NIGHTWATCH 4 SEP 13: Syria Unwrapped — US Lacks Credibility Across the Board, Russia Making Sense

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Proliferation, Officers Call

Russia-Syria: The Russian military news agency, Interfax-AVN, reported two more Russian ships are heading to the Mediterranean Sea. The destroyer Nastoychivyy of the Baltic Fleet and the patrol combatant Smetlivy of the Black Sea Fleet will join the Russian Navy's task force in Mediterranean in the next few days, Interfax-AVN was told at the Main Staff of the Navy on Wednesday, 4 September.

“The patrol combatant Smetlivy will enter the Mediterranean for combat duty in the next few days in accordance with operational command plans. The flagship of the Baltic Fleet, the destroyer Nastoychivyy, is expected to join the group of our ships,” a spokesman said.

The Russian Defense Ministry also said the patrol combatant Neustrashimyy and the large landing ships Aleksandr Shabalin, Admiral Nevelskoy and Peresvet are carrying out missions in the Mediterranean in accordance with operational command plans.

The large landing ships of the Black Sea and Baltic fleets, the Novocherkassk and the Minsk, will join them on 5-6 September. The medium reconnaissance ship SSV-21 Priazovye, which put out from Sevastopol on 1 September, is acting in accordance with special plans of the General Staff.

Comment: The Russian navy task force in the Mediterranean Sea is supposed to comprise 16 ships of various types. Eight of them are listed above. They have the capability to harass any US naval formation of destroyers.

Comments from Navy and Marine Corps veterans question the wisdom of using fleet defense assets – destroyers – in an offensive strike role. The key question is who or what protects the destroyers after they shoot, with Russian destroyers and patrol combatants around. Submarines presumably, but they are not effective in preventing harassment and disruption of surface formations.

Russia-US/France: President Vladimir Putin warned the West against taking one-sided action in Syria, but also said Russia ‘doesn't exclude' supporting a UN resolution on punitive military strikes if it is proven that Damascus used poison gas on its own people.

In a wide-ranging interview with The Associated Press and Russia's state Channel 1 television, Putin said Russia is developing a plan of action in case the United States does attack Syria without United Nations approval, but he declined to go into specifics.

He said he ‘doesn't exclude' the possibility of backing force against Syria, but at this stage he does not even accept that an alleged chemical weapons attack took place.”

Syria and Gas: Previously, the US, France and the UK published declassified documents about the 21 August gas attack and Syrian government forces use of gas in the past. Today, Russia published a summary of its findings about a prior attack that was alleged loudly and wrongly to be a Syrian government chemical attack.

This Russian study concerns a gas attack in Aleppo, also attributed to the Syrian government. The Russian document has received no coverage in Western media.

NightWatch reproduces the Russian report below.

Continue reading “NIGHTWATCH 4 SEP 13: Syria Unwrapped — US Lacks Credibility Across the Board, Russia Making Sense”

Berto Jongman: US Intelligence Missed Signs of WMD Attack? Or Just Now Leveraging Fabricated Israeli or Saudi-Concocted “Intercepts”?

02 Diplomacy, 03 Environmental Degradation, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Proliferation, 08 Wild Cards, Corruption, Government, Ineptitude, IO Deeds of War, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence
Berto Jongman
Berto Jongman

US spies missed signs of Aug. 21 Syrian WMD Strike

By KIMBERLY DOZIER

Associated Press, 4 September 2013

WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. intelligence agencies did not detect the Syrian regime readying a massive chemical weapons attack in the days ahead of the strike, only piecing together what had happened after the fact, U.S. officials say.

One of the key pieces of intelligence that Secretary of State John Kerry later used to link the attack to the Syrian government — intercepts of communications telling Syrian military units to prepare for the strikes — was in the hands of U.S. intelligence agencies but had not yet been “processed,” according to senior U.S. officials.

Continue reading “Berto Jongman: US Intelligence Missed Signs of WMD Attack? Or Just Now Leveraging Fabricated Israeli or Saudi-Concocted “Intercepts”?”

NIGHTWATCH: Syria Assad Interview, Other Comments

02 Diplomacy, 03 Environmental Degradation, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 05 Iran, 06 Russia, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Proliferation, 08 Wild Cards

Syria: President Asad gave an interview to Le Figaro which was published by the Syrian news agency Sana on 3 September. Excerpts follow.

Asad denied Syrian forces launched a chemical attack. He said Syria has no motive to make such an attack because it is winning the fight. He challenged the US to produce its proof and show it to the UN since the party making the accusations has the burden of proving them.

He said his soldiers were wounded in the attack on the 21st and the UN inspectors visited them in hospital.

He accused the US President of being a weak leader who succumbed to pressure from small groups and as one who starts wars instead of prevents them.

Concerning a Syrian response to a US attack, he reminded the interviewer that the architects of a war only control the first shot. He said the first and the greatest danger is that the situation will explode into a regional war.

In response to a question about Russian support he said,

Continue reading “NIGHTWATCH: Syria Assad Interview, Other Comments”

Berto Jongman Et Al: Syria Round-Up 2.0

03 Environmental Degradation, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Proliferation, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Terrorism, IO Deeds of War
Berto Jongman
Berto Jongman

Berto Jongman:  Adam Shatz on How Israel and Saudi Arabia Abuse the USA Repeatedly

Berto Jongman: A Detailed Summary Of The Evidence On Munitions Linked To The August 21st Attacks

Berto Jongman: Al Jazeera on US Three Months of Bombardment of Syria…

Berto Jongman: Bait and Switch – Obama’s “limited” strikes are just the prelude to massive intervention in the Middle East. And Congress shouldn’t fall for it.

Berto Jongman: Joseph Bodansky on White House Involvement in Planning the Syria Chemical Attack

Berto Jongman: Online Recruitment for Syria

Berto Jongman: Syria Non-VIolence Map

Berto Jongman: Turkish Support for Jihadists including from USA, Canada, and France

Berto Jongman:  USA Arrests Female Veteran Non-Violently Protesting Syria War

Berto Jongman: US Cyber Attack on Syria

Berto Jongman:  War Crimes in Syria

See Also:

Continue reading “Berto Jongman Et Al: Syria Round-Up 2.0”

Ioannis Koskinas & Kamal Alam: Reconciliation foolosophy: Fishing without bait

02 Diplomacy, 03 Economy, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Proliferation, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Justice, 09 Terrorism, 10 Security, 10 Transnational Crime, 11 Society, Civil Society, Cultural Intelligence, Ethics, Government, IO Deeds of Peace, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence
Cianni Koskinas
Cianni Koskinas

使用谷歌翻译在下一列的顶部。

गूगल अगले स्तंभ के शीर्ष पर अनुवाद का प्रयोग करें.

Google sonraki sütunun üstünde Çevir kullanın.

Используйте Google Translate на вершине соседней колонке.

گوگل اگلے کالم میں سب سے اوپر ترجمہ کا استعمال کریں.

Kamal Aman
Kamal Alam

Reconciliation foolosophy: Fishing without bait

By Ioannis Koskinas, Kamal Alam

Foreign Policy, 14 June 2013

The United States, Afghan, Qatari, and Pakistani governments have all voiced their support for the opening of a Taliban office in Doha in order to promote peace negotiations.  Some consider transforming the Taliban from an armed insurgency into a legitimate political group to be the critical first step in the Afghan peace process. However, to date, reconciliation efforts have stalled and focus more on rhetoric rather than substance.

There is no concrete evidence that Taliban leadership is either worn down or desperate to reach a peace agreement.  Attempting to secure his legacy as a peacemaker, Afghan President Hamid Karzai wants to reach an agreement before the end of his term in April 2014. Because the Taliban have also cooperated somewhat with this principle of reconciliation, it is not immediately clear why the current approach has achieved nothing.

Viet-Nam Viet-Cong Redux
Viet-Nam Viet-Cong Redux

The answer is that the Doha peace process has been riddled with unrealistic expectations, and remains hopelessly inconsistent.  Such reconciliation efforts without strategy and clear objectives reflect a hook without bait – while encouraging, these talks are doomed to fail without significant reform.  Only with realistic expectations, a coherent strategy, national solidarity, and lots of patience, will reconciliation stand a chance of materializing.

Where We've Been Thus Far

The reconciliation offer requires three specific things from the Taliban: ending violence, breaking ties with al-Qaeda, and accepting the Afghan Constitution. The fourth, less advertised condition is the acceptance of a residual ISAF element in Afghanistan post-2014. At a recent summit in London, British, Afghan and Pakistani leaders set a six-month timeline to reach a peace settlement.

But substantive results are unlikely to emerge until after the 2014 Afghan Presidential elections. This is the single most important date in the reconciliation process and will set the tone for future debate.  A six-month deadline to reach an agreement is not only unrealistic, but also damaging to the credibility of the process.

Continue reading “Ioannis Koskinas & Kamal Alam: Reconciliation foolosophy: Fishing without bait”

Gianni Koshinas: What Afghanistan Needs After 2014: A lighter, smarter, long-term commitment

01 Poverty, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Proliferation, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Terrorism, 10 Transnational Crime, Cultural Intelligence, Ethics, Government, IO Deeds of Peace, Military, Officers Call
Cianni Koskinas
Cianni Koskinas

使用谷歌翻译在下一列的顶部。

गूगल अगले स्तंभ के शीर्ष पर अनुवाद का प्रयोग करें.

Google sonraki sütunun üstünde Çevir kullanın.

Используйте Google Translate на вершине соседней колонке.

گوگل اگلے کالم میں سب سے اوپر ترجمہ کا استعمال کریں.

What Afghanistan Needs After 2014:  A lighter, smarter, long-term commitment

Gianni Koshinas

Foreign Policy, 12 February 2013

Maintaining a large military presence in Afghanistan is not in the strategic interests of either the U.S. or the Afghan government. It does not help the United States accomplish its long-term goal of countering terrorism from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, nor its short-term goal of helping Afghanistan achieve stability and self-reliance in fighting insurgency. It is also economically unsustainable. However, retaining a smaller, lighter, residual presence in Afghanistan is critical to U.S. strategy and vital to core U.S. interests.

Additionally, U.S. strategy in Afghanistan must be based on a vision that goes out decades: Considering only short-term goals amounts to strategic myopia, unworthy of the sacrifices made by almost 2,200 U.S. service members in Afghanistan alone.

A Case for Lighter, Smarter, Long-term Residual Presence

With Osama Bin Laden dead and al-Qaeda's capabilities diminished in the Af-Pak region, the immediate threat of attacks on the U.S. from the region has greatly diminished.  But the ingredients that could help Al Qaeda regenerate in the next decade remain, and thus the mission endures.

In fact, the “surge” of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2009 had little to do with bin Laden; rather, it was an attempt to rescue the failing mission of stabilizing Afghanistan. Bin Laden was hunted and killed not by the surge, but by a small, specialized group, the likes of which I argue should remain in Afghanistan to monitor and guard against the long-term threat of terrorist cells.

More importantly, a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy must include the training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to counter domestic threats. But this will take significantly longer than estimates suggest.  As such, the U.S. must alter its stated strategy in Afghanistan to consider the training and equipping of the ANSF a key element of its plan to counter threats, and support Afghanistan in its domestic fight against terrorists that, left unchecked, could re-emerge. The numbers of trainers must be kept low and should not be outsourced to contractors.  Currently, the only elements specifically designed to counter insurgencies are the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). Considering the nuanced task, the training force should be predominantly SOF.

Continue reading “Gianni Koshinas: What Afghanistan Needs After 2014: A lighter, smarter, long-term commitment”