The author has produced a useful but slightly incomplete merger of information on the past decade of efforts to develop UN intelligence (decision-support) capabilities, within the prism of an imposed social science investigation construct which dilutes the practical value.
Fragile States Index (Color Coded Maps 1995, 2001, 2008)Effective conflict management results from a congruence between state capacity and the systemic risk factors that “fuel” conflict dynamics and the escalation to violence. Global Report 2009 is now available; it includes a detailed assessment of “state fragility” for each of the world's 162 major countries (with populations greater than 500,000) that comprises a 2×4 matrix of indicators (effectiveness and legitimacy indicators for security, governance, economic, and social dimensions of state performance). In Global Report 2009 we chronicle a 19% overall improvement in state fragility in the global system since 1995.
“Global Terrorism” is often identified as a key security threat. Indeed, the numbers of people killed in “high casualty terrorist bombings” (HCTB–bomb attacks on non-combatant targets resulting in 15 deaths or more) increased dramatically after the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States. However, most of these attacks have been concentrated in a handful of locations in the Middle East and South Asia and have taken place mainly in Iraq in recent years. There was a dramatic surge in HCTB attacks in Iraq in the first eight months of 2007 (claiming more than 3,761 lives and 87% of the global total during that period). Attacks in Iraq dropped sharply beginning in early September 2007, falling from 2677 deaths in the previous period to 712, 663, and 512 deaths in the following three six-month periods. HCTB attacks in Iraq have increased in the most recent period, ending in early September 2009 (926 deaths).
This Center for Preventive Action Working Paper surveys existing approaches to assessing state fragility and failure within the context of development, conflict, and governance. It examines the risk factors that have been identified through systematic inquiry and research with the goal of improving the prospects for successful conflict prevention and management, and argues that the goal of “early warning” relating to state fragility and failure should be more to inform and temper our expectations for policy response than to trigger costly and risky interventions.
Phi Beta Iota: This is a brilliant piece of work, precisely what we should have been doing from 1988 onwards. It is probably too late only because the US Government is incapable of a 180 degree turn that puts two Berlin Airlifts in motion, one to Afghanistan and one to Iraq, with each redirected to Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen as the process moves forward.
Edit of 20 Dec 09: This article is one of two cited by a top US flag officer speaking to COINSOC in Iraq. The other one is Reference: PK Officer View on AF.
Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. Antonio Giustozzi gathers a renowned cast of journalists, experts, and academics to answer the most pressing questions regarding the Taliban today. Each contributor possesses extensive knowledge of the insurgency's latest developments, decoding its structure and organization as it operates within specific regions and provinces. They analyze the new Taliban as it expands, from the mature south, where they hold sway, to the southeast, where they struggle to penetrate, from the west and northeast, now in the initial stages of infiltration, to the provinces surrounding Kabul, which have been unexpectedly and quickly occupied.
Empires of Mud: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007. Warlords are charismatic leaders who exploit weak authorities to gain control of subnational areas. Nevertheless, warlords do in fact participate in state formation, and this book considers the dynamics of warlordism within the context of such debates. Antonio Giustozzi begins with aspects of the Afghan environment that are conducive to the fragmentation of central authority and the emergence of warlords. He then accounts for the phenomenon from the 1980s to today, considering Afghanistan's two foremost warlords, Ismail Khan and Abdul Rashid Dostum, along with their political, economic, and military systems of rule.
Phi Beta Iota: Read the report and draw your own conclusions. On balance we give it a C+ [this is actually a complement] in part because it cost too much to get to this point, neglects all Chinese and other language sources, neglects or is unaware of the non-military capabilites, and is completely lacking in context–the Chinese are NOT emphasizing attack IW as much as capture and exploit IW, in all the languages we do not comprehend, and for the purpose of waging peace and conquering, with soft power, the entire Southern Hemisphere. Our two-pager on Chinese Irregular Warfare is free and more policy-relevant. See also: