Reference: Scientific Journal Publishes Conclusive Evidence of Super-Thermite Across Multiple Samples of World Trade Center Dust

09 Terrorism, Analysis, Articles & Chapters, Reform

Concluding sentence:

Based on these observations, we conclude that the red layer of the red/gray chips we have discovered in the WTC dust is active, unreacted themite material, incorporating nanotechnology, and is a highly energetic pyrotechnic or explosive material.

Bentham Open Access 25 Pages with Full Photographic and Other Graphical and Electromagnetic Evidence
Bentham Open Access 25 Pages with Full Photographic and Other Graphical and Electromagnetic Evidence

Continue reading “Reference: Scientific Journal Publishes Conclusive Evidence of Super-Thermite Across Multiple Samples of World Trade Center Dust”

Journal: Chuck Spinney Highlights: West ignores lessons of Soviet humiliation in Afghanistan

Analysis, Military

Times Online Story
Times Online Story

Its Afghan war spelt disaster for the USSR and now Nato is making the same mistakes
Victor Sebestyen
The Sunday Times [UK]
July 19, 2009

“There is barely an important piece of land in Afghanistan that has not been occupied by one of our soldiers at some time or another,” the commander said. “Nevertheless, much of the territory stays in the hands of the terrorists. We control the provincial centres, but we cannot maintain political control over the territory that we seize.”

He added: “Our soldiers are not to blame. They’ve fought incredibly bravely in adverse conditions. But to occupy towns and villages temporarily has little value in such a vast land, where the insurgents can just disappear into the hills.”

They could have been the words of a Nato general in the past few days. In fact they were spoken by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, commander of Soviet armed forces, to the USSR’s politburo in the Kremlin on November 13, 1986.

The Soviet forces were in the seventh year of their nine-year war in Afghanistan and had lost about 12,000 men. Akhromeyev, a hero of the siege of Leningrad in the second world war, had been summoned to explain why a force of 109,000 troops from the world’s second superpower appeared to be humiliated, year after year, by a band of terrorists.

Akhromeyev explained about the rough terrain, insisted the army needed more resources – including additional helicopters – and warned that without more men and equipment “this war will continue for a very long time”.

He concluded with words that sound uncannily resonant today, in the eighth year of Nato’s war: About 99% of the battles and skirmishes that we fought in Afghanistan were won by our side. The problem is that the next morning there is the same situation as if there had been no battle. The terrorists are again in the village where they were – or we thought they were – destroyed a day or so before.”

The Soviet campaign in Afghanistan is a largely forgotten war. Few strategists from Russia or the West seem to think anything can be learnt from it. But study Soviet archives and many lessons become clear.

As the world was not watching, the Soviet troops could be brutal, yet massive air raids and the destruction of villages, which killed 800,000 Afghans, did not work. Tactics changed over the years, each time accompanied by a “surge” of new troops that temporarily improved security for the Russian-backed communist government in Kabul.

Much of the fighting was in places that have become familiar to us. Soviet troops were sent on sweeps in the most troublesome areas on the border with Pakistan, through which most of the guerrillas’ weapons flowed, and the southern provinces of the country, such as Helmand. As soon as they left their fortified bases, the troops were in danger of ambush from bands of mujaheddin – the army of God.

That war, like today’s, was characterised by disputes between soldiers and politicians. As newly revealed Russian documents show, the Communist party bosses ordered the invasion against the advice of senior commanders. This caused continual friction in Moscow for many years.

Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the chief of the Soviet defence staff, and Akhromeyev, his number two, raised doubts shortly before Soviet forces were dispatched on Christmas Day 1979. They suggested to Dmitri Ustinov, the defence minister, that the experiences of the British and tsarist armies in the 19th century should encourage caution.

Ustinov told them to “shut up and obey orders”, according to politburo minutes.

Ogarkov went further up the chain of command to Leonid Brezhnev, the party boss. He warned that an invasion “could mire us in unfamiliar, difficult conditions and would align the entire Islamic East against us”. He was cut off in mid-sentence.

“Focus on military matters,” he was told. “Leave the policy making to us and to the party.” Not long afterwards the marshal was fired.

The Soviet troops realised soon after they entered Afghanistan that they had blundered, but Kremlin officials felt trapped. When Mikhail Gorbachev became leader in March 1985 he declared privately that ending the war – “our bleeding wound” – was his priority. But he could not do so for fear of losing too much face. Withdrawing the troops took a further four years as they searched for that difficult prize for armies on the run: peace with honour.

It was an agonising process that marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire and eventually the USSR itself. “How to get out of this racks one’s brains,” Gorbachev despaired to his fellow Soviet magnates in the spring of 1986. He told his generals later that year: “After all this time we have not learnt how to wage war there.”

When the last troops left on February 15, 1989, about 15,000 of their comrades had been killed. It was the only war the USSR lost. To Gorbachev, one vital issue was how to “spin” it correctly. As he wrote to his key aides during the last phase of the retreat, presentation was key: “We must say that our people have not given their lives in vain,” he said.

– Victor Sebestyen is the author of Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire, to be published on July 30 by Weidenfeld and Nicolson

Reference: Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 205 Analytic Outreach

Analysis, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), Methods & Process
ICD 205

This is an excellent directive that is being ignored across the entire U.S. Intelligence Community, and most speciicially is being violated by the unpressional narrow and unresponsive (and largely ignorant) behavior of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Open Source Center (OSC) which is supposed to be a service of common concern but has obstinantly refused to modernize since this matter was first brought up with its predecessor, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) in 1992 by the US Marine Corps.  For a critique of FBIS's rotten approach to open sources at that time, see 1992: USMC Critique of CIA/FBIS Plan for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT).  For the broader history of opposition see 2004 Modern History of Public Intelligence and the Opposition.

Analytic Outreach will not happen until the analysts themselves, and their branch chiefs, are given virtual “chips” they can cash in within a national and a defense open source intelligence program.  Long ago we called for $100,000 per year for each analysts, and $1 million per year for each branch chief, to support discretionary outreach, more often than not to uncleared foreign nationals and experts in the US wanting nothing to do with the secret world.  We specifically exclude “body shops” like CENTRA from consideration–if the individual analyst does not know specifically who is best in class and who to hire, they have not done their homework.  See the “cell” we first recommended to the Defense Intelligence Agency, note the financial individual able to execute credit card and other small contracts without further approvals, within the individual, branch, and division budgets.

2006 Markowitz (US) Open Source Information and US Transitions to and from Hostilities (Defense Science Board Report, December 2004), in Relation to Information-Sharing with non-DoD and Froeign Parties

10 Security, Analysis, Budgets & Funding, Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Historic Contributions, Legislation, Policy, Strategy, Threats
Joe Markowitz
Joe Markowitz

NOTE: By “off the record” Dr. Markowitz has clarified that this information may be shared as we are sharing it, but those benefiting from our sharing should treat the knowledge as if they had acquired it “off the record,” as personal views that should not be attributed nor accepted as anything other than background perceptions.

Joe Markowitx
Joe Markowitx

PLATINUM LIFETIME AWARD, Dr. Joseph Markowitz

Dr. Joseph Markowitz is without question the most qualified Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) pioneer in the ranks of those presently in or retired from U.S. government service.  As the only real chief of the Community Open Source Program Office (COSPO) he tried valiently to nurture a program being systematically undermined by both the leadership and the traditional broadcast monitoring service.  When he moved on to advise the Defense Science Board, he served America well by helping them fully integrate the need for both defense open source information collection and exploitation, and defense information sharing with non-governmental organizations.  His persistent but diplomatic efforts merit our greatest regard.

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