
The Long Commission Report was very closely held, at the time only five people including John Guenther and Robert Steele, had access to the entire report. Here's the bottom line:
1) The threat changed and no one noticed. The battalion commander, who had previously served as the senior Marine in the CIA's Special Operations Group (SOG), was told he was in a benign threat environment in which casual shrapnel was the highest threat to his troops, and it therefore made sense, if they were to be billeted ashore (Navy cannot stand dust and bootmarks on its lily decks), to put them in a solid building.
2) Policy-makers had no clue about the connection between their behavior and the threat. They thought lobbing in battleship shells the size of small cars would “send a message” without realizing that a) this changed the Marine Corps role from peace-keeper to belligerent; and b) they might inspire a message back.





