Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform) – Page 44

2005/06/282009/12/04

Review: Squandered Victory–The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (Hardcover)

4 Star, Diplomacy, Empire, Sorrows, Hubris, Blowback, Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform), Iraq, Leadership, Military & Pentagon Power

Somewhat tedious, speaks truth, reveals our shortfalls,

June 28, 2005

Larry Diamond

The bottom line is this book is on page 290: “We never listened to the Iraqi people, or to the figures in the country that they respected.”

While some reviewers are critical of this author for representing all that is wrong with our post-war approach (he doesn't speak Arabic and knows nothing of the Middle East) I do not hold that against him–he tried to help, and he was the best we had. It is the fault of a long series of US Administrations, and multiple generations of Congress, that have chosen to ignore the real world and to short-change American education to the point that we are literally clueless as a Nation about the real world and how billions of people in the real world hold mixed feelings about America: admiring much of what we represent, while despising our immoral corporate and unilateral government behavior.

The U.S. Army, both before the war and in the post-reconstruction period–and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army–come out of this book looking very professional. The Army got it right, both in its pre-war estimates of what would be needed, and in its post-war recommendations. The author places the blame for the post-war deaths and disasters squarely at the feet of a naive President that empowered a Secretary of Defense inclined to go light, and side-lined a Department of State whose own intelligence estimates on Iraq have been consistently superior to those of either the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.

I put this book down with a heavy heart, coincident with Secretary Rumsfeld announcing that we will be in Iraq and be taking losses for another twelve years. The good news is that Iraq will over time achieve its own balance, its own form of democracy. The bad news is that, as Winston Churchill has said so famously, “The Americans always do the right thing–they just do it last (after making every other possible mistake).”

2005/04/212009/12/04

Review: Decisions of the Highest Order–Perspectives on the National Security Council (Paperback)

4 Star, Decision-Making & Decision-Support, Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform)

Classic–Contains Useful Material Not in the New Edition,

April 21, 2005

Karl F. Inderfurth

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

This is the orginal gold standard book on the National Security Council, now “replaced” but not fully so, by the new edition, “Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council,” just published in February 2004.

However, this original edition contains two sections, one on “Disorders” (of the NSC) and the other on “Remedies” (for NSC dysfunctionalities) that have not been fully migrated to the new book, and for that reason, I recommend that this version of the book also be bought, as a supporting element for the value of those two sections and a few other items of significant historical value in understanding the NSC.

Readers should be aware that both books focus on the NSC as primarily a “big stick” actor obsessing with the use of military “hard” power to impose America's will, and while there are helpful mentions in both books of “soft” power options, by and large neither book really addresses the full range of instrumental of national power (commercial, cultural, religious), nor does each book address how one understands and orchestrates all the non-Federal actors including American evangelical organizations, chambers of commerce, multinational corporations, etcetera, in stabilizing and reconstructing the world.

Never-the-less, this is standard book in the field, bringing together the very best minds available in America, and the updated version, while updated, does not completely replace it.

The editors and publishers might usefully consider a new volume on “comparative national security decision-making” in which sections address how Arab, Chinese, European, South American, South Asian, and Russian national security decisions are made.

2005/04/212009/12/04

Review: Fateful Decisions–Inside the National Security Council (Paperback)

4 Star, Decision-Making & Decision-Support, Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform)

Updated Improved Version, But Dropped Some Good Stuff,

April 21, 2005

Karl F. Inderfurth

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

This is an updated and improved version of the 1988 version, “Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council,” a book that remains, in its original form, a gold standard in the field.

The new improved version is both that–new and improved, with updated perspectives all the way into the first Bush Administration, recognizing the end of the Cold War and the new Global War on Terror, and I venture to say there is no finer book available for orienting both undergraduate and graduate students–as well as mid-career adult students–with respect to the vital role that the National Security Council plays in orchestrating Americas foreign and national security policies.

I have just two modest criticisms, both easily addressed through the use of other readings, but which would take this excellent book to a full five stars if the next edition integrated more material:

1) The original had some really excellent pieces Disorders and on Remedies, and the new version, while more timely and current, has left some useful historical perspectives on the cutting room floor. I would have preferred that the editors add as they have, but with less deletion from the past.

2) The book still has the flavor of the Cold War in that the NSC is looked upon as a largely military “big stick” get our way in the national security arena book, and it does not orient its readers to the full range of national capabilities, all of the instruments of national power including the economic, cultural, and religious. It does not fully reflect the growing role of non-state actors and the emerging appreciation for national security as a multi-cultural arena in which non-governmental organizations such as Doctors without Borders, and Chambers of Commerce, have at least as much to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction as do the U.S. Armed Forces.

In my view, this book is the standard, but I would like to see a third edition that addresses these last two points.

2005/01/292009/12/04

Review DVD: Bush’s Brain (2004)

4 Star, Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform), Politics, Reviews (DVD Only)

Explains McCain's Loss,

January 29, 2005

Lee Atwater

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add link to the others books on what Rove did to us.

This is quite a chilling movie, and it makes even more sense to me now that I have finished reading Lee Harris' “Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History.” Never mind John Kerry, a world-class loser with a wife to match–what this movie explains is how and why John McCain lost the South Carolina primary to Karl Rove's dirty tricks.

What really chilled me is not that Rove plays dirty against Democrats, but that he plays dirty against Republicans.

The movie begins with an early look at Karl Rove's start with Lee Atwater teaching young Republicans, including “dirty tricks” that the movie takes pains to point out are questionable but not illegal.

Included in the middle year's are stories with on the record interviews and replays of old media stories that make it quite clear that Rove is not above planting a “bug” in his own office (one with a six hour battery life, only 15 minutes of which have expired by the time it is “found”), nor of co-opting a single rogue FBI special agent to “coincidentally” have opponents under supeona just when it matters most.

Over the course of the movie, one learns that Rove is a master of playing the politcal “game” (only his version actually kills people) at three levels:

1) Disciplined overt politics–staying on message
2) Underlying messages that are legal but misdirecting
3) Underlying dirty tricks that are out and out unethical

This is where I was able to see the connection between Rove's playbook from Texas, and how John McCain was done in after a roaring victory in New Hampshire, when the South Carolina primary suddenly produced carefully orchestrated whisper campaigns about McCain's mental abilities, his black “love child” (actually an adopted orphan), and his family member's drug addition (an open issue being dealt with but made to sound terrible). In all this John Weaver, McCain's political director, shines as a voice of reason and honor when discussing the details.

Over-all the movie suggests that Rove has brought politics to a new low in ethics, and a new high in efficiency. Rove is a killing machine. He turned 9-11, and the war on Iraq, into political devices, and suggests that Rove, who has never served in uniform or in combat (nor have Cheney, Rice, or Wolfowitz), is essentially sacrificing American lives to keep his candidate in power.

The movie comes to closure with more than one commentator from Texas, where they all know Karl Rove *real well,* saying, “There's no rule he won't break.”

Well, as a moderate Republican, I find this troubling. What was done to John McCain in the South Carolina Republican presidential primary, and to Max Cleland of South Carolina in his Senate race, strike me as so reprehensible as to call into question the future of the Republican Party.

I recommend this movie to every American, but especially to Republicans, in whose name some things are being done that should shame us all.

2004/11/112009/12/04

Review: Inside CentCom–The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

3 Star, Biography & Memoirs, Congress (Failure, Reform), Empire, Sorrows, Hubris, Blowback, Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform), Iraq, Leadership, Military & Pentagon Power, War & Face of Battle

Puff Piece, Bland, Avoids Conflicting Facts & Big Picture,

November 11, 2004

Mike DeLong

On balance I found this book very disappointing. It reads more like “how I spent my summer vacation” (and like all school essays, avoids the negatives), and it also reads as if the author is either oblivious to or unaccepting of the investigative journalism reporting. I use Tora Bora as a litmus test. For this author to fail to mention that Secretary Rumsfeld authorized a Pakistani airlift that ultimately took 3,000 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters out of the Tora Bora trap, tells me all I need to know about the over-all balance in this account. It is a glossy rose-colored view more suited for Fox viewers than for any military or intelligence professional who is actually well-read across global issues literature. A great deal of important detail is left out of this 140-page double-spaced book (the additional 80 pages are largely useless appendices used to bulk up the book).

In no way does this diminish the personal accomplishments of the author. He was clearly a great general and a loyal hard-working individual within the military chain of command. The book does however trouble me in that it has a very tight narrow focus on military operations “as ordered,” and does not reflect the kind of geo-political awareness and nuanced appreciation of non-military factors–diplomatic, cultural, economic, demographic–that I want to see at the flag level. His treatment of Sudan in passing is representative: astonished delight that they are “helping” in the war on terrorism, and no sense at all of the massive genocide of the Sudanese government against its own people.

On the intelligence aspect, this book smells a bit. The general has not been close enough to CIA to know that agents commit treason, case officers handle them–calling a CIA officer an “agent” is a sure sign of ignorance about what CIA does and how it does it. He also claims, contrary to many open source reports as well as government investigations, that Guantanamo produced “reams of intelligence.” In my own experience, tactical combatants have very little to offer in the way of strategic third-country intelligence leads, and on balance, I believe that while the general may have been led to believe that Guantanamo was a gold mine, in fact it was a tar pit and a blemish on the US Armed Forces. The author continues to be a believer in the now long-discredited Chalabi-DIA-CIA views on the presence of weapons of mass destruction, to the point of still being in the past on the issue of the aluminum tubes.

There are exactly two gems in this book. The first deals with the problems we had in supporting our Special Forces in Afghanistan above the 12,000 foot level (actually, anything above 6,000 feet challenges our aviation). I ask myself in the margin, “why on earth don't we have at least one squadron of helicopters optimized for high-altitude combat operations?” The Special Air Force may claim they do, but I don't believe it. We need a high-altitude unit capable of sustained long-haul operations at the 12,000 foot level, not just a few modified Chinooks and brave Chief Warrant Officers that “made do.”

The second gem in the book is a recounted discussion on the concept of Arab honor and how US troops in Iraq should have a special liaison unit that approached the families of each person killed “inadvertently” to offer a profound and sincere apology and an “accidental killing fee.” This resonates with me, and I was disappointed to see no further discussion–evidently the general heard and remembered this good idea, but did nothing to implement it.

I have ordered a copy of the Koran and will read it, because I respect this officer's account of how much good it did him in understanding his mission and the context for the mission (aided by a regular discussion of the contents with an Islamic practitioner).

Bottom line: great officer within his scope, moderate author within his mandate, the book is at about 60% of where I would expect to be given this officer's extraordinary access.

2004/08/292009/12/04

Review: America the Vulnerable–How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism

5 Star, Congress (Failure, Reform), Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform), Threats (Emerging & Perennial)

“The” Book on Domestic Security,

August 29, 2004

Stephen Flynn

Edited 20 Dec 07 to add links.

Some will say this book aids the enemy, pointing out with shocking clarity the extreme vulnerabilities of our transportation, communications, and other core systems. I happen to agree with the author's core point, as Thomas Jefferson would agree: politicians will continue to ignore these vulnerabilities and lie to the public until the public achieves its own appreciation of the threat.

This is a double-spaced book, an easy read from Tampa to Dulles (2.5 hours), and well-worth any thinking person's attention. For those who disparage this book as “gloom and doom”: go back to your vodka martinis.

THE fundamental point of this book, and one that I happily endorse on the basis of my other 493 reviews of national security non-fiction, is that how we spend the federal tax dollar is completely out of balance. We are spending $500 billion on a “hard power” military that can barely contain terrorism, crime, genocide, revolution, and war between states, while we are letting our states and cities go begging, and refuse to fund just 16,000 Customs inspectors, among other vital initiatives.

This is the single best book I have found that points out that in the era of asymmetric warfare, where non-state actors have both explosive and nuclear-biological-chemical power at their disposal, it is the “soft targets”, the non-military infrastructure targets, which will be most attractive to the “sleeper” agents of Al Qaeda and others. Washington continues to deceive America about its vulnerability, and about Washington's feckless irresponsibility in failing to redirect funds from hard power only relevant to fighting major states, to a combination of homeland defense of soft targets, which is this book's focus, and soft power projection such as Joe Nye recommends in his various books, but especially The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone,

The author's first line is a block-buster: “If September 11, 2001 was a wake-up call, clearly America has fallen back asleep.” He is right. I deal with those responsible for the “Global War on Terror” and most of them are working 9-5, spending half their day gossiping or browsing the Web. [This is still true as of 20 Dec 07, besides which, terrorism is a tactic, you cannot make war on a tactic].

In my view, the author, a former Coast Guard commander and also a National Security Council staff member, is right on target when he says that the Pentagon is guilty of an “escapist” perspective in thinking they can defeat terrorism “over there.” It was this point that caused me to both buy this book in an airport, and to review it concurrently with General Tommy Franks' book American Soldier General Franks is both a superb officer, and a naive escapist, and reading this book drives that point home in a way that would make any intelligent person pleased to have spent time with the author.

There is a “seam” between our homeland security and our overseas capabilities, and there is no one in charge of any coherent program to decide how best to protect BOTH our neighborhoods AND our overseas investments.

This is a nuanced book, one that makes the point that security must become as embedded as safety has been, and the further point that security properly embedded is actually PROFITABLE! He's right. Green lanes for containers that have proper GPS and content authentications will SAVE dollars by saving time. Bio-chemical detection across all herds and food supplies will detect “natural” threats such as we have seen with SARS, monkey pox, bird flu, West Nile virus, etc.

Finally, security and openness can help reduce fraud, especially import/expert tax fraud, where containers loaded with priceless equipment are mis-labeled as low-cost machinery, or vice versa, an advanced form of money laundering that is costing the U.S. taxpayer over $50 billion a year in lost tax revenues.

Of the 1000+ books or so that I have reviewed here at Amazon, this book easily makes it into my top ten list of books relevant to getting national security right in the near term. Beyond five stars.

2004/08/132009/12/04

Review: Osama’s Revenge–THE NEXT 9/11 : What the Media and the Government Haven’t Told You

4 Star, 9-11 Truth Books & DVDs, America (Anti-America), Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform), Media, Misinformation & Propaganda, Security (Including Immigration), Terrorism & Jihad

Third of Three “Must Reads” on Bin Laden and Threat to USA,

August 13, 2004

Paul L. Williams

This is the third of three books that I am reviewing today and that I strongly recommend be read by every adult in America. The first two, in order of priority, are Mahmood Mamdani's Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror and CIA Anonymous Executive Analyst, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror. I should add that terror is a tactic, not an enemy, it is impossible to win a war against a tactic.

What this book does is piece together all of the English-language reports over the past ten years or so regarding the probabilities and specifics of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda's having acquired several forms or portable nuclear devices. Although some reviewers have slammed this book for being fictional, they do not know what they are talking about. The FACTS are that the Soviet general officer responsible for the 100 suitcase nuclear bombs designed for Spetznatz use, some pre-positioned in the USA, has said publicly, in writing, and on more than one occasion that 66 of those are unaccounted for.

I took one star off for excessive reliance on two secondary sources, both excellent but never-the-less cited too often, and the commensurate lack of attention to foreign language materials that could have deepened this study considerably, especially when one takes into account the CIA executive analyst's comments in IMPERIAL HUBRIS regarding the straight truth-telling that can be found in Bin Laden's Arabic-language postings. “Nuclear hell storm” is out there (the author does cite this), and we had better take this more seriously than our government has.

The author opens with a notional “letter to America” from Bin Laden that is based on Bin Laden's actual statements (as itemized in IMPERIAL HUBRIS) and is alone worth the price of the book. If we don't take a long hard look at ourselves and correct the misbehavior that is radicalizing over a billion Muslims, we will not (not!) win this war.

The author does a really fine job, not just of amassing and stringing together a coherent story of Bin Laden's likely possession of nuclear capabilities, but also of showing the inter-relationship between the Afghanistan drug fields that the U.S. Government has stupidly allowed to flourish, the Pakistani production facilities that take the opium to a “Number 4” level of quality, and criminal organizations as well as corrupt governments everywhere that facilitate Bin Laden's operations. The roles of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan (especially Pakistan) in facilitating the storage, refurbishment, and technical maintenance of the purchased nuclear elements are covered in a manner that persuades me–this is a very real threat.

The book is a useful compilation of both mistakes by the US, and events taking place from 2002-2004, and it ends with full translated copies of the 23 Aug 96 Fatwa and the related 23 Feb 98 World Islamic Statement. Within the book are some extracts from Al Qaeda training manuals, one portion of which make it clear that the “sleepers” now in the US are specifically forbidden to go to mosques or appear Islamic in any way.

Bottom line, totally consistent with the other two books I recommend: the US needs to meet Bin Laden's reasonable demands, and redirect its focus from occupying Islamic countries toward cleaning up its own homeland. [I realize that calling Bin Laden's demands “reasonable” in going to infuriate many people, but I have to say, based on all three books taken as a whole, that all three authors agree on this point, and they have persuaded me. We cannot win if we persist in supporting 44 dictators, occupying Muslim lands, demanding cheap oil at the expense of the Muslim populations, and supporting an Israel that is racist as well as terrorist in nature toward the Palestinians. It is what it is–the sooner we stop deceiving ourselves, and demand that our government get back to the ideals of moral capitalism and truly representative democracy, the sooner we have a chance to avoid this “nuclear hellstorm” that I believe this book credibly documents as a very real possibility.]