Lightweight, Ignores History, Without Useful Sources,
October 13, 2000
Ashley J. Tellis
his is a simple-minded book that manages to obscure the basics with convoluted language. It also achieves a remarkable feat, failing to mention history as a relevant factor in understanding and anticipating ethnic conflict in the 21st Century. It does nothing whatsover to suggest to the interested analyst, for whom this “template” was designed, how to operationalize the few relevant factors the book identifies, and does not provide any discussion at all of sources and methods helpful to studying ethnic conflict. There is no bibliography and no index. The footnotes are lightweight.
This is an admirable and unusual work, of doctoral-level quality in its sources and methods, while also reflecting the professional intelligence career status of the author. It complements Amy Zegart's broader book, Flawed By Design, in an excellent manner. This book, focusing as it does on the CIA alone, and on internal sources not readily available to Zegart, fills a major gap in our understanding of the CIA's origins. The author excels at demonstrating both the actual as opposed to the mythical origins of the agency, and pays particular heed to the role of the Bureau of the Budget and that Bureau's biases and intentions. At the end of it all, the author notes that the agency was moving in controversial directions within four years of its birth, quickly disturbing Harry Truman, who is quoted as saying, twenty-years after the fact (in 1963), “For some time I have been distributed by the way CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational arm and at times a policy-making arm of Government….I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations.” The author himself goes on to conclude that “the nature of the new threats and the revolution in information acquisition and dissemination have thrown traditional ways of intelligence organization, collection, evaluation, and distribution into question. … CIA has entered the second half-century of its existence striving to avoid the fate of its OSS parent. In the process, it is groping for new missions and purposes while blighted by the legacy of its past derelictions, and while operating amid a rapidly changing global environment and technological revolution that are rendering its sources, methods, organizations, and mystique obsolete.” I would hasten to add, as my own book documents, that we will always have hidden evil in the world and will always needs spies and secret methods to some extent, but this book, combining academic rigor with insider access, must surely give the most intelligent of our policy, legislative, and intelligence managers pause, for it very carefully documents the possibility that 75% of what we are doing today with secret sources and methods need not and should not be done. This book has much to offer those who would learn from history.
Expensive, Ineffective, Unrealistic, But Interesting,
August 29, 2000
William A. Owens
This is a well-intentioned book and the best available manifesto for the “system of systems” that can integrate intelligence, precision strike, and communications technologies by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). On balance it provides several important contributions, but its core assumption that technology can be a substitute for people is flawed, as is its completely insupportable assumption that our allies might be willing to follow us down this very expensive and dubious interoperability trail. Perhaps even more troubling, the school of thought represented by this book suffers from the severe delusion that everything that needs to be seen can be seen by national technical means, and processed in time to be relevant to the commander. Nothing could be further from the truth-fully 90% of what is needed to succeed in today's environment is not in digital form, not in English, and not collectible by technical means. The most important point made in the whole book, and here I give the author high marks, is its compelling description of why military reform cannot be achieved from within: because there is no decision process by which a “joint” leadership can determine force structure and weapons acquisition without fear of service politics. His approach to reform, shifting from a focus on system stovepipes to joint mission areas, is valuable and could be helpful in defense transformation if it were cleansed of its unhealthy obsession with expensive technology and forced to face the fact that three-quarters of our challenges in this new century are Operations Other Than War (OOTW) that call into question virtually every dollar being spent under existing RMA auspices. The book is also helpful in pointing out the redundancy between the four services, the 12:1 support ratio in personnel, and the need to embed information handling capabilities in all future mobility and weapons systems. Perhaps most disappointingly, this book by a distinguished Admiral and apparent out-of-the-box thinker fails to outline a force structure, including a 450-ship Navy, capable of dealing effectively with all four levels of war in every clime and place.
Alvin & Heidi Toffler have always written and spoken as a team, but this is the first book where Heidi has been included. Future Shock and PowerShift remain their two most important works, this one comes in third. They start off with a compelling reason for buying the book, a quote from Trotsky: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” Today, right now, there are 26 conflicts going on around the world killing more than 1000 people a year; 78 “low intensity” conflicts killing more than 100 but less than 1000 people a year; and 178 violent political conflicts causing fewer than 100 deaths per year–source is the PIOOM project in The Netherlands. There are also 16 genocidal campaigns ongoing as we speak, and another 18 emerging–from Rwanda and Burundi to Sri Lanka to East Timor to obscure sections of China and Russia. This is a serious book by serious researchers who had the good fortune to be prescient and to become world-renowned futurists. The book is strongest on Third Wave wars and niche wars, does a very creditable job of covering a wide range of unconventional forms of conflict, and ends, somewhat disappointingly, with a useful but less than gripping discussion of “peace forms”. Fun to read, including the chapter on “The Future of the Spy.”
I'm sticking to my story–there is nothing wrong with America, the government, the department of defense, or the secret intelligence community, that cannot be restored with one word–INTEGRITY.
In no way does this impugn the honor or the good intentions of specific individuals or organizations. Instead, this addresses the reailty that our industrial-era society has failed to adapt and is on the verge of collapse in the face of complexity. Only bottom-up Collective Intelligence can cope, but that requires innovative and pervasive education for all.