The truth at any cost lowers all other costs — curated by former US spy Robert David Steele.
SHORT URL: http://tinyurl.com/UN-Class-1
See Especially:
2011 Peace from Above: Future of Intelligence & Air Power
References: NATO Transformation Process Documents — and Gaps + Peace from Above RECAP
See Also:
Adequate Content, Disgusting Pricing,
David Carment
I wish to respectfully inform all prospective buyers that a book like this, in lots of 2,500, costs a US penny a page to produce. I could produce this book for $34.95, with Amazon paying me $15.75, which after cost of printing and graphics would leave me with a $10 profit.
I am–to put it mildly–outraged at the disgraceful overpricing that the publishers are attaching to this book. This kind of over-pricing urges the violation of copyright and the posting of a pirated copy of this book to the web.
I earnestly hope that Amazon will get into the business of direct publishing to Kinko's and localized delivery by Federal Express, and put such dishonorable publishers completely out of business.
SHAME!
Free peace intelligence at Earth Intelligence Network.
All OSS books, including Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future are free online at OSS.Net, or reasonably prices on Amazon. We are opening a new edited book on Peace Intelligence (Col Jan-Inge Svensson, SE Ret) as editor and inviting contributions from authors who are not happy having their work buried by publisher greed.
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I Respond to Comments Here or There
Timely, Relevant, Useful, Incomplete, Well-Presented, Lacking Notes & Larger Context,
This is an important book for our time. Indeed, I put it down thinking that the author has presented us with a meal of worms–and only those visible at the top of the planter box–but when you are starving–when there is no other viable alternative for peacekeeping–worms can be appetizing.
Before I present some details that made it to my fly-leaf notes, a few “big points” that stayed with me:
1) UN is a grotesque failure in many many ways, but also the closest thing we have to a viable global enterprise, hence, a good starting point for all its flaws.
2) Not addressed at all in the book, spoken of only in passing, the rather important point that most UN agencies are not at all subordinate to nor responsive to the Secretary General and his Secretariat.
3) The UN suffers from two major impediments: first, that the contributing or Member nations do not really want it to be effective, and ham-string it, particularly the Security Council members, although the author is vitriolic on China and Russia vetoing votes, while strangely silent on the US and its constant veto; and second, that personal relations built over decades far out-weight actual job titles and responsibilities, and can be blamed for many things including the Oil for Food corruption nightmare.
4) The author gently explores three major alternatives to the current situation:
4a) the division of the UN into a global body for mobilizing resources and consensus; and a separate global police or gendarme force. I would note, with a genuflection toward Oakley et all in “Policing the New World Disorder,” that this needs to be standing force or at least an earmarked force, ideally led by the Dutch, which trains together and has inter-operable concepts, doctrines, and equipment. See also the edited work, “Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future.”
4b) a Democracies body, one that purportedly brings together democracies and ends the domination of the UN by third-rate third-world countries, many managed by dictators and corrupt leaders who loot their commonwealths far more aggressively than Wall Street loots America and the rest of the world. This fails when one realizes that most democracies really are not…
4c) Regional networks that bring to bear regional concerns and resources in the context of the varied global agencies. This has some real possibilities, especially if information is shared broadly to provide a “ground truth” that is undeniable. I am reminded of J. F. Rischard's excellent recommendations in High Noon 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them
There is a useful history of key Secretary Generals, one that makes the point that Dag Hammarskjöld was an anomaly, and Annan, for all his flaws, may be one of the few to rise to the Hammarskjöld level of effectiveness..
The author provides a useful history of UN ineffectiveness and UN successes. I certainly recommend that this book be read in tandem with William Shawcross's Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict Interestingly, Shawcross and US diplomat Holbrooke were the only two personal guests at the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony.
This book is severely lacking in two ways:
1) It really does not communicate the complexity of the over-all UN archipelago of fiefdoms, most of which are not responsive to the Secretary General, nor does it adequately describe the many problems for the UN created by Third World and other blocs. In this book, China, Russia, and to a much lesser extent than it merits, the US, are the evil doers.
2) It completely misses the role that multinational, multiagency, multidisciplinary, multidomain information sharing, what the Swedes call M4IS, can play in bringing disparate groups to the table. The word “intelligence” does not appear in the index nor as far as I can tell, in the book itself. Overall the book focuses excessively on the Oil for Food scandal, and on Darfur, correctly making the point that Darfur was anticipated, that the Member nations chose to pay lip service to the problem through UN “deliberations,” but the book fails to point out that Darfur is one of 17 genocides on-going, and it fails to put the Secretary General's mission in the larger context of what I call the [ten threats, twelve policies, and eight challengers]. See The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political–Citizen's Action Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs, & Corruption for large context.
The author concludes that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq have weakened the UN; and that most of the world does not see terrorism as a threat. Indeed, since this was written, the High-Level Threat Panel places terrorism as ninth on a list of ten high-level threats.
Throughout the book the role of the US as the 900 lb bully is the subtle and sometimes not so subtle sub-text. My own view, formed by my actual experience as well as my broad reading in non-fiction, is that the US, for all its good, is also the single most negative force on the planet, simply because it persists in virtual colonialism, unilateral militarism inclusive of 750 secret and not secret bases world-wide, and its tolerance for predatory immoral capitalism that has created a class war in which US financial and corporate elites bribe foreign elites, and they both destroy their own middle classes while looting all relatively defenseless economies. See the books Confessions of an Economic Hit Man; The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy; and Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions.
There is PLENTY of money to address the ten high-level threats with twelve intelligent inter-related policies that help the eight challengers avoid American mistakes that today produce a third of the waste on the planet while consuming a third of the energy. What we need now, in support of our new Secretary General, is a commitment to implement ALL of the Brahimi Report recommendations, inclusive of a Director of Global Intelligence (Decision-Support), perhaps sponsored by the UN Foundation, so that every Member nation, and every non-governmental organization, might operate in a transparent, accountable, sensible context. See Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future and my essays on “Virtual Intelligence” and on “Information Peacekeeping: The Purest Form of War.”
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I Respond to Comments Here or There
“Peacekeeping Intelligence & Information Peacekeeping”
This is a short but very worthwhile book that while it might be flawed in some small ways, renders and invaluable service but putting all of the arguments against the United Nations into one easy to understand and well-organized book.
The author is dramatically and compellingly sensible when he addresses the insanity of letting a bunch of left of center poor nations, each led by fat-cat corrupt bureaucrats living high on the hog and stealing their own countries blind, “out vote” the bill-payer–the USA–and saddle the USA with all kinds of costly and often ludicrous program demands.
He is also compelling in condemning United Nations tolerance of terrorism and of corruption. While the US continues to support 44 dictators–something that is addressed by Ambassador Mark Palmer is his superb book on “The Real Axis of Evil” and therefore something we have to stop before we can credibly criticize the United Nations, the author makes a strong case for dumping the UN and moving toward a new form of organization that is comprised of only the democratic nations that are not corrupt and that can pay their bills.
The author arouses fury, at least in me, when he points out that Russia and China have manipulated the system and avoided their responsibilities by paying, in 2003, $18.6 million for Russia and $23.7 million for China, this at a time when the US is paying 22% of the entire United Nations system budget. ENOUGH!!
There are over 15 places throughout the book where I have “AGREE!” in the margins, and I give the author very high marks for itemizing everything that is wrong with the United Nations and that needs to be fixed in a new organization. At one point, I could even see the great value of throwing the UN out of the US, of the Rockefeller family repossessing the land they gave to the UN for its HQS. Enough. Let them move to Geneva while we create a completely new building and a completely new democratic-capitalist organization that can serve as the political and economic counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
This brings up another point–the author very wisely points out all that is wrong with the European countries that abuse their NATO membership to get a free ride on regional security, when they are unwilling to invest even minimalist amounts in their own armed forces and in forces that could be use to the coalition. The author makes important points against both Germany and France that need to be understood by all Americans.
I do not normally agree with all that neo-conservatives say, but in this case, I believe the author has rendered a stellar service, and his book is not only worthwhile, it is politically actionable. Good stuff.
See also, with reviews:
Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Information And Communication Technology for Peace: The Role of Ict in Preventing, Responding to And Recovering from Conflict (Ict Task Force Series) (Ict Task Force Series)
Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes
Burundi on the Brink 1993-95: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy (Perspectives Series)
The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power
The author's primary focus is on what some would call “public diplomacy” or “public affairs” information, that is, the message that goes out from the United Nations force (civil, military, police) to all concerned–the world at large, the participating governments, the Member governments not participating, all other NGOs and organizational participants, the host government, and the indigenous belligerents and bystanders (many of them refugees).
The author's two core points are that information operations must be in the UN mandate or it will be unlikely to be addressed as a coherent unified program by the leaders on the ground; and that the information program *must* be unified–there cannot be separate SGSR, force commander, and police commander messages and programs.
Although the author makes passing reference to intelligence and the value of information collected overtly by elements of the total force, both this work and the book specifically avoid any discussion of intelligence in the form of decision support, as the Brahimi Report has stated so forcefully is needed by the UN at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
The author makes very good points with respect to the need for continuity of operations (too many personnel on short tours make it impossible to succeed), for substantial numbers of language-qualified interpreters and translators, and for an educational program to teach all concerned within the force, the message, and their role in getting the message out.
The author touches very lightly on the fact that no amount of message is going to save a completely screwed up mission with the wrong mandate, insufficient forces, insufficient aid, and lousy tactical leadership.
In my view, in the age of information, the concepts of peacekeeping intelligence and information peacekeeping, two different concepts, are going to comprise the heart of stabilization operations world-wide. Emerging technologies including application oriented intelligence networks, semantic web and synthetic information architecture, super-sized federated data systems, and fully funded commercial information support operations, will dramatically alter what we do, when we do it, and how we do it, as we all seek to avoid war and foster prosperity within the lesser developed regions of the world.
The author is, in my view, one of the intellectual pioneers whose voice must be heard, and it is my hope that we will see more from her on this topic in the very near future.
See also:
Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future
This book is a first class piece of work, a seminal work with ideas not readily available elsewhere. Building on her earlier monograph about the UN experience in Haiti with respect to public information–a monograph that is included in this book as a chapter–the author has gone on to look at several other UN operations.
The author's conclusions are consistent with but expand upon her findings from the Haiti mission.
1) Information Operations must be in the mandate and must be a major focus of effort from day one. Although the author has a limited focus, on information as public affairs or public diplomacy, her points are all relevant to the larger appreciation of Information Operations as inclusive of decision-support and tactical-operational Peacekeeping Intelligence, as well as the larger concept of Information Peacekeeping.
2) Secretary General's Special Representative (SGSR), the military force commander, and the police force commander must agree on unified public information operations and an integrated staff with a single coherent message.
3) Standing staffs and normal tour lengths are essential to success. The somewhat common practice of Member states rotating people in and out in 30-90 day cycles is simply not professional and ultimately undermines the mission.
4) Considerable numbers of language-qualified translators and interpreters are required.
5) In illiterate societies (such as Haiti), radio and music rule. Strong radio programs can be extremely helpful, but only if hundreds of thousands of portable radios, and the batteries to power them, are given out. When confronting violence on the street, or seeking to break up gathering mobs, music has extraordinary power to diffuse anger.
While the author is most diplomatic in addressing the facts, it is clear from this book that the Department of Public Information (DPI) at the UN has still not matured, and is still a major obstacle to the implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendations on creating strategic, operational, and tactical decision support or intelligence capabilities for all UN operations. In my personal view, the next head of the DPI needs to be given one simple order: “turn DPI into a global grid for information collection and information sharing, or find a new job.” DPI today is 77 one-way streets, and generally immature one-way streets with potholes. DPI has no understanding of peacekeeping intelligence, information peacekeeping, information metrics, or information as a substitute for money and guns. In the context of what the Brahimi Report seeks to accomplish–all of it good and urgently needed–DPI appears to be a huge cancer within the UN, one that must be operated on before the larger UN information environment can become effective.
The author adds to the literature in articulating six principles for outward communications of message in a peacekeeping operation; in brief, 1) public perceptions are a strategic factor; 2) international and local public opinion impact on the political influence that impacts on tactical effectiveness; 3) external information campaign must be a strategic focus from day one; 4) education campaigns, e.g. on the rule of law, are vital aspects of peacekeeping campaigns; 5) culturally-sensitive messaging is a must; and 6) transparency of policy and objectives is a pre-condition for message success.
The notes and references in this book are quite professional. One wonders if the Brazilians and the Americans are reading the DPKO Mid and Post Mission Assessment Reports from Haiti in 1996, or simply making the same mistakes anew.
See also:
Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Information Operations: All Information, All Languages, All the Time
The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political–Citizen's Action Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs, & Corruption
THE SMART NATION ACT: Public Intelligence in the Public Interest
