Journal: Ivory Tower Musings on Intelligence-Sharing

Academia, Cultural Intelligence, Methods & Process
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Full Op-Ed Online

Why intelligence-sharing can't always make us safer

By Jennifer Sims and Bob Gallucci

Friday, January 8, 2010; A19

Phi Beta Iota: This Op-Ed is stunningly irrelevant to the problem at hand: a secret intelligence community that over-emphasizes cash inputs and secret remote collection, and simultaneously fails to exploit machine-speed all-source geospatially and time tagged processing, multi-lingual open sources, or analysts that actually know anything  in the way of historical, cultural, and linguistic context.   Intelligence-sharing–as the CIA Mid-Career Course teaches so very well–is a cultural trait that ultimately can only be achieved by humans who know each other, walk around, and frequently engage in informal non-bureaucratic non-mechanical interaction.  We're not there.  The alternative below is what was done when Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski (two sides of the same coin) tried to be their own intelligence analyst, with the futher unprofessional crime of not sharing what they gathered with their intelligence support team.  As Ellsberg lectured Kissinger, this ultimately made him “like a moron,” a phrase that will be instantly pushed back by those who have “bought in” to the Potemkin Village (or what Chuck Spinney calls “Versailles on the Potomac”) but instantly embraced by those who live in the real world and understand Whole Systems.

Three representative sentences from their Op-Ed:

To win against a networked adversary, the intelligence community must share critical information with decision makers but not always with every element of its own community first.   . . . . . . .

Yet if this instance suggests that single, timely tips can be enough, psychological research suggests that intelligence-sharing can be downright bad.   . . . . . . .

To win in network warfare, then, decision makers must think of themselves as collectors and analysts, too.

Phi Beta Iota: The new book,INTELLIGENCE FOR EARTH, with chapters loaded as they are finished in first draft, is both a captone work about decades of work by hundreds that this Op-Ed ignores, and a primer for leaders who wish to get intelligence (decision-support) tuned up for the transnational non-state and often human-created but global non-human threats identified in priority order by the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in their report A More Secure World–Our Shared Responsibility–Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

See also:


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Review: World Out of Balance–International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy

4 Star, Country/Regional, Diplomacy, Economics, Empire, Sorrows, Hubris, Blowback, Military & Pentagon Power, Power (Pathologies & Utilization), Security (Including Immigration), United Nations & NGOs
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4.0 out of 5 stars Erudite, Itself Out of Balance, Secoond Tier Reading

January 8, 2010

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth

This is one of three books I bought to reflect on the same generic topic, the other two are Power & Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threat and To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, which I will read and review this week-end.

It is a substantive contribution, important, but second tier in terms of clarity and utlity and comprehensiveness.

The authors do a fine job of setting the stage for why this book matters in relation to policy, putting forth three overarching questions worth quoting:

1. Can the United States sustain an expansive range of security commitments around the globe?

2. Is the United States well positioned to reshape the international system to better advance its security interests?

3. What are the general costs of unilateralism?

I have mixed feelings about this book for three reasons:

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Search: QDR OSINT

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Spectacular search and most welcome.  Below are two of the slides from the DoD OSINT Leadership Briefing.  The colorful slides are all in the DoD OSINT Staff Briefing.

OSINT and QDR
DoD OSINT Contradictions

See also the following collections relevant to getting DoD OSINT up to flank speed for policy support, acquisition support, and of course operational support beginning with Afghanistan, where no one seems to have been told what multinational translators and tribal experts can do for us via reach-back.

Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

Search: Strategic Analytic Model

2009: Search: United Nations Intelligence Training

2009: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Trilogy

Worth a Look: Dari in 10 Mikes from AF to FR and Back

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Satellite Phone with Camara

Phi Beta Iota: Tell us again why it takes ten days for a Dari translation of a captured document?  This is OLD technology.  2 megapixels is not great, 4 would be safe, but the point is that there is absolutely no reason why we cannot be doing real-time Dari translations from the field, both of documents and via webcam, of on demand conversations including body-language interpretation.  The lack of imagination and knowledge among those supposedly responsible for supporting our troops in the field is startling.  Instead of lard-assed civilians with questionable language skills struggling to keep up with our tough-as-nails troops  (the butts in seats high profit poor delivery model) engage brain and harness the distributed skills of the Earth.  This is not rocket science–it just requires imagination combined with integrity.

See also:

Journal: US Government Still Inept at 183 Languages, 33 of them Core (including 12 distinct dialects of Arabic)

Search: World-Wide Linguist Supply

Reference: Department of State Language Gaps

Journal: FBI, Still Deaf 8 Years After 9-11

Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

CENTCOM Week in Review Ending 7 January 2010

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NOTE:  This offering ends 9 Feb 10 unless we can find a volunteer to do once a week.

Hot Topics

AA: Instability in Yemen a global threat 01/04/10

AA: Pipeline politics in Central Asia 01/04/10

AE: UAE plans cyber crimes court 01/05/10

AE: Waha Capital closes financing of AED 6.7 billion transportation aircraft for … 01/05/10

AF: Killings Rock Afghan Strategy 01/02/10

EG: Egyptian threatened over interest in Israel 01/06/10

IQ: Iraq says militant leader linked to hostages freed 01/05/10

YE: Al-Qaeda seeks to make Yemen its safe haven 01/04/10

Below the Fold: Instability, Special Operations, Security Forces, Foreign Affairs, Crime

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Journal: USG, IC, and Especially CT in a Shambles

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Chuck Spinney
Report Card

January 7, 2010

Why?

CounterTerrorism in Shambles

By RAY McGOVERN and COLEEN ROWLEY

On January 5, a blogger with the PBS’ NewsHour asked former CIA analyst Ray McGovern to respond to three questions regarding recent events involving the CIA, FBI, and the intelligence community in general

Two other old intelligence hands were asked the identical questions, queries that are typical of what radio/TV and blogger interviewers usually think to be the right ones.  So there is merit in trying to answer them directly, such as they are, and then broadening the response to address some of the core problems confronting U.S. counter-terror strategies.

After drafting his answers, McGovern asked former FBI attorney/special agent Coleen Rowley, a colleague in Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) to review his responses and add her own comments at the end.  The Q & A is below:

Question #1 – What lapses in the American counter terrorism apparatus made the Christmas Day bombing plot possible?  Is it inevitable that certain plots will succeed?

2 – Has the new intelligence bureaucracy created after the Sept. 11th attacks functioned correctly?  How could it be improved, or was it a good idea to create it?

3 – What one reform would you recommend that might improve information sharing among agencies working to prevent terrorist attacks?

Here's the bottom line:

Hold accountable those responsible.

More “reform” is the last thing we need.  And, sorry, but we DO have to look back.

The most effective step would be to release the CIA Inspector General report on intelligence community performance prior to 9/11.  That investigation was run, and its report was prepared, by an honest Inspector General, it turns out.  (Interestingly, he retired almost a year ago and has not been replaced.)

Actually, the Inspector General report fixed blame and named names.  So it was immediately suppressed by one of those named, then-Acting DCI John McLaughlin—another Tenet-clone.  McLaughin’s successors as Director, Porter Goss, Michael Hayden, and now Leon Panetta followed suit.

Accountability is key.  If there is no accountability, there is total freedom to screw up, and screw up royally, without any thought of possible personal consequences.

Not only is it certain that we will face more terrorist attacks, but the keystone-cops nature of recent intelligence operations …. whether in using cell phones in planning kidnappings in Italy, or in allowing suicide bombers to penetrate CIA bases in Taliban-infested eastern Afghanistan….will continue.

Worth a Look: Rahm Emanuel conducting pogroms within Obama administration and Democratic Party

Ethics, Government, Law Enforcement
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Phi Beta Iota: This is a replay of a Wayne Madsen report.  Over lunch we checked with our most connected consultant and learned that this is roughly half right, with some of the specifics names and methods not right, but that over-all there is general consensus on three points:  Rahm is playing dirty “within and against the Democratic family”; Rahm is a big problem for the President; Rahm has to go (along with Brennan and if it were up to us, Axelrod would also be moved out of the White House).  The President needs a neutral professional Chief of Staff, someone like General Jones, who is the perfect Presidential-level administrator.  The President needs a national STRATEGY & POLICY advisor that can restore Whole of Government balance, an Office of Management and Budget director that can MANAGE, and a Director of National Intelligence–Admiral Blair deserves first shot–with AUTHORITY.  The below material is replayed to provoke reflection, nothing more.

Emanuel conducting pogroms within Obama administration and Democratic Party

WMR's White House press sources have revealed that President Obama's Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, is conducting a virtual political pogrom within the administration and the Democratic caucus in Congress. WMR has learned that the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretapping program, once known as STELLAR WIND but changed after the classified code name was leaked to the media, is being used by Emanuel to force administration officials and Democrats in Congress to “toe the line” in their support of Obama's policies, including health care. the surge in Afghanistan, and the bail out of Wall Street.

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