STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Aug. 15 (UPI) — The founder of WikiLeaks says he will seek a publishing license for his controversial operation in Sweden where whistleblower protections are strong.
Phi Beta Iota: The Nordic nations have consistently been “smarter” and more ethical than the US and all others. Wikileaks has made many mistakes of judgment, as our esteemed colleague Steve Aftergood of Secrecy News has noted in “Wikileaks Fails Due Diligence Review,” but it can safely be said that the US, the UN, and all others are too easily found to be in violation of the “rule of law” they claim to represent. In our own experience, US Ambassadors spend too much time sweeping dirt under the rug and lying for their government (not their country–America the Beautiful does not want liars as Ambassadors), and the UN is an incestuous bog of little fiefdoms that “live and let live” without the ability to police the integrity of its own professionals. Wikipeaks exists–and is gaining traction–precisely because those who object to its leaks have failed to maintain their own integrity.
The alleged Russian spy ring is a pleasant summer distraction (Anna Chapman — call your agent!) and a wonderful opportunity to use the phrase femme fatale. But if you want to ponder a 21st-century intelligence puzzle this July 4 weekend, turn your attention to cyber-espionage — where our adversaries can steal in a few seconds what it took an old-fashioned spy network years to collect.
First, though, let's think about what the Russian “illegals” were up to in their suburban spy nests. U.S. intelligence officials think it's partly that the Russians just love running illegal networks. This has been part of their tradecraft since the 1920s, and it enabled many of their most brilliant operations, from Rudolf Abel to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The FBI finds it hard to break its cultural habits, and so does Russia's intelligence service, the SVR.
Detroit jet terrorist attack was staged – journalist
The recent failed attack on a US passenger jet traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit was a set-up provocation controlled by US intelligence, author and journalist Webster Tarpley stated to RT.
“[The terrorist’s] father, a rich Nigerian banker, went to the US embassy in Nigeria on November 19 and said ‘my son is in Yemen in a terrorist camp, do something about this.’ Nevertheless, the son is allowed to buy a ticket in Ghana, paying cash, $2,800, for a one-way ticket,” Tarpley said.
After that, a mentally deficient young man who doubtfully could make it from one gate to another managed to illegally enter Nigeria and get on a plane to Amsterdam.
“There was a well-dressed Indian man who brought him to the gate and said, ‘my friend does not have a passport, get him on, he is Sudanese, we do this all the time – that is impossible!” said Tarpley.
Information technology's next grand challenge will be to secure the cloud–and prove we can trust it.
By David Talbot
Phi Beta Iota: The story is so good we will not extract from it. It must be read in its entirety. Government is failing to do its job, leaving a “wild west” environment alive and corruptible in the cloud. Standards are beginning to emerge but security is not a priority and the end-user as the ultimate source of the security is not even being considered (over ten years ago Eric Hughes conceptualized anonymous banking and end-user controlled encryption of all data). Eventually, after great expesne and great loss of data, government and industry may realize that the ultimate security is that which originates with the individual end-user, not a central service that can be hacked by disgruntled insiders or that can make a mistake that instantly explodes tens of millions of clients. Below is the original Mich Kabay slide, still relevant.
Mich Kabay's Threat Slide Link Leads to NSA Las Vegas Briefing
Phi Beta Iota: To be good at intelligence (decision-support) it is important to have a sense of balance between secret and open sources; between collection and processing; and between unilateral and multinational anaysis. The welcome acknowledgement by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that we spend $75 billion a year on secret intelligence and covert action, combined with the recent release of most of the U.S. telecommunications spy manuals now posted at Cryptome, suggest that we are out of balance. We still don't balance between secret and open source collection; we still don't have all-source processing; we still don't do multinational engagement with any depth or breadth; and we still don't provide decision-support to 95% of the federal, state, and local government clients and customers with serious needs.
