Category: Officers Call

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Journal: Vacation in Afghanistan, Fight NATO

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, 11 Society, Cultural Intelligence, Officers Call
Taliban fighters in Dhani-Ghorri in northern Afghanistan. Photograph: Ghaith Abdul-Ahad for the Guardian

UK-based Taliban spend months fighting Nato forces in Afghanistan

Taliban fighter reveals he lives for most of year in London and heads to Afghanistan for combat

Special report: Taliban troop with a London cab driver

British-based men of Afghan origin are spending months at a time in Afghanistan fighting Nato forces before returning to the UK, the Guardian has learned. They also send money to the Taliban.

A Taliban fighter in Dhani-Ghorri in northern Afghanistan last month told the Guardian he lived most of the time in east London, but came to Afghanistan for three months of the year for combat.

“I work as a minicab driver,” said the man, who has the rank of a mid-level Taliban commander. “I make good money there [in the UK], you know. But these people are my friends and my family and it's my duty to come to fight the jihad with them.”

“There are many people like me in London,” he added. “We collect money for the jihad all year and come and fight if we can.”

Tip of the Hat to Robert Young Pelton at Facebook.

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Journal: Can’t Get No Satisfaction from US Intelligence Community…

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Budgets & Funding, Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, Government, Intelligence (government), Methods & Process, Money, Banks & Concentrated Wealth, Officers Call, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests, Strategy
Richard Wright

Dowd says it pretty well. My guess is that because CIA connsiders ISI an “asset”, they insist that no one including themsleves target the ISI. This of course means that ISI can continue using CIA and the U.S. as pawns in thier undeclared cold war against India.
Op-Ed Columnist

The Great Game Imposter

By MAUREEN DOWD

The New York Times

Published: November 23, 2010

And we wonder why we haven’t found Osama bin Laden.

Though we’re pouring billions into intelligence in Afghanistan, we can’t even tell the difference between a no-name faker and a senior member of the Taliban. The tragedy of Afghanistan has descended into farce.

. . . . . . .

Just as with Saddam and W.M.D., or groping and the T.S.A., we get no satisfaction for the $80 billion a year we spend on intelligence. Or we get fake information like Curveball that leads us into spending trillions more on a trumped-up war. Last year, seven top C.I.A. officials were fooled by a Jordanian double-agent who got onto an American base in Khost and blew all of them up. Our agents in the “wilderness of mirrors” may not be up to le Carré, but can’t they learn to Google, or at least watch “The Ipcress File”?

Who knows? Maybe we’ve been dealing with bin Laden all along. Maybe he’s been coming and going under a different moniker. As far as our intelligence experts are concerned, a turban and beard are just a turban and beard.

Read entire article…highly recommended.

Phi Beta Iota: What is not properly emphasized above is that most of the budget is spent on technical collection and beltway bandit vapor ware, with no one held accountable for massive failures, be they by Lockheed, SAIC, CSC, or what-have you.  CIA is at best $10 billion, of which at least 75% is sheer waste, fraud, and abuse.  What it does in the way of “intelligence” we could do for $100 million a year, and we could do it faster, better, cheaper and for 1000 times more individual consumers.  Neither are intelligence officials held accountable for failure (96% of the time) by Congress or the White House because both the Intelligence Community and the Pentagon are nothing more than pork gone rancid.  Leon Panetta could have been the greatest director of CIA in history with his unique background as White House Chief of Staff, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Representative.  Similar Jim Clapper could have been the first real Director of National Intelligence.  The lack of vision, initiative, accountability, and productivity at the top of the US secret world is quite extraordinary.  This is how the White House and Congress want it to be.  This is “blessed dysfunctionality” profitable for those who feast at the taxpayer's expense, and most assuredly not in the public interest.  That's how it is.  That is how it will remain absent President Obama choosing to remake himself, or America demanding Electoral Reform, a Coalition Cabinet, and a Balanced Budget in 2010.  We are in the Dark Ages of modern American faux-governance.

See Also:

Journal: CIA Does It Again….

Reference: American Tragedy–Another Free Ride for Pentagon

Journal: Death by a Thousand Cuts? Or Deliberate Elite Murder of the USA?

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Reference: Our Choice–Changing the Game

About the Idea, Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, IO Sense-Making, Officers Call, Policies, Real Time, Threats, Topics (All Other)

Today, with permission, I present Tom Atlee's newest vision, “Are We Ready to Change the Game Yet?,” and at the end, a link to his 2000 audio interview with Jim Rough, pioneer of Citizen Wisdom Councils and author of Society's Breakthrough.

ARE WE READY TO CHANGE THE GAME YET?

by Tom Atlee

2010-11-15-atlee.jpg

Some people say Gandhi was about nonviolence. And he was.

But he is significant for something else that I believe is far more important:

He changed the game.

With no one's permission, he reconfigured the playing field of colonialism to a higher Game in which everything the British did in their smaller, narrower game backfired on them. Prisons, guns, threats and bureaucracies of control not only ceased to work like they used to, but actually generated more power for Gandhi's world-changing Game.

Gandhi's Game involved, in his words, “experiments in Truth” — a search for Truth, a bigger Truth, a common inclusive Truth, a win-win Truth in every situation. The British — and even many of Gandhi's compatriots — were not aligned to that Truth. They wanted victory, control, and righteousness. These things trapped them in their smaller game until, one by one, and sometimes wholesale, Gandhi's commitment to Truth won their hearts and minds — and Shift happened.

Unfortunately he failed to create adequate social institutions that embodied, sustained, and empowered the Search for Truth by the whole of society. He depended on individuals seeing the light and being transformed. The miracle of his work is that so many people did transform — and continue to transform even to this day — inspired by his words, his life, his work. But in the end, what he left was an inspiring possibility, not an India or a world that was united, peaceful, just and sustainable.

Today's world calls us, with increasing intensity, not just to carry on Gandhi's work, but to carry it further. It isn't a matter of doing nonviolence as he and Martin Luther King, Jr., did it. It is a matter of changing the game.

Which brings me to the current state of U.S. politics and governance. These games are desperately in need of changing. Several recent innovations offer us the possibility to actually accomplish that and the timing is ripe.

Continue reading “Reference: Our Choice–Changing the Game”

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Journal: US Keeps Spending in AF

07 Other Atrocities, 11 Society, Budgets & Funding, Cultural Intelligence, Government, Military, Officers Call, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests

Tom EngelhardtTom Engelhardt
Editor of TomDispatch.com

Posted: November 15, 2010 03:23 PM

The Stimulus Package in Kabul (I Was Delusional — I Thought One Monster ‘Embassy' Was the End of It)

You must have had a moment when you thought to yourself: It really isn’t going to end, is it?  Not ever.  Rationally, you know perfectly well that whatever your “it” might be will indeed end, because everything does, but your gut tells you something different.

Read rest of long, deep, important articulation….

Phi Beta Iota: Please take the time to link to the entire article at Huffington Post.  Tom Englehardt has produced one of the most gripping, detailed, insightful, and provactive snapshots of how three monstrous billion dollar “embassies” in Baghdad, Kabul, and now Islamabad, are the last clarion of the Empire.  His piece is a “must read,” both an epitaph on the Empire, and sadly, a preface to the next 20 years of death and debt as we wind down all that has been set in motion.

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Journal: Arrogance, Rankism, & Incapacity

Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, IO Sense-Making, Officers Call, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests

Seth Godin Home

Arrogance is a bug in signal processing

We care a lot about finding people who are brilliant, who get things done, who make a difference. We care a lot about finding a playwright with talent, a surgeon who can cure us, a programmer who can get the thing to work.

Along the way, many of the linchpins who are able to do work like this develop affectations, quirks and even obnoxious qualities. They might demand an over-equipped dressing room or a private jet or merely be a jerk in meetings (or show up late, which is almost as bad).

We often put up with this, because, after all, they're superstars, right?

Somewhere along the way, we confused the signals with the work. Now there are people who start with the bad behavior and the affectations, hoping that it will be seen as a sign of insight and talent. And they often get away with it. “Who's that?” we wonder… “I don't know, but they must be good at what they do, because why else would we put up with them?” It's a great plan when it works, but I don't think it's a strategy to be counted on.

The key to getting a reputation for being brilliant is actually being brilliant, not just acting like you are.

Phi Beta Iota: The literature on organizational pathologies also refers to this as “rankism,” an affliction suffered by most who rise to the top ranks and allow themselves to be cut off from reality.  Daniel Elsberg's quote from Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers, is still the best:

The danger is, you’ll become like a moron. You’ll become incapable of learning from most people in the world, no matter how much experience they have in their particular areas that may be much greater than yours” [because of your blind faith in the value of your narrow and often incorrect secret information].

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Journal: Taliban’s grip is far stronger than the West will admit

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Analysis, History, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), Military, Misinformation & Propaganda, Officers Call, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests, Strategy
Chuck Spinney Recommends...

Afghanistan – behind enemy lines

James Fergusson returns after three years to Chak, just 40 miles from Kabul, to find the Taliban's grip is far stronger than the West will admit

Independent, 14 November 2010

The sound of a propeller engine is audible the moment my fixer and I climb out of the car, causing us new arrivals from Kabul to glance sharply upwards. I have never heard a military drone in action before, and it is entirely invisible in the cold night sky, yet there is no doubt what it is. My first visit to the Taliban since 2007 has only just begun and I am already regretting it. What if the drone is the Hellfire-missile-carrying kind?

Three years ago, the Taliban's control over this district, Chak, and the 112,000 Pashtun farmers who live here, was restricted to the hours of darkness – although the local commander, Abdullah, vowed to me that he would soon be in full control. As I am quickly to discover, this was no idle boast. In Chak, the Karzai government has in effect given up and handed over to the Taliban. Abdullah, still in charge, even collects taxes. His men issue receipts using stolen government stationery that is headed “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”; with commendable parsimony they simply cross out the word “Republic” and insert “Emirate”, the emir in question being the Taliban's spiritual leader, Mullah Omar.

The most astonishing thing about this rebel district – and for Nato leaders meeting in Lisbon this week, a deeply troubling one – is that Chak is not in war-torn Helmand or Kandahar but in Wardak province, a scant 40 miles south-west of Kabul.

Read rest of this direct look at ground truth….

Phi Beta Iota: We are reminded by this piece of how the best CIA desk officers knew instantly, the day we announced going to war in Viet-Nam, that we had gotten it wrong, that Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist, and that we would lose.  By the time Afghanistan rolled around, intelligence had become both jejeune and unethical (silent in the face of treason), and politics had become even more ideologically psychopathic and corrupt than ever before.  James Fegusson has given us a very fine contribution–this is ground truth at its best.

See Also:

Worth a Look: Book Review Lists (Negative)

and most especially:

Review: War Without Windows

Review: None So Blind–A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam

Review: Who the Hell Are We Fighting?–The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars

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Journal: Taliban Tet a Tet + Tet Offensive

04 Inter-State Conflict, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, 11 Society, Government, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence
DefDog Recommends...

Analysis: Nine years on, the Taliban have a message for West

By Sayed Salahuddin

KABUL | Sat Nov 13, 2010 1:44am EST

KABUL (Reuters) – When NATO leaders gather for a summit in Lisbon next week, where Afghanistan will top the agenda, they can expect a message waiting for them from the Taliban.

That message may well be a violent demonstration of their staying power, even though Washington and U.S. and NATO commanders have been talking up recent successes in Afghanistan before the summit and a strategy review by President Barack Obama next month.

This comes as many European NATO members begin to look at how long they can keep justifying their commitments to an increasingly unpopular war, and as Obama remains committed to beginning a gradual drawdown of U.S. troops from July 2011 before the 2014 goal set by Kabul to take total security responsibility.

Rest of article….

Phi Beta Iota: Morality is a strategic force and generally favors the indigenous fighting on their own land for their own values.  It is costing us $50 million per Taliban body to fight the Taliban on their own ground.  Obama needs advisors who have integrity, intelligence, and an instinct for the future.