Event: 4-5 April Extra-Judicial State Control Over Non-State Nuclear Proliferation

02 Diplomacy, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Proliferation, 09 Justice, 10 Security, 11 Society, Corruption, Government, Key Players, Law Enforcement, Military, Non-Governmental, Peace Intelligence

Cooperation to Control Non-State Nuclear Proliferation: Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction and UN Resolutions 1540 and 1373

This workshop will explore theoretical options and practical pathways to extend states' control over non-state actor nuclear proliferation through the use of extra-territorial jurisdiction and international legal cooperation.

UNSC Resolution 1373 and the raft of counter-terrorism treaties related to non-state based nuclear terrorism allow for states to exercise extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction in certain ways. UNSC Resolution 1373 even requires the exercise of such jurisdiction in certain cases. UNSC Resolution 1540, in contrast, focuses on domestic controls.

Workshop Dates: April 4-5, 2011

Host: Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, The Stanley Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Venue:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2103

Learn more….

Tip of the Hat to Contributing Editor Berto Jongman.

Phi Beta Iota: Extra-judicial anything is a crime against humanity.  While the International Tribunals have done some extraordinary work, the reality is that most non-state proliferation is actively aided and condoned by specific states including the permanent members of the UN Security Council.  This is a very troubling line of inquiry.

Bin Laden Show 56: Taliban on a Roll, BL Irrelevant

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, 11 Society, Advanced Cyber/IO, Civil Society, Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, Ethics, Government, IO Impotency, Military, Peace Intelligence

NIGHTWATCH

Afghanistan-Taliban: On the death of bin Laden. The Afghan Taliban issued a lengthy statement praising bin Laden, but decoupling his jihad from the current struggle in Afghanistan.

“…The martyr (may God the Exalted have mercy on him) was among the protectors of the Islamic Afghan jihad against the enemy Soviet Union, and he participated with complete loyalty and courage in jihad alongside the Afghans until the Soviet invader forces departed Afghanistan. He offered great sacrifices in jihad in the cause of God, which the history of the ummah of Islam will always take pride in. In addition to this, the martyr shaykh (may God the Exalted have mercy on him) was among the strongest of defenders on the issue of the first qiblah [direction of prayer] of the Muslims: the issue of Al-Aqsa in occupied Islamic Palestine. Likewise, he was the greatest mujahid, and knew not laziness in his struggle against the Crusader-Zionist aggressors all over the Islamic world…”

“… If the occupying Americans and their allies think that the ranks and fighting spirit of the mujahidin in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the occupied lands will weaken with the killing of Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin (may God have mercy on him), this points toward the naïve thinking of the Americans and their lack of understanding of the meanings of jihad and martyrdom. The tree of jihad has been watered, and it is flourishing. It will always do so from the pure blood of the martyrs. With the martyrdom of each martyr, a hundred others will advance to the fields of sacrifice and devotion.”

‘Let America know that the jihadist movement present now in Afghanistan was established from within the Afghan people. It is an expression of the sentiments and hopes of this proud people, and every strike from the occupiers in this country will engender a more powerful response than the strike. The people are in solidarity with the mujahedin.'

‘Indeed, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan considers that the martyrdom of Shaykh Usama (may God have mercy on him) at this sensitive stage of jihad will give birth to a new spirit of jihad against the occupiers, and will incite the jihadist waves further and further. Time will prove, to friend and enemy alike, the will of God the Exalted. What we have said is sincere.'

‘The Shura Command of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ”

Comment: The statement represents guidance to the commanders in Afghanistan that bin Laden was important in the fight against the Soviets and his death is an inspiration for the future. The Shura Command, however, does not extol him as a hero of Afghanistan today. Rather it stresses the point that his struggle moved in a different direction. The Afghan fight is home grown so that bin Laden's death is not a blow to the Taliban struggle or morale.

The statement makes clear that the Taliban think that bin Laden had nothing to do with the struggle of the Taliban.  The Afghans always despised the Arabs as much as the Arabs looked down on the Afghans. Mullah Omar extended hospitality to bin Laden and his Arabs and they paid him rent and abused Afghan hospitality.  Omar lived to regret the arrangement because he lost his country in 2001 to US forces and northern tribal allies because of those Arabs.  The Shura members apparently have not let Omar forget his bad judgment and thus they showered bin Laden with faint praise.

The language of the statement also looks like a direct rebuke of western pundits and officials who predicted that bin Laden's death would demoralize the Taliban. The Shura Command disagrees and so does the data on the level of fighting and security incidents in May. More to follow.

NIGHTWATCH KGS Home

Bin Laden Show 30: Five Truths On Killing Bin Laden

07 Other Atrocities, 09 Justice, 10 Security, 11 Society, Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, Government, IO Sense-Making, Military, Peace Intelligence

Osama bin Laden

Comment: Five Surprising Truths About the Killing of Bin Laden

By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |

For intelligence and terrorism experts, the frustrating part of Osama bin Laden’s assassination is not the lack of details on the operation, nor the diplomatic ping-pong currently taking place between America and Pakistan. Rather it is the media spectacle that has unfolded around the story ever since it first made headlines. The cacophony of conjecture that has hijacked the global news agenda is maintained by an army of talking heads, who rely on rumor and speculation to satisfy sensationalist media editors. The outcome is a sterile media circus, devoid of substance, which leaves news consumers confused and uninformed. To counter this trend, intelNews lists here five truths of critical importance about Osama bin Laden’s assassination. In summary: One, America does not have to prove it killed bin Laden. Two, bin Laden’s assassination is not a victory against terrorism. Three, it likely will not reduce —and may even increase— terrorism. Four, it will not have the slightest effect on the Taliban or the war in Afghanistan. Five, even if the Pakistani government consciously shielded bin Laden, there is not much the US can do about it. More specifically:

Read full posting.

Secrecy News: The Costs of War & More (CRS)

03 Economy, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, 11 Society, Budgets & Funding, Corruption, Military, Peace Intelligence

THE COSTS OF WAR, AND MORE FROM CRS

As of March 2011, Congress had approved a total of more than $1.2 trillion dollars for costs associated with the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and other post-9/11 “war on terror” operations, the Congressional Research Service said in its most recent update on the subject.  See “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” March 29, 2011.

Other new or newly updated CRS reports include the following (all pdf).

“Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians,” April 6, 2011.
“The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations,” April 27, 2011.
“U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress,” March 28, 2011.
“Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress,” April 6, 2011.
“Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,” April 6, 2011

See Also:

Graphic: Medard Gabel’s Cost of Peace versus War

Journal: Over $1 trillion Wasted on Wars, Veterans and Families of Veterans Vocal Against Both Elective Wars

Secrecy News: Costs of Major US Wars, Contractors in Iraq & AF, Drones & Homeland Sec

From the Pentagon? More Education, Fewer Guns?

03 Economy, 04 Education, 10 Security, 11 Society, Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis, Ethics, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence, Strategy, Threats

An excellent read from credible sources in the vein of Phi Beta Iota articulated reforms.  Oh, and by the way, surprisingly this was written (in part, this is a two-author article) by a fellow naval intelligence professional (and more surprising is the fact it comes from a senior navy intelligence officer …. not something I would have expected, given how wed to cold-war ideals most of the senior leadership is…

Now Playing

The Pentagon’s ‘Mr. Y’ And National Security

Direct download: Mp3 (podcast)

The Pentagon’s ‘Mr. Y’ And National Security

Two Special Assistants to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen say (unofficially) it’s time, strategically, to spend more on education and less on guns. We’ll hear them out.

See Also:

Continue reading “From the Pentagon? More Education, Fewer Guns?”

Right-Sizing the US Military–Doug Macgregor

10 Security, 11 Society, Intelligence (government), Key Players, Military, Misinformation & Propaganda, Money, Banks & Concentrated Wealth, Peace Intelligence, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests, Strategy, Threats
Winslow Wheeler

Although there are important elements I disagree with — in some cases strenuously — US Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor (Ret.) has written an important piece on the fundamental changes and massive budget reductions that are needed to improve America's ability to survive into the future.

Macgregor gets the three essentials right, I believe:

1) the threat America faces is now massively reduced; its future character may very well not be what conventional wisdom expects, and Americans need to fundamentally change how we interact with the rest of the world,

2) before any changes are effected in the size, character and funding of our armed forces, a comprehensive audit must be successfully and immediately completed to understand how we spend our money, and funding should be withheld unless and until that is done, and

3) massive changes are needed in our armed forces and their leadership, organization, staffing, weapons, and more.

Macgregor's two part article, “Lean Mean Fighting Machine” and “A Radical Plan for Cutting the Defense Budget and Reconfiguring the Military.”  Both are published by Foreign Policy; I believe they merit your thorough reading and consideration.

Phi Beta Iota: The US Marine Corps understood all this in 1989, and sought to change the defense paradigm from worst case to most likely in 1992; then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and his subordinates were not at all interested.  Right-sizing defense–and the whole of government–is not that difficult, provided that one has absolute integrity rooted in real-world truthful intelligence.  That cannot be said of the US Government today.

See Also:

2010: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Trilogy Updated

2009 Perhaps We Should Have Shouted: A Twenty-Year Restrospective

2008 Rebalancing the Instruments of National Power–Army Strategy Conference of 2008 Notes, Summary, & Article

2008 U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century

2001 Threats, Strategy, and Force Structure: An Alternative Paradigm for National Security

2000 Presidential Leadership and National Security Policy Making

1998 JFQ The Asymmetric Threat: Listening to the Debate

1995 GIQ 13/2 Creating a Smart Nation: Strategy, Policy, Intelligence, and Information

1993 On Defense & Intelligence–The Grand Vision

1992 MCU Thinking About Revolution

1992 E3i: Ethics, Ecology, Evolution, & intelligence (An Alternative Paradigm)

Reference: 1992 USMC C4I Campaign Plan

1991 MCG Intelligence Support for Expeditionary Planners