Secret intelligence is ten percent of all-source intelligence; all-source intelligence is ten percent of Information Operations (IO). IO is the foundation for Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing and Sense-Making (M4IS2), which in turn makes it possible to create a world that works for all.
All entries listed and linked below the line. Links repaired 21 November 2011
Collective intelligence is not an abstraction. It is a real-world emergent phenomenon — a phenomenon that ranges from collective stupidity to collective brilliance. It arises from interactions among entities in shared situations. Collective intelligence — of any quality — can just happen, or it can be consciously enhanced or undermined. The diversity of the entities involved and the free flow (and absorption and consideration) of relevant information among them can facilitate higher levels of collective intelligence. But regardless of what is happening, some level of collective intelligence is always present wherever interacting entities share fate in shared circumstances.
Many people think collective intelligence only applies to groups of people or, perhaps also, to groups of primates and social insects. But we as individuals are actually intelligent collectives. One aspect of this can be seen when a therapist helps a patients sort out different “voices” inside them — and then has those voices talk to each other — sometimes with the patient physically moving to different chairs assigned to each voice. In therapy, these bickering “voices” are helped to come up with some coherent decisions or more conscious relationships among themselves that make the patient more functional and feel more whole. As it gets its act together, this little internal community acting as one person usually seems to work quite well!
The Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) is a direct descendant of the failed U.S. Army Future Combat System Program (FCS) which was cancelled in 2009 after a cost of some $18 billion dollars. The goals of the FCS Program were always somewhat ambiguous, but included the concept of “Network Centric Warfare”; the principal military advocate of which was the late Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (U.S. Navy). Since his death his total vision of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has found no strong advocate, but one component of NCW has been adopted by both the U.S. Navy and the Air Force namely an information focused command and control system under the acronym of C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4) Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)).
(See Network-Centric Warfare by Norman Friedman (Naval Institute Press 2009))
Since each of the U.S. Military Services operate in a vacuum, to my knowledge the U.S. Army never approached either the Navy or the Air Force to share their experiences with NCW before or after launching the FCS Program. The DCGS is of course the information management component of a C4ISR decision making system. From the sound of it the U.S. Army spent over $2 billion dollars on an information system that not only did not benefit from Navy or Air Force experiences with similar systems, but whose designer had no understanding the basic analytic needs of troops who were going to use the system. Indeed the various program managers apparently did not talk to each other let alone the analysts in the field that were going to use it. This is all the more inexcusable because ten years ago the necessary applications to retrieve multi-source data, organize it, and display it using GIS was already in use. (I and many other analysts routinely used this combination for analysis and production.) To design a system today which cannot do this with ease is criminally incompetent. This is what happens when the Military Services, in this case, the U.S. Army are devoid of institutional memory and operate in nearly complete isolation. This is an area where the near somnolent Joint Chiefs ought to act, but are clearly too wrapped up in enhancing their own parochial interests.
Phi Beta Iota: The above remarks were inspired by DefDog: US Army Blows Intelligence Computing (Again)…. All signs point toward the complete collapse of the US Government, including the Department of Defense (DoD), as a legitimate capable entity in both international and domestic state and local eyes. More and more we are seeing hybrid constellations that have come to the realization that they cannot trust the US Government, they cannot rely on the US Government for valid actionable information or intelligence (decision-support), and they need not fear the US Government as long as they are “not an expensive enough problem.” We now look to selected Governors, chambers of commerce, universities, professional associations, and perhaps a few enlightened national governments to begin shaping the new world network. Through its own arrogance and ignorance, the US Government has cut itself off from reality and is unable to adapt to the new paradigm where sharing rather than secrecy, integrity rather than ideology, and intelligence rather than force, are the new rules of the game.
The Distributed Common Ground System, the US Army's 2.7 billion dollars computing system that was designed to share intelligence with troops fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, has proved to be a bit of a dud because ‘it doesn't work' properly, analysts have said.
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However, analysts believe that the DCGS-A was unable to perform simple analytical tasks in the past, and complained that its search tool made finding the information difficult. They also said that the software that is used to map the information was not compatible with the search software.
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They also detailed problems with the hardware, insisting that the system is vulnerable because it is prone to crashes and faces dangers of going off-line frequently.
Phi Beta Iota: This is the norm for all acquisition now. Apart from needing integrity in all matters, the information paradigm must change, as so many outlined from 1988 onwards.
Wall Street often tries to play down its influence in Washington. As Congress pushed through financial regulations that seemed to get watered down last year, Wall Street’s chief executives tried to suggest, somewhat surprisingly, that their highly paid lobbyists did not have much sway.
If there is still any question about how much power Wall Street actually has in Washington, here is some fresh evidence worth examining.
In a piece of legislation recently passed by the House and the Senate to revamp patent law, a tiny provision was inserted at the last minute called Section 18.
The provision, which my colleague Edward Wyatt detailed in an article ahead of the House’s vote on the bill last month, has only one purpose: to allow the banking industry to skirt paying for certain important patents involving “business methods.”
The provision even allows “retroactive reviews of approved business method patents, allowing the financial services industry to challenge patents that have already been found valid both at the U.S. Patent and Trade Office and in Federal Court,” according to Representative Aaron Schock, an Illinois Republican who tried to strike the provision.
Phi Beta Iota: In the absence of accountability, holistic analytics, and transparency, it is very easy for specific individuals to give up their integrity. The implications of this are breath-taking: Wall Street is showing it can legislate retrospective and ex post facto crime, not just future crime.