05 Civil War – Page 90 – Public Intelligence Blog

a a flournoy official — Michèle Flournoy

Phi Beta Iota: We don't make this stuff up. The Pentagon has no strategy because the U.S. Government has no strategy. The National Security Council is managed by a General who emphasized getting along with the Chief of Naval Operation, never-mind leaving Marines wounded on the battlefield for lack of Naval Gunfire Support (NFS).

Join us in savoring what passes for a strategist and nominal policy making savant with the below headlines.

Below item is full text to avoid inconvenience. It is followed by several linked headlines that make quite clear the shallowness of the Pentagon strategy-policy pool.

Executive Summary: The gentle lady has no idea what the ten high-level threats to humanity are, nor does she care. She's a place-holder for the disappointed John Hamre, and a token female at the top who goes with the flow. She has neither any grasp nor any conceptual framework for actually creating grand strategy, harmonizing Whole of Government policies nor even–this really did surprise us–how many failed states there are in the world.

PBS March 27, 2010

Interview With Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy

Charlie Rose (PBS), 1:00 A.M.

CHARLIE ROSE: The United States military is engaged around the world. It is withdrawing combat troops from Iraq as it builds up troops in Afghanistan. It is partnering with Pakistan in an aggressive counterterrorism campaign including drone attacks in the tribal areas. It’s working with the Yemeni government to counter a resurgent al Qaeda there. And U.S. troops are still in Haiti for the humanitarian relief efforts.

But the military has to do more than respond to the conflicts of the day. It must prepare for future wars, adoptive enemies and a shifting security environment.

The person at the Pentagon who spends the most time working on these issues is Michèle Flournoy. She is under secretary of defense for policy and the highest ranking female official in the Defense Department. I am very pleased to have her with me in the night studio at the Newseum in Washington.

Tell me what it is that you do at the Pentagon, how do you define this responsibility?

Continue reading “Journal: Pentagon Strategy & Policy Oxymoron Squared?”

2010/03/182010/09/03

Handbook: Democide–Internal Murder by Regimes

05 Civil War, 06 Genocide, 07 Other Atrocities, Threats/Topical

This is a virtual handbook, an online compilation of a new broader concept, democide, that encompasses genocide but focuses on what be called “death by power” or “killed because they could” at the hands of authoritarian regimes. The term does not include those killed by the USA or other countries engaged in foreign wars in which civilians are “collateral damage,” in the case of the Global War on Terror, along the lines of 10 to 1 by the USA and 100 to 1 by those who plant bombs to terrorize publics (some of the bombs appear to be planted by Blackwater and their like, sponsored by the Joint Special Operations Group (JSOC) and/or the Centeral Intelligence Agency (CIA) to justify further militarization of a given conflict. The US secret world can no longer be trusted to act in the public interest, nor to be effective in support of legitimate campaign needs such as those of our commanders in Afghanistan.

On genocide, see Dr. Greg Stanton's Genocide Watch.

On 44 dictators, 42 of them “best pals” of the US Government, see Ambassador Mark Palmer's two contributions:

2004 Palmer (US) Achieving Universal Democracy by Eliminating All Dictators within the Decade

Review: Breaking the Real Axis of Evil–How to Oust the World’s Last Dictators by 2025

2010/03/07

Journal: USG Clears Way in AF for “Thug in a Box”

05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Terrorism

The Obama Administration’s clear-hold-build-leave strategy in Afghanistan is crucially dependent on the Afghan’s central government’s ability to displace the Taliban with clean local governance throughout a rugged country larger than Texas, with a population of 28+ million, where the vast majority of people live in small hamlets and villages. To this end, the combined forces clearing operation in Marjah, a poppy growing area of home to about 80,000 in southern Helmand Province, was to be a model operation. After clearing out the Taliban and setting up a “Hold” zone (a series of positions outside of town occupied by two battalions Marines and Afghan forces to secure the area), the operation was to be followed by the cookie-cutter installation of what the commander, General Stanley McChrystal, called a “government in a box” — which to work, must be an honest government that will immediately go to work at improving the lot of the locals.

As usual, the Taliban, like all competent guerrilla forces when faced with superior firepower bugged out ahead of the combined Nato-Afghan sweep through Marjah. Now, as Jeffrey Fleishman reports in the 7 Mar 2010 issue of the LA Times, it is beginning to look like McChrystal’s “government in a box” will be led by a typical thuggish representative of the morally challenged Karzai clique, which has a history of plundering those they rule. It turns out that the new leader, Abdul Zahir, a man who vowed “to bring back dignity and prosperity” to Marjah (a fertile opium growing area), stabbed his own son, was convicted of manslaughter, and served time in a German slammer. Just the sort of man to win the hearts and minds of those he rules.

The Marjah operation is off the front pages, and recent reports indicate the next target in our new strategy is the much more formidable Pashtun city of Qandahar, with population of about a million. But Marjah is not over. The people of Marjah know the Taliban are lurking in the shadows, waiting to install a another shadow government, when the US inspired “government in a box” does not win their hearts and minds and the US focus of effort is elsewhere.

Chuck Spinney

New leader in Marja reportedly has violent past

The new civilian leader, installed after the Taliban was swept out of its southern Afghanistan stronghold, vowed to ‘bring back dignity.' Now reports surface about a conviction in Germany.

By Jeffrey Fleishman, Los Angeles Times, March 7, 2010

Continue reading “Journal: USG Clears Way in AF for “Thug in a Box””

2010/02/21

Journal: IED Deja Vu–from Viet-Nam with Love…

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Military

Robots and bees to beat the Taliban

The homemade IED is the extremists’ deadliest weapon and America is spending billions on trying to combat it. We are granted access to this secret, smart and bizarre world

Phi Beta Iota: In 1988 the US Marine Corps told the emerging MASINT community that their highest priority was the detection of explosives at a stand off distance regardless of the container. This was based on USMC experience in El Salvador, where wooden containers were used to defeat mine detectors. The article is incorrect about mines replacing small arms as the weapon or casualty-causer of choice; mines in Viet-Nam took out more people (and the able-bodied needed to carry the wounded) than any other capability. The Israeli solution is a well-trained dog.

2010/02/082010/02/08

Journal: Human Terrain Team (HTT)–Drama Part III

02 Diplomacy, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, 11 Society, Cultural Intelligence, Ethics, Methods & Process, Military, Peace Intelligence

New Details Emerge in Salomi Hostage Case: High Drama in HTS

by John Stanton

Observers indicate that two individuals in HTS leadership positions on the ground in Iraq—Lieutenant Colonel Byrd (Program Management Office – FWD) and Michael Goains, GG-15 (Theater Coordination Element) had direct knowledge of Issa Salomi's prior forays outside Camp Liberty/Victory Base Complex in Iraq unaccompanied by his teammates (team designation IZ-02,) or US military personnel. Salomi was apparently taken by an Iraqi insurgent group in January 2010 and a video of him recently appeared in global media outlets in February 2010.

Observers have also pointed out that Salomi is not, in fact, a contractor but is instead a temporary US Army Civilian employee. In 2009, HTS reverted to a government program and contractors were forced to choose between leaving or converting to US government civilian status.

“There is so much drama within the HTS program right now that it is unbelievable. Many, many people are being fired, rearranged and moved around due to management incompetence and personality problems,” said observers. “The amount of money being squandered is ridiculous.”

Continue reading “Journal: Human Terrain Team (HTT)–Drama Part III”

2010/01/202010/01/20

Reference: BGen McMaster at ODNI on Afghanistan

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, Government, Memoranda, Military, Non-Governmental, Peace Intelligence

Memo corrected to remove (Ret). BGen McMaster was promoted to his present rank on 29 June 2009 after being twice passed over (2006, 2007), presumably for having the integrity to be outspoken. He is the author of the widely-admired book Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam.

Nine key factors are examined by BGen McMaster in his talk to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Answers question on why we were so unprepared. Final paragraph of trip report:

Can’t get much from a database and IT networks, but contractors keep pushing and we keep buying. But what really need is experts from anywhere, context, and also need to ask the soldiers! Make Phebe Marr a general! Also pay attention to: Charles Tripp, R. Kadeiri, Sarah Chayes, Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, Michael Howard, Frontline piece on Children of the Taliban, Fariad Ali Han on borders. Educate analysts (and self-educate) on the place, don’t waste time training them on the process.

2010/01/152010/01/15

Journal: MILNET Selected Headlines

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 06 Genocide, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Cultural Intelligence, Military, Peace Intelligence

British Search And Rescue Team Turned Away From Port-Au-Prince

There were reports that the airport at Port-au-Prince had run out of aviation fuel, one of the factors that is understood to have led the US military to close it. . . . The scene at Santo Domingo airport was one of chaos, uncertainty and often despair for aid workers.

graphic africa collage — Ethno-Colonial BIG Africa

Phi Beta Iota: Lesson learned by the USMC the hard way (as of 1992): need Forward Area Refueling Points (FARP) in the FIRST lift.

U.S. Army Africa Boss: ‘I Feel Like The Lone Ranger…'

“Africa’s not high on America’s priority list these days.

Sometimes I feel like the Lone Ranger trying to get people to bring resources to bear out here.”

I had pointed out in an earlier interview that U.S. Army Africa and Africa Command in general are notably absent from the wars in Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, conflicts Garrett said are “currently the world’s two deadliest.”

For Israel, a Reckoning

A new global movement is challenging Israel's violations of international law with the same strategies that were used against apartheid

Phi Beta Iota: Israeli influence on the US Government has been as bad as post-war Nazi influence on the Cold War ubbas–both have spawned policies that have murdered and displaced millions, with attendant atrocities.

Pakistan: U.S.-Backed Broadcast Begins

Phi Beta Iota: Too little too late and they almost certainly have no idea about the history of the Pashtun Peace Army.

Taliban steps up violence in Afghanistan

Recent Pakistani military operations in insurgent strongholds in Pakistan also have driven greater numbers of Pakistan-based Taliban back into Afghanistan, the officer said.

UK plans ‘trust fund' to woo Taliban fighters

Phi Beta Iota: Turn in one weapon, get enough money for two…or go enlist and training and food along with a new weapon. Money corrupts and it is not a substitute for Whole of Government Stabilization & Reconstruction accomplishments.

How To Apply ‘Smart Power' In Yemen

Developing a coherent strategy focused on the right objectives is important, and hard to do. The country team in any normal American embassy (like the one in Sana) does not have the staff, resources or experience to do so. The limited American military presence in Yemen does not either. Despite years of talk about the need to develop this kind of capability in the State Department or elsewhere in Washington, it does not exist. It must be built now, and quickly.

Phi Beta Iota: Start with Tony Zinni's The Battle for Peace and implement Robert Steele's DoD OSINT-M4IS2 Strategy along with Whole of Government Intelligence (Decision-Support).