Review: The Web of Knowledge–A Festschrift in Honor of Eugene Garfield

4 Star, Information Society
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4.0 out of 5 stars About the Methods, Not the Findings,

February 11, 2001
Helen Barsky Atkins

This was not the book I was looking for, but it is still worthy of buying if you have any interest at all in charting knowledge terrain and “knowing who knows”. In honor of Eugene Garfield, arguably the most influential man in the sociology of knowledge in this century or any other, the book provides a wonderful collection of *methodological* articles about the bibliometrics and indicators associated with charting who quotes whom and what does it mean in terms of influence within and among nations, organizations, schools of thought, and individual cabals.

I was intrigued to find that the book, perhaps because it is so original and represents the first book-length collection of its kind, did not include an article on a topic near and dear to my heart, that is, developing algorithms to identify anomalies in citation such that one can weed out those who are citing one another simply to “beat the game.” As citation analysis becomes a more mainstream means of measuring intellectual contributions (it is still not mainstream–too many otherwise talented intelligence community managers of analysts have no clue it exists), some form of citation validation and policing will be needed.

There are three other areas where I would say that this book is a vital and valuable foundation, and desperately in need of three distinct sequel publications:

First, we need to migrate the value of citation analysis to the Internet, not only to electronic journals but to citations of self-published papers on web sites as well as to informed observations in expert forums. Neither the classification schema nor the industry standards for making this possible exist today. I would go so far as to suggest that a new Internet standards committee dedicated to this specific issue should be created, immediately.

Second, an analagous situation exists with those experts who are not permitted to publish in the open literature, but who are very well known by virtue of their title, organizational affiliation, participation in conferences, or classified work revealed to a very few. As the core competency of government becomes the nurturing of national knowledge–not only in science and technology but also in all international as well as domestic matters–some form of citation analysis process must be developed that makes these experts (or if not expert, then influentials by virtue of their position at the international, national, state/provincial, or local levels) and their counterparts in non-governmental organizations (e.g. Red Cross, World Bank, elements of the United Nations) readily identifiable. The Internet, and the public availability of email communication pattern analysis information that does not intrude on the substantive privacy of electronic communications, may possible be helpful here.

Third, and finally, we come to the area of interest that originally led to my purchasing this book, which is that of actually identifying centers of excellence and “portals” into the entire range of published and unpublished knowledge on any given topic. Such a sequel publication must not only document, in an evolutionary or “living” way, who the top 100 people are across every social science and science topic, but also the top 25 institutions with deliberate distinctions between Asian, Americas, European, and African centers of excellence. The Institute of Scientic Information (ISI) has been unwilling to do this as an internal investment, and has not heard from enough governments and corporations to warrant its moving aggressively to create what I would regard as an extraordinarily valuable and relevant guide for all manner of investments and improvements in international, national, and state-based research and education. I would go so far as to say that such a guide, such a service of common concern, would go a very long way toward making possible extraordinary new means of leveraging distributed intellectual resources, lowering the cost of seminal research, and introducing new forms of transnational collaborative work.

Garfield, and citation analysis and all those who have built on Garfield's work, together represent the first mile in a hundred mile journey toward creating the “World Brain” that H.G. Wells, among a select few, has envisioned. There is much yet to be done.

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Review: Intelligence Power in Peace and War

5 Star, Diplomacy, Information Society, Intelligence (Government/Secret), War & Face of Battle
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5.0 out of 5 stars The Ultimate Graduate/Policy Text on Intelligence,

January 10, 2001
Michael Herman
This is the textbook for the best and the brightest of both the academic world and the policy world. It is not an easy read, between the British language form and the deep thinking, but it is, as Christopher Andrew says, “the best overview” and “surely destined to become a standard work”. I especially liked its attention to components and boundaries, effects, accuracy, and evaluation. Perhaps most usefully within the book is the distinction between long-term intelligence endeavors that rely primarily on open sources and serve to improve state understanding and state behavior, and short-term espionage that tends to be intrusive and heighten the target state's feelings of vulnerability and hostility. No intelligence library is complete without this book–it provides a rock-solid foundation for serious thinking about the intelligence in the 21st Century.
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Review: Soldier Spies–Israeli Military Intelligence

5 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)
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5.0 out of 5 stars Really Serious, Really Current, Combat Military Intelligence,

January 10, 2001
Samuel M. Katz
Use the out-of-print service, this book is a gem. This is a great book about the minutia and the value of a well-rounded military intelligence capability–it is relevant to U.S. and other operations going on right now. I was especially impressed with four aspects: the emphasis on prisoner interrogation; the development of easy to install tactical signals collection devices that could be carried in and installed by deep reconnaissance units; the over-all commitment to long-range patrolling; and the clearly authorized commitment to “behind the lines” covert violence (assassination), using all the tools of intelligence to identify and then kill very specific individuals such as the two Egyptian Colonels believed to be guiding the Palestinian terrorist actions against Israel. These are all areas where the U.S. military is weak (and in one case clearly forbidden to consider action), and I consider this book a helpful manual for military officers who wish to take a more active role in preparing defense intelligence for the future–we cannot do military intelligence the way the Israeli's do it, if we persist in thinking that desk-bound beltway analysts and overhead satellite collection are all that we need.
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Review: For the President’s Eyes Only–Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush

5 Star, Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform), Intelligence (Government/Secret)
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5.0 out of 5 stars For Presidents, Cabinet Members, Commanders, & Senior Staff,

January 10, 2001
Christopher Andrew
“Over the past two centuries only four American presidents-Washington, Eisenhower, Kennedy (briefly), and Bush-have shown a real flair for intelligence.” This 660-page book documents this assessment, and ends with the conclusion “The presidents in the twenty-first century, like their Cold War predecessors, will continue to find an enormously expensive global intelligence system both fallible and indispensable.” His general findings in the conclusion are instructive: presidents have tended to have exaggerated expectations of intelligence, and have frequently overestimated the secret power that covert action might put at their command. For all that failed, both in intelligence not getting it right and presidents not listening when it did, intelligence undeniably helped stabilize the Cold War and avoid many confrontations. This book is extremely relevant to the emerging discussion, in 2001, about the need to depoliticize the position of the Director of Central Intelligence, and perhaps to consider a new National Security Act of 2001.
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Review: New Spies–Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage

4 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)
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4.0 out of 5 stars Party Line, Neither Investigative nor Innovative,

January 10, 2001
James Adams
By the then (UK) Sunday Times Bureau Chief in Washington, a former defense correspondent, I found this book somewhat disappointing but never-the-less worthy of consideration. Although the author concludes that the end of the Cold War should have produced a massive upheaval and did not, leaving “too many of the old practices intact with little evidence that the intelligence community is ready to face the fast changing, frightening world that lies ahead,” my impression was that the author was completely taken in by the party line and overlooked most of the really trenchant intelligence reform literature, including the open source revolution. It is, however, replete with useful references, especially to what then DCI Bob Gates was thinking and talking about, and for that reason I would tend to include it in any serious intelligence library.
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2001 Decision for the Vice-President Elect on Creating an Open Source Information Program (OSIP) in Support of National Security Decision-Making, with Emphasis on Third World/Non-State Threats

History of Opposition, Memoranda
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The below memorandum was delivered to the Vice-President-elect via the Transitioin Team.Ā  Although Condi Rice, prodded by Kevin Scheid, did read a related memorandum on reforming national intelligence, and asked for a tailored one-pager on homeland security, the White House never really got it and Sean O'Keefe left the Office Management and Budget (OMB) before they could be briefed into a Presidential Initiative that was ready to go at $125M a year Initial Operating Capability, climbing to $2B a year at Full Operational Capability (FOC).

Memo to VP Elect
Memo to VP Elect