Review: The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare

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Max Manwaring

5.0 out of 5 stars A Capstone Book — Still a Disconnect Between What We Know and What We Do, October 20, 2012

John Fishel opens the book with a valuable contextual overview that reminds us of the preceding volumes that Max has put together:
Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime: Shadows from the Past and Portents for the Future (International and Security Affairs)
Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries: New Dynamics in Uncomfortable Wars (International and Security Affairs Series, Vol. 6)

John is modest in not mentioning two very important works, certainly relevant here, that he and Max put together:
Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations (Small Wars and Insurgencies)
Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs)

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Reference: Max Manwaring on Strategy & Insurgency

SHADOWS OF THINGS PAST AND IMAGES OF THE FUTURE: LESSONS FOR THE INSURGENCIES IN OUR MIDST

Max G. Manwaring, November 2004, Strategic Studies Institute

Phi Beta Iota: Every passing day reminds us that Dr. Col Max Manwaring has made so many extraordinary contributions to our strategic understanding across so many fronts, and yet his work does not appear to have been appreciated to the degree that we consider warranted.  Below is one small portion of his teachings from this reference.

This monograph concludes with the idea that the complex realities of contemporary political-insurgency wars must be understood as holistic processes that rely on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion to achieve mutually agreed political-strategic ends. In this connection, at a minimum, three strategic-level imperatives are needed to begin to deal effectively with unconventional conflict situations. They are:

(1) civil-military and military-to-military dialogue regarding viable security and stability,

(2) fundamental education and understanding requirements, and

(3) the strategic application of U.S. military power.

The associated  recommendations take us beyond doing “something” for something’s sake to the cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning and implementation of the strategic ends, ways, and means that directly support the achievement of a political endgame.