Diplomacy – Page 9 – Public Intelligence Blog

Pragmatic, Philosophical, and Patriotic, September 7, 2008

Andrew Bacevich

The book is a combination of pragmatism, philosophy, and patriotism, and a major contribution. To balance it out, I would recommend General Tony Zinni's The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose; Professor Joe Nye's The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone; and General Smedley Butler's War is a Racket: The Antiwar Classic by America's Most Decorated Soldier. Also The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World. And of course Chomsky and Johnson.

My notes:

“The United States today finds itself threatened bhy three interlocking crises. The first of these crises is economic and cultural, the second, political, and the third military. All three share this characteristic: They are of our own making.” (p. 6)

+ US short on realism and humility. See my reviews of The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World and Why the Rest Hates the West: Understanding the Roots of Global Rage

+ Citizenship is down, debt is up.

+ Book is a call to arms for citizens to put our own house in order–lest we miss this point, the author places “Set thine house in order” on the first page (2 Kings, chapter 20 verse 1).

+ The author credits the left, in general, with advancing rights and liberties in the USA.

+ He points out how we have been drowning in red ink from 1975 (and in fairness to the right, I believe we can now recognize that Bill Clinton's “surplus” was based on Wall Street fraud and fantasy, postponing our reconciliation with reality and the truth).

+ The author is at pains to address the hypocrisy of our Nation, see also: The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead and Fog Facts: Searching for Truth in the Land of Spin.

+ The author explores how the demise of the Soviet Union created a great deal of instability, including in particular in Central Asia but also elsewhere.

+ He explicitly identifies President Ronald Reagan's “Tanker War” (the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships) as setting the stage for today, and points out that not only was Iraq rather than Iran behind most of the attacks, but this also created the American delusion that it could force the oil pipe to stay open.

+ He slams Clinton and Albright for various good reasons.

+ Great quotes:

– “Long accustomed to thinking of the United States as a superpower, Americans have yet to realize that they have forefeited command of their own destiny.” (p. 65)

– “Rather than confronting this reality head-on, American grand strategy since the era of Ronald Reagan, and especially through the era of George W. Bush, has been characterized by attempts to wish reality away. Policy makers have been engaged in a de facto Ponzi scheme intended to extend indefinitely the American line of credit.” (p. 66)

+ The author joins a wide range of others in condemning all Washington institutions: DYSFUNCTIONAL.

The author points out that the ideology of national security is the key CONTINUITY across BOTH the dysfunctional parties.

On page 85 he addresses the cult of secrecy and the manner in which virtually all of our governmental agencies (not just the spies and the White House) evade public accountability.

The author addresses how our politicians and our senior civil servants and flag officers (generals and admirals) have come to feel IMMUNIZED from public accountability.

I smile on page 91, when John F. Kennedy concludes on the basis of the Bay of Pigs that he was set up, and that CIA is not only incompetent, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff are either stupid or untrustworthy, or both.

He spends some time on the bureaucracy as the enemy of Presidents, and I would beg to differ. Our bureaucracy's are quite valuable, but only if we respect their deep and broad knowledge.

On page 113 I am fascinated to see Nitze's contribution described as a “model” in which the enemy is demonized, “options” are offered that manipulate the decision, a “code language” is used to sway the public, and panic is promoted to sweep away reasoned inquiry. Then he caps this by pointing out that Wolfowitz is the heir to Nitze.

The author begins drawing to a conclusion by pointing out that we have been distracted from the real lessons of the Iraq war, and this begins the very rich final portion of the book.

LESSON ONE: Ideology of national security poses an insurmountable obstacle to sound policy making

LESSON TWO: Americans can no longer afford to underwrite a government that does not work.

LESSON THREE: The Wise Men concept is moose manure. “To attend any longer to this elite would be madness. This is the third lesson that the Iraq War ought to drive homo. What today's Wise Men have on offer represents the inverse of wisdom. Indeed, to judge by the reckless misjudgments that have characterized U.S. policy since 9/11, presidents would be better served if they relied on the common sense of randomly chosen citizens rather than consulting sophisticated insiders.” p 122-123.

He offers three illusions that took rote post Viet-Nam:

1) That we reinvented war in its aftermath (naturally, emphasizing extremely expensive stuff that does not always work)

2) That we could achieve “full spectrum warfare” while ignoring counterinsurgency and small wars and gendarme and so on.

3) Civilian and military leaders and staffs learned to make nice and work together. NOT SO.

Three more lessons that he caveats:

1) Civilians screwed up Iraq BUT our generals were mediocre and subservient

2) Commanders need more leeway BUT in fact they did not lack for authority, they lacked for ability (and I would add, integrity)

3) Need to repair the gap between the military and the public by reinstituting the universal draft BUT draft is not a good idea because it perpetuates the large one size fits all military

FINAL LESSONS:

1) War is war and we cannot simplify it or second guess chaos and friction

2) Utility of the Armed Forces is finite

3) Preventive war is lunacy

4) We have lost the art of strategy

I strongly recommend this book for the War Colleges and for thinking adults who may be very concerned about who is giving advice to the two presidential candidates: “the Wise Men” and the young wanna-be “wise boys” who are trying so desperately to be adults but do not read much and have not spent much time in the real world.

2009/03/302011/04/21

Review: China and Iran–Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World

5 Star, Country/Regional, Diplomacy

Foundation Stone for Serious Global Understanding,

May 30, 2009

John W. Garver

This is a sensational book, dry as only a serious academic can be, but so absolutely original and fundamental as to make me smile and cheer. This is what a book should be–original, properly sourced, wonderful appendix that is a chronology of Chinese and Iranian substantive state-level contacts, and so on.

Although the author cannot cover it all, the length of the book and the totality of this work move the book from four stars to five. This is a VERY important book for anyone who wants to move beyond the failed analytic frameworks and corrupt policy frameworks of the past and into reality in the 21st Century.

The bottom line up front: when it gets down to “either or” China will favor its desire for US comity over its respect for Iranian anti-hegemonism, but over time, China has executed a very skillful balancing act that has helped Iran restore its role as the central power in the Persian-Middle East region.

For me the huge eye-opener–I actually have goosebumps and am posting a variation of the map on page 292 of this book to share my appreciation–was the role that Pakistan and Iran play in giving China access to the sea and Middle Eastern energy as well as African natural resources.

Although India is not discussed in this book, I learn that the author has written Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century and that will be in my stack for my next long trip. This book is vitally important and as I reflect on all the books that I have absorbed over the years, this one stands out as “the way it should be done.” This is a perfect book at the strategic level. It could be complemented by others writing companion books, for example, I would love to see a book studying both Chinese and Iranian inroads into Africa and Latin America, illuminating both the processes and the cross-overs. The kind of thing CIA should be doing but does not, for at least four reasons: children as analysts; security obstacles to outreach; lack of a holistic analytic model; and lack of access to open sources that are not online, in English, and easily processed.

There are chapters on Iran and China in relation to Xinjiang Muslims; Chinese support to the Iranian nuclear program both directly and via Pakistan (siginficantly, China stood down on support related to weaponizing nuclear and also stopped Iranian use of Silkworm missiles from China against shipping). The three page chronology on this aspect is fine detail. The chapter on Chinese-Iranian military exchanges draws heavily on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and I am reminded of that organization's priceless contributions. The last three chapters cover US-Taiwan in relation to China-Iran; economy, and energy.

The 1000 word limit is a good one for reviewers, so I will be concise in the sharing of my other flyleaf notes:

1. PRIMAL FACTORS. The Chinese-Iranian relationship can be traced back and has been active since centuries before Christ. At the same time, China and Iran represent the apex of regional powers who have not been co-opted or corrupted by Western colonial hegemony backed by unilateral militarism. I can only anticipate they will be the “last man standing” on their home ground.

2. Iranian Constancy. Both Shah and Post-Shah have played US and Russians consistently, and both have been concerned about US and Russian incursions into the Indian Ocean.

3. Pakistan. Both China and Iran have convergent interests in Pakistan, and Pakistan is a key player on many fronts–a book by this author on Pakistan in relation to China, Iran India, Central Asia would be phenomenal.

4. China Core Concept. The strategic core concept that China pursues is “Unified Front.” The author elaborates. I note the contrast with US core concept of “American exceptionalism” and unilateralism (Obama is Empire as usual, I have sponsored a new meme, “Free Obama.” Between the two corrupt parties working for Wall Street, and the persistent special interests and Versailles bureaucracy, nothing has changed). At the operational level, the author discusses Chinese “Realistic Prudence.”

5. China-Iran Geopolitical. The map with embedded text on page 46 is so very good I am uploading that at well. This book is well illustrated, well-documented–a pure pleasure.

6. Civilizational Rhetoric. The author opens with this, and I love it. The author makes it clear that this matters [for decades I have called for historical intelligence, i.e. show me every Chinese, Vietnamese, Philippine, and Malaysian statement on the Spratley Islands going back 200 years, but to no avail–CIA does not do history or culture in any meaningful sense of the word, partly because they cannot read in the original languages and do not access ofline original books.]

7. Concerns About Iran. The author enumerates Chinese concerns about Iran, one wonders if any US policy bubbas have pursued this aspect of US-Chinese relations. See page 28.

8. End of the Shah. The author documents how China missed the rise of the Khomeini regime as did the USA. The clerics did not know China had 20 million Muslims, and this ultimately helped the dialog.

9. Stage Two. The author provides a lovely review of how China ramped up its relations with Iran in the aftermath of negative global opinion over its repression of demonstrations, the collapse of the USSR, and the unilateral aggressiveness of the USA in the Middle East.

10. Iranian Roadmap. The author outlines how Iran's strategic plan began with Lebanon, then moved over to Afghanistan, and next plans to focus on Central Asia and Xinjiang in China, the latter in the face of Chinese resistance. Pakistan needs its own book.

11. Gulf I and Gulf II. The public record available to the author suggests that both Iran and China opposed both US invasions (Gulf I and Gulf II) because they put a US armed presence or footprint in the area. My personal view is that Iran played the US for a sucker with Chalabi as an agent of influence, and got the US to knock of Hussein and displace the Taliban.

I have to stop here. This is a wonderful book, a deep serious contribution, a real original, absolutely essential for both undergraduate and graduate students as well as policy and business adults.

Other strategic books I admire that are top down in nature (this is a bottom up strategic book. You have to search for my summary reviews, Amazon buries serious reviews with any negative votes:
The Lessons of History
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence and the Will of the People
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility–Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
High Noon 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them
Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War
Global Values 101: A Short Course
Modern Strategy

AA Mind the Gap — Vote and/or Comment on Review

2008/10/252009/12/04

Review: Charm Offensive–How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World

5 Star, Country/Regional, Culture, Research, Diplomacy, Strategy

Extremely Good Effort for One Mind–Missing Some Links, October 25, 2008

Joshua Kurlantzick

I first studied China, the “Middle Kingdom,” in 1975 when I found Mao relevant to my primary interest, understanding and addressing revolution in all its forms. The image above is the heart of my graduate-level quick look at how the PRC exercised foreign influence back then. In addition, my father was a Chinese “guest” in 1967-1968 after pirate militia sank his trimaran enroute from Saigon to Hong Kong, a story told in Yachtsman in Red China.

The author has done a superb job of observing, interpreting, and documenting. I take away one star for a certain amount of naiveté and incompleteness–the book ends somewhat weakly–but I totally disagree with those who consider this book disorganized or less than four stars in merit. I found the book absorbing, consistent with my own recent observations tracking Chinese irregular warfare including both electronic warfare and waging peace in Africa and South America, and over-all, I cannot think of a finer book for American diplomats, politicians, and students of serious mien.

The author opens with a very personal and relevant account of how he watched the fall of US influence and the rise of Chinese influence in Thailand, marking the late 1990's as the time of change. To his surprise, when he asked US diplomats about this, he found them unaware. Today, they are aware, but powerless in the face of a White House that under Dick Cheney has totally destroyed the policy process (for an account of how this was done, see The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill.

He follows the 1990's in Thailand with a very compelling comparison of how George Bush was heckled by Australian senators and booed by the Australian public in 2003, while a few days later the Chinese leader Hu Jin Tao was welcomed as a hero. He points out that Australians now see US unilateral militarism as a threat to Australian peace and prosperity fully co-equal to the threat of radical Islam. For one balanced take on foreign public perceptions on America, see The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World

He properly credits Joe Nye with the term “soft power” but I am in agreement with the anthropologists and others who now choose not to use that term because global presence has to be managed as a Whole of Government/Whole Earth enterprise, something Stewart Brand and others understood decades before the rest of us. Of all Stewart's books, my favorite remains Clock Of The Long Now: Time And Responsibility: The Ideas Behind The World's Slowest Computer, a book I fear the Chinese appreciate vastly more than the two idiot parties now looting the US commonwealth on behalf of their Wall Street masters.

The author says that the Chinese think of their primary power as everything outside the military and security realm. See my image above for a nuanced understanding that is still valid–the names have changed, but the Chinese are simply playing a modern version of Middle Kingdom ubber alles.

The author reviews the mis-steps under Mao (Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, export of revolution), and then gives proper credit to Deng Xiao Ping as the transitional and transformational leader who adopted pragmatic reforms. The deal China made, in substituting enhanced nationalism for absolute communism, was “make money, not trouble” and all would be allowed.

The new leaders are college graduates and in many cases have graduate degrees. The end of the Cold War freed China from fear of Russia, and now China is focusing on the Second World. For good reasons why, see
The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order

The new era leaders clearly understand that global problems impact on them, and they must pursue global solutions.

Here are the 20 elements of China's global strategy as I understood them from the author's excellent account.

01 Stability in the 14 countries on its borders
02 Cease military confrontation (e.g. Spratleys), use non-military assets
03 Go after resources all over the world
04 Create ring of allies as buffer against US and other interventionists
05 Non-interference in affairs of others
06 “Born-again Multinationalism” (Susan Shirk)
07 Cooperative agreements (7 with Mexico, 14 with Venezuela, etc)
08 Help those the US shirks or slights (Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia, Uzbeckistan…)
09 Offer socio-economic model in which state, not market, is steering
10 Focus on small nations ignored by US and others
11 Cultural and public diplomacy ****needs its own book****
12 Direct recruitment of overseas Chinese in 1980's, used their wealth, $30B or 7% of external investment, as seed crystal for 1990's boom
13 Aid, trade, easy loans, investment (a fraction of what US does, but they get more mileage out of theirs by how and when and why they do)
14 Easy fit with corruption and deals outside the rule of law
15 Lots of construction including free buildings for headquarters (the author does not say this, I do: “no extra charge for the electronic bugs”)
16 Junkets to China, junkets with issue training for the staffs
17 Exporting men (this could have used more attention–Argentina will be majority Chinese by 2020 or so)
18 Exporting visual media (#2 in the world right now)
19 Rolling Taiwan back, everyone withdrawing recognition
20 Direct influence both good and bad (good: anti-drugs, some effort on human trafficking, on disease; bad: illegal lumber harvests in Myanmar, Indonesia)

The last three chapters are not as arresting, but still good:
IX: America's soft power goes soft, both Clinton and Bush killed us overseas
X: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, giving US “wedgies” all over the world
XI: Rest of World waiting for two things from USA: live up to our values and stop our bad policies

The author is a big naïve (or less informed) when he lambasts the Chinese for supporting dictators and fails to realize that our two corrupt political parties love 42 of the 44 dictators as their best pals (see Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025).

Serious book by a serious person for serious people. Well done.

My last four allowed links:
Election 2008: Lipstick on the Pig (Substance of Governance; Legitimate Grievances; Candidates on the Issues; Balanced Budget 101; Call to Arms: Fund We Not Them; Annotated Bibliography)
Running on Empty: How the Democratic and Republican Parties Are Bankrupting Our Future and What Americans Can Do About It
The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism
Collective Intelligence: Creating a Prosperous World at Peace

2008/10/032009/12/04

Review: Opening America’s Market–U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776 (Luther Hartwell Hodges Series on Business, Society and the State)

5 Star, Capitalism (Good & Bad), Diplomacy

Understood Difference Between FREE Trade and FAIR Trade, October 3, 2008

Alfred E. Jr. Eckes

I give the author high marks for explaining early on the difference between FREE trade and FAIR trade. While he is an avowed protectionist and much of what he offers must be balanced by more progressive views, the tide is turning as “true costs” become established and we all begin to realize that between exporting solid jobs for the middle class and the earnest blue collar trade specialists, and allowing illegal immigration and the Reagan-led destruction of the trade unions, we have put a stake in the heart of THE fundamental source of national power and prosperity: people.

2008/08/142009/10/30

Review: Losing the Golden Hour–An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction

5 Star, Diplomacy, Iraq, Stabilization & Reconstruction

Unusual Primary Source on Stabilization & Reconstruction, April 14, 2008

James Stephenson

I heard the author speak at the Army War College Strategy Conference organized by the Strategic Studies Institute (8-10 April 2008) and was so impressed I ordered his book on the spot. As a person, this man strikes me as supremely professional, competent, worldly, down-to-earth, and above all, without ego. This is a courageous individual that has specialized–only a handful can say this–in delivering aid into combat environments.

The book is relatively short–under 150 pages–well written and easy to read. Here are the highlights from my flyleaf notes:

1) 28 years experience in stabilization & reconstruction, seven failed states behind him that he tried to help

2) Foreword of the book is by Rich Armitage, a former Navy Seal that I have found to be a speaker of truth to power (one reason why the Bush Administration hated him)

3) Pentagon (Rumsfeld) blew it Part I. They closed the Department of State and the Agency for International Development (AID) out during the critical year before and year after the elective invasion and occupation of Iraq.

4) Pentagon (Rumsfeld) blew it Part II. They created a Pentagon version of AID run by a General that had no clue about the more nuanced community based assistance program, who blew his whole wad on heavy duty infrastructure projects instead of the community water, electricity, food, and sewage treatment and health security needed.

5) Pentagon (Rumsfeld) blew it Part III. Instead of embracing skilled experts from AID and elsewhere, the Pentagon staffed their program office with ideologically-pure puppies, enfants terrible whose only qualification was a resume at the Heritage Foundation and the ability to chant the mantra, “God Blesses Dick Cheney, Dick Cheney IS God.”

MOST IMPRESSIVE to me was the author's elegant discussion of how stabilization must be secured BEFORE reconstruction can begin.

The author points out that at 18 billion and up this was the largest RECONSTRUCTION project since the Marshall Plan (explicit throughout the book is the fact that the US Army, handicapped by Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz, never, ever, achieved sztabilization.

The author is kind to Wolfowitz. In his words, Wolfowitz was a decent man who fell sway to the “swan song” of Chalabi and the other knaves representing Iran and one slice of the Iraqi exiles.

The author is also careful to point out that he saw no villany, only incompetence and hubris, during his time in Iraq. [There is a superb recent memo, look for it at Earth Intelligence Network, on the utter incompetence of Foreign Service Officers and Pentagon “temp hires” to manage any kind of program.

Early on we learn that the Pentagon's program office for Iraq is totally dysfunctional, mockingly called the “Jonestown” of Iraq (where everyone drank the poisoned kool-aid).

The author slams Paul Bremmer as a good man who paid his dues in traditional diplomacy and had absolutely no clue how to manage an occupation presence. The author is careful to note that Bremer was an enigma, personable and competent but not right for the job, and to be faulted for allowing DoD to foist off on him an army of incompetent puppies, each a minor-league ideological hack.

The author is clearly a world-class expert in identifying stabilization first, then reconstruction, and in the latter, focusing on the urgency of domestic security, border control, and accommodating neighbors.

He is devastatingly critical of Admiral Nash (a Sea Bee) focusing on big engineering projects dealing with big infrastructure reconstruction, while completely missing out–not having a clue–on the importance of the less expensive but necessarily more pervasive and localized community reconstruction–rule of law, water, electricity, food, and don on.

He points out that because of ignorance at all levels of the Pentagon “chain of command” that completely excluded State and AID during the critical pre and post “Golden” years, agricultural reconstruction was not funded at all.

He returns to the theme of hundreds of US advisors whose only qualification was ideological insanity, each capable of doing great harm as long as they were within Iraq.

I am VERY impressed by the author's recounting of the logic behind ensuring that AID personnel received hardened cement residences instead of trailers–the cement could be done faster, provided more protection, and was cheaper. The idiot general in charge of housing, on the other hand, went with trailers because he was not a combat general that understood the dangers of loose shrapnel in the night (in Viet-Nam, after each of 10 coups, I would pick shrapnel out of those wonderful French roll-down windows that could stop anything short of an RPG).

Kudos go from the author to, among others:

David Wall of International Resources Group

General Peter Chiarelli of 1st Cav gains huge face here, to the point that he could be a real star at the four-star level in the near term. This is a general that understood and demanded community-level assistance to prevent the need for deaths and bullets.

Fernando Cossich is described as heroic and clearly merits his own Wiki page at Wikipedia.

Ambassador Negroponte gets very high marks from this author, who describes Ambassador Negroponte as forceful in demanding everyone recognize that his arrival represented the END of the occupation, and the beginning of US representation to the Iraqi sovereign government. I was deeply impressed by this portion of the book.

In dealing with rumors and morale, the author found, based on his experience, that transparency and constant accountability was the best.

USAID kept 30,000 young men from insurgency by employing them via various means that did not cause them to be targets.

The military, up to and including General Abizaid, had no clue what AID did or was capable of doing. A Capt as permanent liaison to AID proved to be worth his weight in gold.

During the darkest days, the author discovered that the Pentagon has no evacuation plan, a mandated requirement.

The Pentagon was considerd so very blind, reliant on sources that told them what they wanted to hear, that the CIA Station challenged and mocked the “good news blinders”. The author elaborates that the Pentagon wanted to pretend everything was fine, and did not understand that security in a non-permissive environment was something to be managed, not pretended.

The author concludes that we missed the Golden Hour by persisting in occupation and allowing looting and then allowing contractors to spend on security that should have been the precondition for contractors entering the country at all.

The author is careful to praise the contractors. They did what they were asked to do, in a non-permissive environment that the Pentagon allowed to exist when General Shinseki, General Zinni, and so many others had warned in advance, as did Mr. White of the Department of State, of the insanity of going it at all, much less “Rumsfeld Lite.”

The author concludes that Iraq cannot remain whole. The Kurds and the Shi'ites have their act together and are already independent, while the Sunnis self-immolate in chaos aided and abetted by US incompetence.

The author himself recommends the following two books:
Blood Money: Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq
Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone (Vintage)

I put this book down with a sense of reverence and admiration. I knew AID people in Southeast Asia, in Viet-Nam, in Thailand, and elsewhere, including AID people that died in the line of duty. I am now convinced we need a Vice President for Foreign Affairs with complete oversight of State, AID, a restored US Information Agency with the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Open Source Agency as the two main divisions, and Defense as a reduced power.

Of all the books I have read on Iraq, this is the one that I take most seriously. It is a first-person account, focused on the good side of America. The author is clearly qualified to be director of AID under a sane president and a legal vice president, and I for one think he is one of the very best men in public service.

2008/05/042010/01/05

Review: New Turkish Republic–Turkey As a Pivotal State in the Muslim World

5 Star, Country/Regional, Diplomacy

Undergraduate Overview, Superb Price, a Real Value, May 4, 2008

Graham Fuller

I might have made this a four star since it is missing a couple of big pieces, but the overall book is so well presented in summary form, and the publisher has made it so reasonably priced, this would appear to be exactly the kind of book that is ideal for both the undergraduate and the graduate whom might be beginning a more intensive look at Turkey in its new “360 degrees” or Ankara-centric re-emergence as both a regional power and a continental power.

No Turks in, of, and for Turkey are on the credits, which confirms my first impression that this is a superb primer of, by, and for American students, but the US Institute of Peace is the publisher, so I get over it. Still, the book does not address the Muslim world outside the immediate region, and I am immediately irritated by the early depiction of Paul Wolfowitz as a proponent of democracy in Iraq–Wolfowitz lied to Congress and the public, and is no more a proponent of democracy anywhere than I am in favor of making Islam the ruling religion in America.

Having said that, the author's commitment and knowledge cannot be denied, and I found this book totally worthy of my time. I learned from it.

+ Turkey *is* a part of the Middle East, but ignored it up through the 1990's and did not settle its border with Syria until 2004.

+ Turkey, not Saudi Arabia or any other pretender, has been the center of the Muslim world (the Caliphate) for six centuries, and as the center of the Ottoman empire was the protector of the Holy Places.

+ The author asserts that Turkey is the most advanced secular and democratic state in the Muslim world. Huh? Coming out of an era of military dictatorships, and never mind Malaysia, Indonesia, or India (second largest Muslim population after Indonesia)? Not so fast!

+ While the author sets forth a key question, will Muslims embrace democracy, I point the reader to Who Speaks For Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think and the finding in that book that most Muslims consider democracy to be a FOREIGN concept.

+ The author shocks early on in pointing out that Turks consider the USA to be the TOP THREAT to Turkey. I begin to realize the author has delicately folded major truths in, with a minimalist pandering to the jerks that are still in power (or seeking power one last time before they run out of Depends diapers for adults).

+ No one in the White House or anywhere else in the USG is likely to read this book (less well-intentioned Foreign Area Officers on their way there) so I regard the book as a useful cautionary tale for all of us. The neoconservatives took Turkey for granted, offended Turkey, and are so visibly amoral and inept as to inspire contempt from Turkey, a contempt I certainly share. As the author puts it, we are “treading water” with Turkey (as a time when they should be one of our “top ten” for deep engagement).

+ The author tells us that Turkey abolished the Caliphate in 1924, and that this was a body blow to Islam. In a brilliant analogy, he says that this would be the equivalent of an Italian Prime Minister abolishing the Papacy without consulting Catholics worldwide, and doing so as a snap decision.

+ The author illuminated the Turkish intellectual vision of state, faith, and modernity being compatible, and provides two very valuable pages on t he Abant Forum for intellectual tolerance and inquiry.

+ A great deal of the book is undergraduate level brevity (e.g. the Iran-Iraq war gets one paragraph at a time when Turkey was a major adjacent party).

+ Among the prices of the Cold War (see my review of The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World was the disconnection of Turkey from the Middle East and the Arabs, making is a client state of the USA in unwelcome and ultimately unwise ways.

+ The author teaches me that the Kurdish revolutionaries and separatists, the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, or Kurdish Workers Party) are a problem in Syria and Iran as well as Iraq and Turkey. I gain the impression that Turkey will do just about anything to prevent a free Kurdistan, but I also wonder in Kurdistan and Palestine are two areas that could be turned into zones of peace and development.

+ On that note, I learn that Palestine was part of the Ottoman empire, and that the Sultan was the Protector of Holy Places.

+ I am deeply engaged by the author's discussion of Islamic banking, and Turkish concerns that the Saudi regime is using increased focus on this as a means of reinforcing Islamic forces within Turkey.

+ I learn that Turkey is pursuing a regional strategy of “no enemies” and has a foreign policy strategy of “proactive peace.” Wow. This is seriously good stuff, and it shames me that America cannot rise to this level of sophistication and future-focus.

+ I learn that four of the five Central Asian states are Turkic, and that after the USA and Russia, China is Turkey's major concern, in part because the Uyghurs are Turkic. Has the USA ever had a Turkic strategy or a Caliphate strategy? Highly doubtful.

+ The author states that the Turks are suspicious of Saudi international policies, and I wonder why there is no deeper discussion, especially since it is now widely known that the Saudi dictatorship has been funding Bin Laden, rote-learning madrasses, and total hate crimes against Shi'ites (15%, with Iran as the only state).

+ He says that Turkey has a strong commitment to Afghanistan, but here I have a note, “too much avoidance.” This is an excellent book and easily understandable by an undergrad, but it needs a couple more chapters (one on Saudis as enemies of Muslim stability world-wide, another on Turkey and the non-Arab Muslim states), and a decent bibliography with a 360 view of competing authorities.

+ He tells us the Kurds have entered mainstream Turkish politics, including election to their Parliament, but I am skeptical and wondering if there is not a really big deal to be cut that runs from Turkey to Kurdistan and Lebanon to Palestine–the three trillion we have wasted in Iraq could have resurrected America AND paid for a massive Marshall Plan for the region.

+ The US chapter is vital. It will never be read by those that make their own idiotic reality, but for the rest of us, it is a fine tale of friction, opportunity lost, a lack of sufficient respect, and more. This is a really good and really important chapter.

The book concludes that Turkey has three choices: continue to be US centric, become Europe centric and join the European Union, or return to Ankara centric, with 360 interests and responsibilities in all directions. I am truly inspired by this book, and in the future will factor Turkey in as co-equal to Brazil, China, Indonesia, India, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela.

Bottom line: this book was a real pleasure to read as an adult hooked on respecting reality, and I strongly recommend it for both teaching at any level, and for anyone interested in what is clearly a major player in the 21st Century. On balance, this book respects Turkey in a very sincere and useful way, while delicately calling out the USA (under all recent Administrations of either party) for being distant, dumb, inattentive, and generally stupid. I am reminded of Daniel Elsberg lecturing Kissinger on how one becomes like a moron the higher up the secret classification scale you go, thinking you know more secret, and becoming unwilling to listen to those with their feet on the ground and decades of eyes and ears on and in place. See my review of Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers.

2008/04/272009/10/30

Review: How We Missed the Story–Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan

4 Star, Diplomacy, Information Operations, Stabilization & Reconstruction, United Nations & NGOs

Important Contribution with Some Errors and Omissions, April 27, 2008

Roy Gutman

I cannot second-guess the author's findings based on his extraordinary direct research, but I do question some of what he was told (Madeline Albright, for example, misled this author), and I also have some issues with how the book's findings over-state, under-state, and ignore other credible sources I have reviewed here at Amazon.

Up front, seven excellent insights from this book:

1. The U.S. in the 1990's had no idea that Information Operations (IO) was going to be important, and that the dissemination of deadly knowledge (e.g. from the Afghanistan wars, on how to create Improvised Explosive Devices, etcetera) was going to become a global threat. Tracking “dangerous knowledge” has now become one of my top “indicator & warning” elements. See my review of Forbidden Knowledge: From Prometheus to Pornography

2. Small wars cannot be ignored, power vacuums cannot be allowed or they will be filled negatively. Non-state actors can hijack a state and we need to notice when they do. It is at this point I begin to feel the author is over-stating Bin Laden's reach, especially when compared to criminal states around the world. See my review of Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy.

3. Successive administrations, from Bush Senior to Clinton to Bush Jr, had no clue about the importance of the “cultural roots” that Bin Laden was spreading with his financing of madrasses across Afghanistan (it is at this point I grow concerned that the author is ignoring the Saudi government's financing of both Bin Laden and the madrasses all over the world and especially in Indonesia). I have scheduled a book on CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE: Beliefs, Faiths, Ideologies, and the Five Minds for 2009. This is clearly an area where the US Intelligence Community and the foreign policy/national communities know nothing.

4. If journalists are not on the scene in every clime and place, then it is easier for the US Government to ignore problems that will inevitably ignore borders and come home to America. See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility–Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The author ignores the fact that with the exception of The Atlantic Monthly, the New Yorker, and the Boston Globe, virtually every newspaper and journal is a paid huckster for their corporate owners.

5. IMPORTANT: Administration must not only HAVE a grand strategy, but within that strategy must craft BOTH a domestic message for the US public and an inter-agency foreign policy campaign plan for achieving OUTCOMES, not just “messages.” This was the book's strongest point.

6. American indifference reinforces instability enablers and formentors. I know for a fact that Madeline Albright repressed INR reporting on terrorism becoming a real problem. She chose to accept Iran's attack on Khobar Towers and the Al Qaeda attacks on two embassies and the USS Cole as “acceptable losses.” That alone disqualifies her from advising Hillary Clinton on anything.

7. UN and UN negotiated for the Soviet pull-out but not for a stable follow-on regime. Deja vu in Iraq. Over-all the author does an excellent job of depicting a generally blase, sometimes naive, and often inattentive US foreign policy establishment across all three administrations. See my review of Running The World: the Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power for a sense of the clowns our Presidents tend to appoint for lack of a stronger TRANSPARTISAN bench.

Without regard to how the author may have been led by those telling their story as they would have it come out, there are a number of “dots” that I found worthy of note:

+ Bin Laden is reported to have forecast Iraq's attack on Kuwait and eventually on Saudi Arabia.

+ Over-emphasis on Bin Laden's anti-Americanism and I have noted, “a hit job of Clarke and Scheuer.” It was the US keeping bases in Saudi Arabia that set Bin Laden off, together with the Saudi refusal to allow him to attack Hussein directly.

+ US reliance on Pakistan and failing to deal direct with the Afghan regimes and principal tribes was a fatal error

+ Author avoids any mention of the fact that it was the Saudi regime that funded Bin Laden and global spread of virulent Wahabbism from 1988 onwards.

+ Although Cheney appears in the Index several times, the book and the author, rather astonishingly, fail to to report:

– Cheney was given the mandate for terrorism from day one under Bush Junior, and it was Cheney who first, failed to take terrorism seriously, and then allowed it happen in order to justify an invasion of Iraq. See, among MANY other books, 9/11 Synthetic Terror: Made in USA, Fourth Edition among many other works.

– Both the Clinton and Bush Junior Administrations were actively negotiating with the Taliban over oil and natural gas pipelines. See Crossing the Rubicon, The Long Emergency, and many other works along these lines.

+ Senator Jesse Helms not only destroyed the US Information Agency, the only US agency with a clue on foreign cultures and belief systems, but he also castrated the Agency for International Development (AID) at precisely the time it was most needed.

+ Karzai flagged the Taliban as a group worthy of supporting.

+ US Intelligence had astronomical sums for “getting” Bin Laden but almost nothing for fostering stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan, including support to nationalists like Moussaud.

+ In 1999 Pakistan and Iran cut a deal–THAT IS THE SECOND STORY WE MISSED. [We know have a great deal of reporting in the open on Iranian funding of Pakistani nuclear program, and in my view, likelihood that the quid pro quo was an Islamic nuclear warhead for the Russian Sunburn missiles (carrier killers, 3.0 mach straight, 2.2 mach zig-zag).

+ The author is naive or poorly informed or duplicitous in his stating that Bin Laden was outraged at the illegitimate Arab rules, stating it in such as way as to question Bin Laden's sanity. Michael Scheur and I are agreed on this point: Bin Laden has had good cause to condemn US presence in the Middle East. See my review of Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025 as well as Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror.

+ He reminds us that Ambassador Bill Richardson accomplished nothing in his mission to Afghanistan.

+ He reminds us that Khalizad, the darling of Bush Juniors regime, was part of the problem within the Clinton Administration.

+ He tells a very good story over-all of how conflicted the Department of State was in on the one hand, considering the Taliban not bad over all (what does not come out is the oil and gas deals in the background) and their record on human rights, which included mass murders and atrocities against women and children.

+ The THIRD BIG STORY WE MISSED was the Arabization of the Taliban, to include their changing to the Arabic calendar, the Arabization of libraries (which is to say the burning of most books), and the destruction of Hindu and other religious antiquities, something Pakistan tried to stop. This is new to me, I have not seen reference to it before, and I consider Bin Laden's influence over the Taliban to be seriously over-stated, but I accept this as useful perspective and certainly a good example of how the US simply does not “do” cultural intelligence.

The book ends with a focused chronology (focused instead of incomplete–the author did not set out to do a global review on this missed story, one is still needed) and a generally good index.

I put this book down thinking once again how desperately we need a private sector or public ABLE DANGER able to connect all the dots across all the books. I have tried for years to get Jeff Bezos to realize he can monetize micro-text for micro-cash and also sense-making across literatures, but he is in denial on World Brain possibilities, at least for now.

This is a solid four-star book, certainly worthy of buying and reading if you are responsible for South Asia, Central Asia, terrorism, or understanding why US foreign and national security policy continue to be managed by cronies with little deep knowledge of the real world and no holistic strategic model for addressing threats, policies, and state and non-state partners in a coherent sustainable manner.

My final three links:
Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century
Security Studies for the 21st Century
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century

Category: Diplomacy

Review: The Limits of Power–The End of American Exceptionalism (American Empire Project)