer.  He is also the author of Cash on Delivery: CIA Special Operations During the Secret War in Laos (Rosebank Press, 2009).

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COMMENTING ON:  Richard Wright: Secret Intelligence Cloud, Charlie Allen's Warning, Comment by Robert Steele

Intelligence Agencies Move Towards Single Super-Cloud by Heny Kenyon, Aol Defense, 17 December 2012

So, what we have here, according to Mr. Kenyon, is an effort to develop a pan-agency set of computer servers so that the analysts of all intelligence community (IC) agencies may share data and resources.  One reported hope being that such a system will break down existing boundaries between agencies and change their insular cultures.

The first thing a reader notices is that the alleged motivations for this super-cloud are lower costs and higher efficiency.  Secondly, the CIA already operates a cloud slightly separate from an NSA cloud consisting of five other intelligence agencies and the FBI.  Is that like being slightly pregnant?  Does that provide truly lower costs, higher efficiency, and shared resources and data?  Wouldn't one expect to find different data and resources on each cloud, though some data and resources may be the same?  Moreover, the NSA cloud incorporates the smaller organization-wide clouds of its partner agencies and, in addition, the National Reconnaissance Office has its own plan to build its own cloud.  Seems all of that that does not make for lowest costs and highest efficiencies – nor one super-cloud.

Continue reading “Thomas Briggs: Comments on the US Secret Super Cloud — Dead Since 1995 — With Two Thoughts from Robert Steele”

Eagle: European Court Convicts CIA of Rendition, Torture & Sodomy — Many More Cases Starting to Come Together Against CIA

Corruption, Government, Idiocy, Ineptitude
300 Million Talons...
300 Million Talons…

Khaled El-Masri, German Allegedly Kidnapped By CIA In Afghanistan, Wins Case

Angela Charlton

Huffington Post, 13 December 2012

PARIS — A European court issued a landmark ruling Thursday that condemned the CIA's “extraordinary renditions” programs and bolstered those who say they were illegally kidnapped and tortured as part of an overzealous war on terrorism.

The European Court of Human Rights ruled that a German car salesman was an innocent victim of torture and abuse, in a long-awaited victory for a man who had failed for years to get courts in the U.S. and Europe to acknowledge what happened to him.

Khaled El-Masri says he was kidnapped from Macedonia in 2003, mistaken for a terrorism suspect, then held for four months and brutally interrogated at an Afghan prison known as the “Salt Pit” run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He says that once U.S. authorities realized he was not a threat, they illegally sent him to Albania and left him on a mountainside.

Khaled El-Masri
Khaled El-Masri

The European court, based in Strasbourg, France, ruled that El-Masri's account was “established beyond reasonable doubt” and that Macedonia “had been responsible for his torture and ill-treatment both in the country itself and after his transfer to the U.S. authorities in the context of an extra-judicial rendition.”

It said the government of Macedonia violated El-Masri's rights repeatedly and ordered it to pay (EURO)60,000 ($78,500) in damages. Macedonia's Justice Ministry said it would enforce the court ruling and pay El-Masri the damages.

U.S. officials closed internal investigations into the El-Masri case two years ago, and the administration of President Barack Obama has distanced itself from some counterterrorism activities conducted under former President George W. Bush.

But several other legal cases are pending from Britain to Hong Kong involving people who say they were illegally detained in the CIA program. Its critics hope that Thursday's ruling will lead to court victories for other rendition victims and prevent future abuses.

Read full article.

Continue reading “Eagle: European Court Convicts CIA of Rendition, Torture & Sodomy — Many More Cases Starting to Come Together Against CIA”

Yoda: TIME Magazine Gives Up Fact-Checking [ We Do Not Make This Stuff Up!]

Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, Idiocy, Ineptitude, IO Impotency, Media
Got Crowd? BE the Force!
Got Crowd? BE the Force!

Up, TIME is [Joke make, Yoda]

Time Gives Up on Factchecking: Corporate Media Can't Find a Way to Tell the Truth

PETER HART – Truthout.org

In October, the inevitable was announced: Struggling Newsweek magazine would be finished as a print publication as of the end of the year. But the last mass newsweekly left, Time, also made an announcement of sorts: It was out of the factchecking business.

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Owl: Security Theater — At What Cost?

Corruption, Government, Ineptitude, Law Enforcement
Who?  Who?
Who? Who?

Judging by Bruce Schneier's review of Against Security: How We Go Wrong at Airports, Subways, and Other Sites of Ambiguous Danger, a new book by Harvey Molotch, this is a must-read:

The common thread in Against Security is that effective security comes less from the top down and more from the bottom up. Molotch’s subtitle telegraphs this conclusion: “How We Go Wrong at Airports, Subways, and Other Sites of Ambiguous Danger.” It’s the word ambiguous that’s important here. When we don’t know what sort of threats we want to defend against, it makes sense to give the people closest to whatever is happening the authority and the flexibility to do what is necessary. In many of Molotch’s anecdotes and examples, the authority figure—a subway train driver, a policeman—has to break existing rules to provide the security needed in a particular situation. Many security failures are exacerbated by a reflexive adherence to regulations.

Amazon Page
Amazon Page

Molotch is absolutely right to hone in on this kind of individual initiative and resilience as a critical source of true security. Current U.S. security policy is overly focused on specific threats. We defend individual buildings and monuments. We defend airplanes against certain terrorist tactics: shoe bombs, liquid bombs, underwear bombs. These measures have limited value because the number of potential terrorist tactics and targets is much greater than the ones we have recently observed. Does it really make sense to spend a gazillion dollars just to force terrorists to switch tactics? Or drive to a different target? In the face of modern society’s ambiguous dangers, it is flexibility that makes security effective.

We get much more bang for our security dollar by not trying to guess what terrorists are going to do next. Investigation, intelligence, and emergency response are where we should be spending our money. That doesn’t mean mass surveillance of everyone or the entrapment of incompetent terrorist wannabes; it means tracking down leads—the sort of thing that caught the 2006 U.K. liquid bombers. They chose their tactic specifically to evade established airport security at the time, but they were arrested in their London apartments well before they got to the airport on the strength of other kinds of intelligence.