Worth a Look: Berto Jongman on Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, CIA Torture, and Maj Nidal Hasan’s Slide Show

08 Wild Cards, 09 Terrorism, 10 Security, 11 Society, Analysis, Cultural Intelligence, Government, Military, Peace Intelligence, Worth A Look
Berto Jongman
Berto Jongman

Researcher Berto Jongman recommends….

Poverty and unemployment fuel the conflict according to 70% of Afghans, new Oxfam research shows

Seventy per cent of Afghans surveyed see poverty and unemployment as the major cause of the conflict in their country, according to new research by international aid agency Oxfam and a group of Afghan organisations. Ordinary Afghans blame government weakness and corruption as the second most important factor behind the fighting, with the Taliban coming third, followed by interference by neighboring countries.

200 Web Sites Spread Al Qaeda's Message In English

Reassessing the Evolving al Qaeda Threat to the Homeland: Testimony of Peter Bergen Before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment

Al Qaeda today no longer poses a direct national security threat to the United States itself, but rather poses a second-order threat in which the worst case scenario would be an al Qaeda-trained or -inspired terrorist managing to pull off an attack on the scale of something in between the 1993 Trade Center attack, which killed six, and the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, which killed 168.

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Journal: U.S. Air Force–Remote from War & Reality

10 Security, Collective Intelligence, Methods & Process, Military, Peace Intelligence, Technologies

Full Article Online
Full Article Online

Unmanned limits:

Robotic systems can’t replace a pilot’s gut instinct

BY COL. JAMES JINNETTE, USAF

Unmanned combat systems have fundamental limitations that can make their technology a war-losing proposition. These limitations involve network vulnerabilities, release consent judgment and, most importantly, creative capacity during air combat and close air support (CAS) missions. Although futurists might assume these problems away with grand ideas of technologies yet to be developed, during the next few decades these limitations will remain critical constraints on our ability to provide airpower in the joint fight.

AIR FORCE COL. JAMES JINNETTE is director of the Air Force Element at the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and a recent Army War College graduate. Prior to his current posting, Jinnette was an F-15E squadron commander. He has completed three close air support deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Reference: Gangs in the US Military

08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, 10 Transnational Crime, Commercial Intelligence, DoD, Government, Military, Peace Intelligence
Assessment Report
Assessment Report (2007)
Briefing with Notes
Briefing with Notes
Briefing without Notes
Briefing without Notes

Phi Beta Iota: We have been highlighting our couinterintelligence deficiencies since the 1990's, primarily focused on the need for religious counterintelligence, but also on the need to recognize that sub-state and non-state groups are legitimate threats in and of themselves.  Today the US military it thoroughly penetrated by multiple networks from Opus Dei and the Mormons to radical Islamics and plain street gangs happy to not only receive advanced training, but access to easily stolen weapons–one of the dirty little secrets of the US military is how little control it has over the primary weapon of mass destruction on the planet, small arms (which we also like to sell liberally to anyone with cash and especially dictators).

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Journal: Fort Hood Cognitive Dissonance Round-Up

04 Education, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Terrorism, 10 Security, Analysis, Civil Society, Cultural Intelligence, Military

Major Hasan Analysis by Webster Tarpley (16 Pages)
Major Hasan Analysis by Webster Tarpley (16 Pages)

NIDAL MALIK HASAN OF VIRGINIA TECH, BETHESDA, AND FORT HOOD: A MAJOR PATSY IN A DRILL GONE LIVE? By Webster G. Tarpley 14 November 2009

What Hollywood Can Teach Us About the Fort Hood Massacre Christina News Service, Friday, November 13, 2009 By Chuck Muth

Most Americans have this whole Fort Hood massacre all wrong. Maj. Nidal M. Hassan was not a terrorist.  And he wasn’t a mass murderer.  And he may not even have been a coward.  Maj. Hassan was an enemy combatant.

A Man in a Hundred By ALEXANDER COCKBURN CounterPunch Weekend Edition November 13-15, 2009

The general obviously doesn’t have Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire on his bedside table. Gibbon wrote flatly that the introduction of foreigners “into Roman armies became every day more universal, more necessary and more fatal.”

Is Fort Hood Really a “Tragedy?” Pajamas Media by Victor Davis Hanson November 14, 2009

Something has gone terribly wrong in the entire reaction to the Ft. Hood massacres, as evidenced by the media, the administration, the military authorities, and perhaps the public at large.

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Journal: Iraq “Advise & Assist” Churning Up

04 Inter-State Conflict, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Military, Peace Intelligence

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Full Story Online

‘Advise & Assist' brigade meets with transition teams

Jun 17, 2009

By Spc. Bradley J. Clark

CONTINGENCY OPERATING BASE ADDER, Iraq — Transition teams throughout southern Iraq attended a conference June 12, at Contingency Operating Base Adder.

The conference provided a forum for transition team leaders to establish new relationships, share best practices and receive guidance from the commander of 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. The BCT deployed to Iraq last month as the first “Advise and Assist” Brigade to complete specialized Stability Operations training and be given the job of helping train Iraqi Security Forces.

“You all have the hardest jobs,” said Col. Peter A. Newell, commander, 4th BCT, 1st Armored Div. “Our mission success is based on the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to accomplish their mission. You are the tip of the spear in paving our way to going home.”

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Journal: Presidential Decision-Making 101

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Government, Military, Peace Intelligence

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Full Story Online

Commentary: Mr. President, take your time on Afghanistan

Joseph L. Galloway

Friday, November 13, 2009

The word is that none of the options contains what the president wants to see — an estimate of how many more years beyond the eight already invested would be needed and an exit strategy.

Bravo!

Simple question and a vital requirement: How much longer will it take, and how do we get out when that time is up?

Let's call that Military Planning 101 and, like the president, we're left to ponder why that basic first step in committing a nation and its military and its treasury to a war wasn't taken before now and was missing from all the alternatives offered at this critical junction in a war that's now in its ninth year?

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Journal: Kilcullen on Troops for Afghanistan

05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Cultural Intelligence, Military, Peace Intelligence
David Kincullent
David Kincullent

Kilcullen: Send either lots of troops or none at all

November 12th, 2009

Some quick notes from Georgetown, where David Kilcullen has just addressed students and faculty at the Center for Peace and Security Studies. Highlights below:

The oft-touted 1:50 (or 20:1,000) ratio is “flawed.” It was based on post-war reconstruction studies done by the Rand Corporation, not on actual insurgencies. Successful COIN campaigns have employed ratios that vary widely. It also refers to total security forces, not just — in our case — American troops. Finally, it’s better to think about the military presence functionally, rather than numerically.

“Where local officials sleep” is a good indicator to track progress. In the film, I Am Legend, Will Smith must get home before the vampires come out to feast. Similarly, in Afghanistan today some 70% of provincial governors sleep in Kabul instead of the provinces they govern. This is bad.

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