Threat Archives on Public Intelligence (1992-2006)

Threats

2004

NO

Threat Bjorgo Root Causes of Terrorism

2004

US

Threat Kaplan The Saudi Connection to Terrorism

2004

US

Threat Knapp Al Qaeda and the Mass Media (PSYOP Briefing)

2004

US

Threat Knapp Al Qaeda and the Mass Media (Reference)

2004

US

Threat Knapp Distortion in Islam and Jihad

2004

US

Threat Knapp Diversity in Islam

2006

US

Threat Daly Al Qaeda Against Saudi Oil

2006

US

Threat Johnson Battle of Algiers and Its Lessons

2006

US

Threat Seagraves Gold Warriors: New Epilogue, Further of US Theft of WWII Gold Loot

2006

US

Threat Seagraves Gold Warriors New Chapter Seventeen

2006

US

Threat Steele Who Is to Blamce?  The Vice President and Us

2006

US

Threat Stern Al Qaeda Approach to US Muslims

2006

UK

Threat Story Crunch Time for CIA, Banks, and Related Thieves of $742 Trillion

2005

US

Threat Ellis Scenarios for Next Generation Crises in Latin America

2005

US

Threat GAO GAO Report: US Not Addressing Islamic Fundamentalism

2005

US

Threat OSS Somalia Piracy Quick Report

2005

US

Threat OSS Report on Remote Detonation of Improvised Explosive Devices

2005

US

Threat OSS PRC Trade in Latin America

2005

US

Threat Ray & Gross The Perfect Storm

2005

US

Threat Steele Worksheet for Book Review on Crossing the Rubicon

2005

US

Threat Steele Mother Nature as Terrorist

2005

US

Threat Steele 9-11: Who’s To Blame?  One Man’s Opinion

2005

US

Threat Thompson Is the Terrorism Threat Over-Rated?

2004

US

Threat Daly Globalization & National Defense (Ecological Economics)

2004

US

Threat Louisiana Pre-Hurricane Katrina Study and Conclusions

2004

US

Threat Palmer The Real Axis of Evil: 44 Dictators

2004

US

Threat Peters Early Warning of Disease From Pattern Analysis

2004

US

Threat Seagrave Transcript of Video on Stolen Gold Held by US Treasury & Citi-Bank

2004

US

Threat Vlahos Attachment to the Muslim Renovatio Memorandum

2004

US

Threat Vlahos The Muslim Renovatio and U.S. Strategy

2004

US

Threat Vlahos The Muslims Are Coming

2004

US

Threat Vlahos Insurgency Within Islam

2003

US

Threat Danzip Countering Traumatic Attacks

2003

PRC

Threat OSS PRC Treaty & Trade Penetration of Latin America

2002

US

Threat Emerson & Steele American Jihad Map

2002

US

Threat Steele ACFR, 19 Cities: 9-11, U.S. Intelligence, & the Real World

2000

US

Threat Steele Georgetown/AWC: Non-Traditional Threats

1998

US

Threat Steele TAKEDOWN: Targets, Tools, & Technocracy

1994

US

Threat Steele 6th National Threat Symposium: New Directions in Information Sharing

2005

NGO

Threat NGO Changing Face of Global Violence

2005

NGO

Threat NGO Human Security Audit

2004

US

Threat Pelton Robert Young Pelton on Dangerous World

2004

US

Threat Steele Three Book Review Relevant to Global War on Terror (GWOT)

2003

US

Threat Copeland Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism

2003

US

Threat Manwaring Street Gangs: New Urban Insurgency

2003

US

Threat Manwaring War & Conflict: Six Generations

2003

US

Threat Pelton Summary of Presentation on World’s Most Dangerous Places

2002

US

Threat Betts The Next Intelligence Failure: The Limits of Prevention

2002

NL

Threat Jongman World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2001-2002

2002

US

Threat Wheaton Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: A Model

2002

US

Threat Wheaton Virtual Afghanistan: Modeling a Transition from Authoritarian Rule

2001

US

Threat Godson Governments and Gangs

2001

US

Threat Heidenrich Early Warning & Complex Monitoring of Ethnic Genocide (Slides)

2001

US

Threat Heidenrich Early Warning & Complex Monitoring of Ethnic Genocide (Text)

1998

US

Threat Transnational Enemies: Threats Without Names

1998

US

Threat Glaebus Metaphors & Modern Threats: Biological, Computer, Cognitive Viruses

1997

US

Threat Fialka War by Other Means: Economic Espionage In (Against) America

1997

US

Threat Schwartau Information Warfare: The Weapons of the Information Age

1997

US

Threat Tenney Cyber-Law and Cyber-Crime: Spamming Methods and Costs

1996

US

Threat Keuhl School of Information Warfare Threat and Strategy: Shifting Paradigms

1996

US

Threat O’Malley Countering the Business Intelligence Threat

1996

US

Threat Strassmann U.S. Knowledge Assets: The Choice Target for Information Crime

1996

US

Threat Winkler Electronic Industrial Espionage: Defining Ground Zero

1994

US

Threat Whitney-Smith Refugees: Weapon of the Post Cold War World–Counter Offensive: IW

Review: Strategic Denial and Deception–The Twenty-First Century Challenge

5 Star, Censorship & Denial of Access, Intelligence (Government/Secret), Misinformation & Propaganda, Strategy

Amazon Page
Amazon Page

5.0 out of 5 stars Advanced Reading for National Security Practitioner-Students,

July 25, 2002
Roy Godson
This is a really excellent collection of advanced reading on strategic denial and deception, and it makes the vital point that denial and deception are at the core of 4th generation warfare and asymmetric offense and defense strategy.The two contributing editors are the best-qualified experts possible. Roy Godson’s work in the 1980’s and 1990’s on intelligence requirements, carrying on today with his advanced thinking on restoring covert action and counterintelligence as well as the synergy among these and collection with analysis, makes him the premier policy-scholar in this arena. Jim Wirtz, author of the very insightful “The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War,” and now chairman of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School where very advanced work is being done on the new craft of intelligence (both human and technical, both secret and open), adds a combat practitioners perspective.

While there are some similarities among a few of the contributions, on balance each one is sufficiently unique. Two key thoughts that jumped out:

1) Most of the lessons learned come from World War II. The authors were hard-pressed to find modern examples. The one used from the Gulf War (an amphibious feint) is in my recollection false–we were planning an amphibious attack, and it was only at the last minute that CINCCENT was persuaded to do a Hail Mary end run, prompted in part by some exceptional work from the Navy’s intelligence center that showed the beach obstacles in great detail.

2) Two perennial lessons learned are that policy makers do not want to hear about possible hostile denial and deception–they want to stick with their own preconceptions (which of course make denial and deception easier to accomplish against us); and second, that intelligence experts tend to be under great pressure to cook the books in favor of policy preconceptions, while also being generally unwilling to believe the enemy can deceive them or accomplish slights of hand that are undetectable.

All of the chapters are good, but two struck me as especially helpful today: J. Bowyer Bell’s “Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors,” and Bart Whaley & Jeffrey Busby, “Detecting Deception: Practice, Practitioners, and Theory.” The latter, building on a lifetime of study that included a review of eight strategic cultures as well as the cost of major deceptions (D-Day deceptions that fixed German forces cost less than 1% of the assets and could have saved the entire force), examined 47 seven different kind of “detectives” from scientists and bank tellers to biographers and private eyes, and creates nine categories of “detectibles”, concluding with the Law of Multiple Sensors, something that most stove-piped intelligence communities simply will not grasp for at least another decade.

This is both a serious work of scholarship, and a very valuable policy reader.

Vote on Review
Vote on Review

Review: Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards–U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence

5 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

Amazon Page
Amazon Page

5.0 out of 5 stars Critical Insights on Restoring Balance to Intelligence,

July 25, 2002
Roy Godson
Roy Godson is the only person to have systematically studied intelligence requirements in a holistic manner, consistently distinguishing among collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. His series in the 1980’s, and then again in the 1990’s, on intelligence requirements, stand alone as efforts to define and measure key elements.With this book, written and published prior to 9-11,Godson provides both a historical and a prescriptive treatment of the two most neglected and mis-managed elements of U.S. national intelligence: covert action (concealed influence) and counterintelligence (protecting our secrets by catching their spies and agents of influence).

While 9-11 demonstrated our incapacity in both these vital areas that comprise the black art side of national power, there is no other book and no other expert that has done more to itemize the details that must be contemplated (and are not now being contemplated) by those responsible for devising homeland security defenses. The author’s appreciation for pre-emptive “offensive” counterintelligence and covert action, and his understanding of terrorist and criminal and other nonstate actors (one should include rogue corporations, of which there are many), make him particularly well-qualified to advise the Administration and Congress as we move toward what must be a draconian reconstitution and revitalization of national intelligence.

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Vote on Review

2001 Godson (US) Governments and Gangs

10 Transnational Crime, Government, Historic Contributions, Law Enforcement
Roy Godson
Roy Godson

DR. ROY GODSON was elected president of the National Strategy Information Center in 1993. He is also professor of government at Georgetown University  His focus on the nexus between organized criminal gangs and corrupt governments will remain a critical factor in devising sustainable global strategies for creating a prosperous world at peace.  He is also gifted at communicating the variations of intellectual understanding of strategy–his co-editd book, Security Studies in the 21st Century, remains seminal.  Below is his contribution OSS ’01.

Roy Godson
Roy Godson

Review: Security Studies for the 21st Century

5 Star, Budget Process & Politics, Change & Innovation, Force Structure (Military), Future, Military & Pentagon Power, Strategy

Amazon Page
Amazon Page

5.0 out of 5 stars Outstanding Structured Education for Adult (Policy) Readers,

August 30, 2000
Richard H. Shultz
This book is actually a guide for professors, with chapters presenting specific courses in security studies complete with fifteen-week outlines and all recommended readings. It is in my view a very fine structured reading program for the adult policy maker who is well beyond the need for going back to school, but much in need a fast means of coming to grips with the dramatic changes that have occurred in our international security environment. Early on it addresses the competing approaches to security studies-from the traditionalist national, international, and regional security approaches to the emerging transstate (non-state actors acknowledged as major sources of conflict and instability) to the global (to include human rights, environmental protection, economic prosperity, and social development as fundamental security issues). It’s iteration of the weaknesses of 20th century security studies reads like a list of current biases inherent in those prescribing defense reform today: overemphasis on theory (or worst-case scenarios); insufficient attention to non-combat missions for military forces in peacetime; excessive focus on the US, Europe, and Russia to the exclusion of the rest of the world; too little attention to culture and the relationship of culture to conflict deterrence and resolution; insufficient attention to history prior to World War II; and finally, a neglect of non-military instruments of power and their interaction with the military. Intelligence in particular is singled out as being a relatively recent open topic for discussion, meriting more study. The chapters on Transstate Security by Roy Godson (on non-state actors and the growing prevalence of “global ungovernability”) and on Nontraditional Uses of Military Force by George H. Quester, as well as the introduction and conclusion by Richard H. Schultz, Jr., are each, alone, worth the price of the book. Each chapter, with its course outline, discussion, and recommended references, is worthy of careful examination by any serving or aspiring policymaker. However distinguished one’s pedigree, we are all students today, and Graham E. Fuller is correct when he notes on page 124 that “most policymakers do not even fully realize the dynamics of the new world we live in.”
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