Category: Strategy

Posted on

Journal: ClimateGate Meets Yamal Divergence

03 Environmental Degradation, Academia, Analysis, Commerce, Earth Intelligence, Ethics, Government, Key Players, Media, Methods & Process, Policies, Reform, Strategy

ClimateGate and Yamal Evidence
ClimateGate and Yamal Evidence

Phi Beta Iota: ClimateGate has outraged us for two reasons–first, the lack of integrity among the scientists and the selected United Nations officials concerned; and second, the naivete, ignorance, or corruption of government officials  all too eager to create a new Global Warming Complex that profits from carbon trades (another form of phantom wealth) while imposing severe social costs on the five billion poor.  ENOUGH.  Below the fold are the original comments of Contributing Editor Chuck Spinney, relating past Pentagon data manipulation with the data manipulation that charactizes the Climate Change movement.  It is our view that the UN International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) should be disbanded, while the UN High Level Panel and the UN Environmental Program, both of which kept their integrity intact, are asked to create a World Brain with embedded EarthGame that can address all ten high level threats (environmental degradation is third, after poverty and infectious disease) by providing the world with information that allows the harmonization of spending across all twelve core policy areas in a manner attractive to the eight demographic challengers (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Wild Cards such as the Congo, Malaysia, and Turkey).

Yamal: A “Divergence” Problem by Steve McIntyre, Climate Audit, September 27th, 2009
Continue reading “Journal: ClimateGate Meets Yamal Divergence”

Posted on

Journal: Afghanistan & Iraq–Opportunity Knocks for an Afghan Airlift and a Six-Month Muslim-Centered Multinational Multiagency “Advise & Assist” Transition Toward Departure from Both Countries

Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, InfoOps (IO), Key Players, Methods & Process, Mobile, Policies, Policy, Real Time, Reform, Strategy, Threats

NIGHTWATCH Special Report:  October in Afghanistan 27 November 2009

Taliban and other anti-government fighters have begun to go to winter quarters, in Pakistan or in Afghanistan. The fighting will drop somewhat during the winter, but in the core provinces of the Pashtun south, weather is not a factor.

Based on Taliban public statements, their attacks will remain focused on disruption of the overland truck lifeline for Afghan and NATO forces, mainly by using improvised bombs. In the face of renewed NATO resolve, the Taliban also will wait for the next opportunity to attempt to take power.

Taliban cannot defeat NATO forces, but NATO forces cannot defeat Taliban, especially without combat air support. The government in Kabul cannot survive without NATO forces, but by this time next year the Afghan forces will need more logistics and air support rather than combat soldiers, if the US and European NATO trainers are competent.

Continue reading “Journal: Afghanistan & Iraq–Opportunity Knocks for an Afghan Airlift and a Six-Month Muslim-Centered Multinational Multiagency “Advise & Assist” Transition Toward Departure from Both Countries”

Posted on

Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

Analysis, Budgets & Funding, Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, InfoOps (IO), Key Players, Methods & Process, Mobile, Policies, Policy, Real Time, Reform, Searches, Strategy, Technologies, Threats, Tools
COIN20 Trip Report
Paradise Found

The future of OSINT is M4IS2.

The future of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is Multinational, Multifunctional, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing & Sense-Making (M4IS2).

The following, subject to the approval of Executive and Congressional leadership, are suggested hueristics (rules of thumb):

Rule 1: All Open Source Information (OSIF) goes directly to the high side (multinational top secret) the instant it is received at any level by any civilian or military element responsive to global OSINT grid.  This includes all of the contextual agency and mission specific information from the civilian elements previously stove-piped or disgarded, not only within the US, but ultimately within all 90+ participating nations.

Rule 2: In return for Rule 1, the US IC agrees that the Department of State (and within DoD, Civil Affairs) is the proponent outside the wire, and the sharing of all OSIF originating outside the US IC is at the discretion of State/Civil Affairs without secret world caveat or constraint.  OSIF collected by US IC elements is NOT included in this warrant.

Continue reading “Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]”

Posted on

Journal: Marcus Aureleus Recommends…

Analysis, Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, InfoOps (IO), Key Players, Methods & Process, Policies, Policy, Real Time, Reform, Strategy, Threats
Full Story Online
Marcus Aurelius

CIA’s Lost Magic Manual Resurfaces

Q&A: Climate cash controversy

Global warming industry becomes too big to fail

UN: fight against Congo rebels failing

More Troops to Afghanistan, But What Will They Do?

Where Has the Thrill Gone? The Harder They Fall

Phi Beta Iota: “Too Big to Fail” is industrial era idiocy.  REALITY tells us that the more complex a system gets, the more it DEMANDS self-healing from the bottom-up.  Feedback loops at all levels, each with their integrity intact.  What all of the headlines above have in common is precisely the opposite: degraded feedback loops lacking integrity.

Posted on

Journal: In Iraq Two-Way British-American Hostility

Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, Key Players, Methods & Process, Policies, Strategy, Threats

Full Story Online
Full Story Online

The deep hostility of Britain’s senior military commanders in Iraq towards their American allies has been revealed in classified Government documents leaked to the Daily Telegraph.

By Andrew Gilligan,  22 Nov 2009

In the papers, the British chief of staff in Iraq, Colonel J.K.Tanner, described his US military counterparts as “a group of Martians” for whom “dialogue is alien,” saying: “Despite our so-called ‘special relationship,’ I reckon we were treated no differently to the Portuguese.”

Col Tanner’s boss, the top British commander in the country, Major General Andrew Stewart, told how he spent “a significant amount of my time” “evading” and “refusing” orders from his US superiors.   …

Continue reading “Journal: In Iraq Two-Way British-American Hostility”

Posted on

Journal: Material Poverty (AF) vs Moral Poverty (US)

Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, Key Players, Policies, Reform, Strategy, Threats

Full Story Online
Full Story Online

Afghans say poverty, not Taliban, main cause of war

Jonathon Burch – Wed Nov 18

“ Half our people have been driven mad–always in fear.”

KABUL (Reuters) – Most Afghans see not Taliban militants but poverty, unemployment and government corruption as the main causes of war in their country, according to a report by a leading aid group released on Wednesday.

After three decades of war, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. It is also one of the most corrupt. Unemployment stands at 40 percent and more than half the country live below the poverty line.

Full Story Online
Full Story Online

Retired military officers cash in as well-paid consultants

WASHINGTON — Six months after Marine Lt. Gen. Gary McKissock retired in 2002, he did what many other ex-military leaders do: He joined the board of directors of a defense contractor, a company doing business with his former service.

McKissock also had a second job. The Marines brought him back as an adviser, at double the rate of pay he made on active duty. Since 2005, the Marines have awarded McKissock contracts worth $1.2 million, in addition to his military pension of about $119,000 a year. McKissock is one of at least 158 retired admirals and generals the Pentagon has hired to offer advice under an unusual arrangement.

Continue reading “Journal: Material Poverty (AF) vs Moral Poverty (US)”

Posted on

Journal: What If We Fail In Afghanistan?

Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, Key Players, Policies, Reform, Strategy, Threats

What If We Fail in Afghanistan?

Steve Coll The New Yorker November 16, 2009

What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first-draft straw-man forecast:

The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids

Momentum for a Taliban Revolution in Pakistan

Increased Islamist Violence Against India, Increasing the Likelihood of Indo-Pakistani War

Increased Al Qaeda Ambitions Against Britain and the United States

Phi Beta Iota: This is a classic status quo “Empire as Usua”l question.  It is not only the wrong question, trying to answer it perpetuates the insanity that begot the problem in the first place.  Steve Coll, author of  Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, is a very smart, very well-connected mandarin with The Washington Post as his home base.   The question that We the People should be forcing the White House and Congress to answer is this:

What If We Stop Spending $1.3 Trillion a Year on War, and Instead

Spend At Least a Third of That on Peace?

We never ask a question we cannot answer. The answer is clear-cut: we create a prosperous world at peace. See the two graphics below the fold.

Continue reading “Journal: What If We Fail In Afghanistan?”