Excellent Overview of Allied and Other Economic Espionage,
April 8, 2000
John J. Fialka
John is a distinguished correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, their lead reporter during the Gulf War, and an award-winning investigative journalist in the fields of national security, politics, and financial scandal. The Chinese, Japanese, French and Russians are featured here, together with useful cross-overs into criminal gangs doing espionage on U.S. corporations, as well as overt data mining and other quasi-legal activities that yield far more economic intelligence than most business leaders understand.
Jean, a nationally-respected journalist in France who has covered espionage matters for decades, is the author of one of those rare French books that make it into the U.S. marketplace. Translated into English after great reviews in Europe, it charts the migration of European and Anglo-Saxon intelligence professionals into cyber-space.
I continue to regard this book as one of the best available textbooks for inspiring informed student and entry-level employee discussion about the intelligence professional and its role in supporting policy-making. The author's conclusion, and the “eleven points” he makes regarding the current status and future of intelligence, continue to be an essential contribution to the great debate.
Informing Policy is more important than stealing secrets,
April 8, 2000
Angelo Codevilla
“It is not too gross an exaggeration that when considering any given threat, DIA will overestimate, CIA will underestimate, and INR will blame the U.S. for it.” From his opening chapter and his distinction between static, dynamic, and technical facts, on through a brilliant summary of the post-war spy on page 103 and lengthy sections on how we've gotten it wrong, how we can get it right, and what is needed in the way of reform, I found this book worthy of study. An analyst and political staffer by nature, the strength of this book rests on the premise in the title: that intelligence should be about informing policy, not about collecting secrets for secrets' sake.
Some serious food for thought here. Not only is the power to define madness, criminality, and sexuality addressed, but also the active use of criminals, and sex, to suppress and subjugate the populace. Somewhat more difficult to wade through but similar to Norman Cousins, it helped provoke my thinking on how top-down unilateral command based on secrets is inevitably going to give way to bottom-up multicultural decision-making by the people based on open sources evenly shared across networks. This is really very heavy stuff, and it helps call into question the “rationality” of both the Washington-based national security policymaking process, and the “rationality” of spending $30 billion a year on secrets in contrast to what that $30 billion a year might buy in terms of openly-available insights and overt information peacekeeping.
I was given this book at Hacker's (the MIT/Silicon Valley legal and largely very rich group, of which I am an elected member) by a NASA engineer, went to bed, could not get the book out of mind, got up, and read it through the night. If it were not for the fact that Intelink is largely useless to the rest of the world and soon to be displaced by my own and other “extranets”, this book would be triumphal. As it is, I consider it an extremely good baseline for understanding the good and the bad of how the U.S. Intelligence Community addresses the contradictions between needing access to open sources and emerging information technologies while maintaining its ultra-conservative views on maintaining very restricted access controls to everything and everyone within its domain. I have enormous regard for what these folks accomplished, and wish they had been able to do it openly, for a much larger “virtual intelligence community” willing and able to share information. For a spy, information shared is information lost-until they get over this, and learn that information not only increases in value with dissemination but is also a magnet for 100 pieces of information that would never have reached them otherwise, the U.S. Intelligence Community will continue to be starved for both information and connectivity….an SGML leper in an XML world.
This is an even-tempered book, combining a good primer of the nature of the intelligence process with some analytically-oriented thoughts on needed improvements. Their appendix listing things that can go wrong at each step of the intelligence cycle is of lasting value, as is their glossary. Their forthcoming book, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age (Yale, April 2000) will assuredly be a major contribution.
