The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, General Martin Dempsey, backed by his Joint Staff generals and admirals, stood between a hasty and knee-jerk President Obama who was intent on launching a military attack on Syria and a tenuous peace in the Middle East.
As of the evening of Friday, August 29, President Obama was on track to launch a sustained 72-hour cruise missile and drone attack on pre-selected air defense and other strategic military targets in Syria.
(From Showtime) There is a classified America we were never meant to see. From Academy Award®-winning writer/director Oliver Stone, this ten-part documentary series looks back at human events that at the time went under reported, but that crucially shaped America's unique and complex history over the 20th century. From the atomic bombing of Japan to the Cold War and the fall of Communism, this in-depth, surprising, and totally riveting series demands to be watched again and again. (Showtime forgot to mention that it would be a good idea for Americans to DO something more than just “watch.”).
A notable quote mentioned in the last episode:
“The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.” ~ The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order; Samuel P. Huntington; 1996; pg. 51.
US spies missed signs of Aug. 21 Syrian WMD Strike
By KIMBERLY DOZIER
Associated Press, 4 September 2013
WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. intelligence agencies did not detect the Syrian regime readying a massive chemical weapons attack in the days ahead of the strike, only piecing together what had happened after the fact, U.S. officials say.
One of the key pieces of intelligence that Secretary of State John Kerry later used to link the attack to the Syrian government — intercepts of communications telling Syrian military units to prepare for the strikes — was in the hands of U.S. intelligence agencies but had not yet been “processed,” according to senior U.S. officials.
Special attention to last four paras on page 2. Administration is forcing IC beyond its objective collection/reporting role into political advocacy.
Intelligence Community Unclassified Assessment
Chemical Weapons Attack by the Syrian Regime
The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013, resulting in a large number of casualties, including the deaths of 1,429 people, among them 426 children. We further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack.
This assessment is based on a wide variety of sources, including: human, signals and geospatial intelligence; multiple accounts describing chemical-filled rockets impacting opposition-controlled areas; accounts from international and Syrian medical personnel; thousands of social media reports; and information from a highly credible international organization reporting that three hospitals in the Damascus area received approximately 3,600 patients displaying symptoms consistent with nerve agent exposure.
Syrian regime officials prepared for the attack. We have intelligence leads us to assess that Syrian government chemical weapons personnel were operating in a Damascus suburb near an area that the regime uses to mix chemical weapons, including sarin. On August 21, a Syrian regime element prepared for a chemical attack in the Damascus area, including through the utilization of gas masks.
Syrian forces conducted the attack. Satellite detections corroborate that attacks from a regime-controlled area struck neighborhoods where the chemical attacks reportedly occurred. This includes the detection of rocket launches from regime controlled territory early in the morning, approximately 90 minutes before the first report of a chemical attack appeared in social media.
Syrian regime officials discussed the attack. We intercepted communications involving a senior official intimately familiar with the offensive who confirmed that chemical weapons were used by the regime on 21 August and who was concerned with the U.N. inspectors obtaining evidence. On the afternoon of 21 August, we have intelligence that Syrian chemical weapons personnel were directed to cease operations. At the same time, the regime intensified the artillery barrage targeting many of the neighborhoods where chemical attacks occurred. In the 24 hour period after the attack, we detected indications of artillery and rocket fire at a rate approximately four times higher than the ten preceding days.
Victims displayed the symptoms of chemical weapons. One hundred videos relating to the attack show large numbers of victims exhibiting physical signs consistent with, but not unique to, nerve agent exposure—including unconsciousness, foaming from the nose and mouth, constricted pupils, rapid heartbeat, and difficulty breathing. Several videos show what appear to be numerous fatalities with no visible injuries, which is consistent with death from chemical weapons and inconsistent with death from small-arms, high-explosive munitions or blister agents.
This is not the first time that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons. The Syrian regime possesses numerous chemical agents, including mustard, sarin, and VX and has thousands of munitions that can be used to deliver chemical warfare agents. We assess with high
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confidence the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year. We assess that the regime’s frustration with its inability to secure large portions of Damascus may have contributed to its decision to use chemical weapons on August 21.
It is highly unlikely that the opposition could have executed or fabricated the attack. We have seen no indication that the opposition has carried out a large-scale, coordinated rocket and artillery attack like the one that occurred on August 21. Our intelligence sources in the Damascus area did not detect any indications in the days prior to the attack that opposition affiliates were planning to use chemical weapons. Moreover, we assess the Syrian opposition does not have the capability to fabricate all of the videos, physical symptoms verified by medical personnel and NGOs, and other information associated with this chemical attack.
The use of chemical weapons in Syria threatens U.S. national security interests. Threatening to unravel the long-established international norm against the use of chemical weapons, for which there must be accountability and consequences; risking further violence and instability that threatens the region including close allies and partners like Israel, Turkey and Jordan; and increasing the risk that these weapons will be obtained by terrorist groups who might use them against the United States.
The international community is condemning this attack and calling for action. The Arab League declared that they have decided “to hold the Syrian regime fully responsible for this crime.” The Organization for Islamic Cooperation has said that the regime must be held “legally and morally accountable for this heinous crime.” NATO’s North Atlantic Council declared that “any use of such weapons is unacceptable and cannot go unanswered. Those responsible must be held accountable”.
The purpose of any response would be limited. The President has not yet made a final decision on how to respond. That said, any response would be focused on the regime’s use of chemical weapons. We need to send a clear message to Assad, his allies, and the world that the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated. This is important to achieving the goal of stopping chemical weapons use in Syria, saving lives and deterring the use of chemical weapons by others in the future.
This is not Iraq 2003. The response that the President is considering is limited, tailored, and focused on the issue of chemical weapons. The President has made clear that he is not considering an open-ended military intervention aimed at regime change, nor is he considering U.S. boots on the ground. This is not Iraq or Afghanistan (ground forces) or Libya (a sustained air campaign).
Group joins lawsuit seeking end to spy agency's collection of Americans' phone records.
Michael Winter
USA TODAY, 4 September 2013
The National Rifle Association has joined a lawsuit against the federal government's sweeping surveillance program, claiming the collection of phone records and other data violates First Amendment rights and amounts to an illegal gun registry.
In supporting the American Civil Liberties Union's lawsuit, the NRA on Wednesday filed a supporting brief arguing the National Security Agency's datamining “could allow identification of NRA members, supporters, potential members, and other persons with whom the NRA communicates, potentially chilling their willingness to communicate with the NRA.”
The NSA's phone database would let the government track whether gun owners called the NRA, gun stores, shooting ranges or others.
The brief also says the database “could allow the government to circumvent legal protections for Americans' privacy, such as laws that guard against the registration of guns or gun owners,” thereby creating an illegal “national gun registry.”
The field of “Humanitarian Computing” applies Human Computing and Machine Computing to address major information-based challengers in the humanitarian space. Human Computing refers to crowdsourcing and microtasking, which is also referred to as crowd computing. In contrast, Machine Computing draws on natural language processing and machine learning, amongst other disciplines. The Next Generation Humanitarian Technologies we are prototyping at QCRI are powered by Humanitarian Computing research and development (R&D).
My QCRI colleagues and I just launched the first ever Humanitarian Computing Library which is publicly available here. The purpose of this library, or wiki, is to consolidate existing and future research that relate to Humanitarian Computing in order to support the development of next generation humanitarian tech. The repository currently holds over 500 publications that span topics such as Crisis Management, Trust and Security, Software and Tools, Geographical Analysis and Crowdsourcing. These publications are largely drawn from (but not limited to) peer-reviewed papers submitted at leading conferences around the world. We invite you to add your own research on humanitarian computing to this growing collection of resources.
Many thanks to my colleague ChaTo (project lead) and QCRI interns Rahma and Nada from Qatar University for spearheading this important project. And a special mention to student Rachid who also helped.
