Journal: Just How Important is the WikiLeaks AF Dump?

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Analysis, Budgets & Funding, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), Journalism/Free-Press/Censorship, Methods & Process, Misinformation & Propaganda, Officers Call, Reform, Secrecy & Politics of Secrecy
Chuck Spinney Recommends

OP-ED COLUMNIST

Kiss This War Goodbye

By FRANK RICH, New York Times,  July 31, 2010

A version of this op-ed appeared in print on August 1, 2010, on page WK8 of the New York edition.

IT was on a Sunday morning, June 13, 1971, that The Times published its first installment of the Pentagon Papers. Few readers may have been more excited than a circle of aspiring undergraduate journalists who’d worked at The Harvard Crimson. Though the identity of The Times’s source wouldn’t eke out for several days, we knew the whistle-blower had to be Daniel Ellsberg, an intense research fellow at M.I.T. and former Robert McNamara acolyte who’d become an antiwar activist around Boston. We recognized the papers’ contents, as reported in The Times, because we’d heard the war stories from the loquacious Ellsberg himself.
. . . . . . .

What was often forgotten last week is that the Pentagon Papers had no game-changing news about that war either and also described events predating the then-current president.

. . . . . . .

The papers’ punch was in the many inside details they added to the war’s chronicle over four previous administrations and, especially, in their shocking and irrefutable evidence that Nixon’s immediate predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, had systematically lied to the country about his intentions and the war’s progress.

Journal: Ralph Peters on General Jim Mattis, USMC

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, Military, Officers Call

The ‘warrior monk'

New CENTCOM head is our finest Marine

Last Updated: 4:32 PM, July 13, 2010

Posted: 12:58 AM, July 13, 2010


Phi  Beta Iota: Ralph Peters does not gush very often.  Noted and recommended.  By and large, America's so-called flag officers are a global disgrace–battalion commanders in way over the head, with no clue on multinational, joint, operations other than war, acquisition, military education & training, the list is long.  The Secretary of Defense and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence have been especially disappointing, since there is nothing about defense that is “intelligence-driven” and most especially acquisition–hence, as brilliant as this particular flag officer is, and we almost always agree with Ralph Peters' judgment, he is “lipstick on the pig.”  It is still a pig.

See Also:

Journal: PSYOP Dies, Renamed, Still Dead

Augmented Reality, Cultural Intelligence, info-graphics/data-visualization, InfoOps (IO), Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence

Marcus Aurelius Recommends

PSYOP has long had problems being PSYOP.  Overseas they often work as “Military Information Support Teams” (MISTs).  If you want to get them significantly spun up, try to discuss with them “perception management” or “deception.”  Try that and they tend to go to ground very quickly.  As for nefarious, spooky, and master manipulators, US PSYOP has always been dwarfed by the British; e.g., “Soldatensender Calais,” documented in Sefton Delmer's “Black Boomerang.”  Personally, I just don't think the current Executive Branch of the USG has the will to play a full-up, full-spectrum game in the national security/foreign policy arena.  Now, soon, or later, we will pay for that in needless loss of life.  Remember always John Stewart Mill:  “War is an ugly thing but not the ugliest of things. …”

“Psychological Operations” Are Now “Military Information Support Operations”

3 July 2010

By Kevin Maurer
Associated Press
July 2, 2010

The Army has dropped the Vietnam-era name “psychological operations” for its branch in charge of trying to change minds behind enemy lines, acknowledging the term can sound ominous.

The Defense Department picked a more neutral moniker: “Military Information Support Operations,” or MISO.

U.S. Special Operations Command spokesman Ken McGraw said Thursday the new name, adopted last month, more accurately reflects the unit’s job of producing leaflets, radio broadcasts and loudspeaker messages to influence enemy soldiers and civilians.

One of the catalysts for the transition is foreign and domestic sensitivities to the term ‘psychological operations’ that often lead to a misunderstanding of the mission,” McGraw said.

Fort Bragg is home to the 4th Psychological Operations Group, the Army’s only active duty psychological operations unit. Psychological operations soldiers are trained at the post.

The name change is expected to extend to all military services, a senior defense official said in Washington. The official, who has direct knowledge of the change, spoke on condition of anonymity because not all services have announced how they will revamp or rename their psychological operations offices.

The change was driven from the top, by Pentagon policymakers working for Defense Secretary Robert Gates. It reflects unease with the Cold War echoes of the old terminology, and the implication that the work involved subterfuge.

The change, however, left some current practitioners of psychological operations cold. Gone is the cool factor, posters to online military blogs said. With a name like MISO, one wrote, you might as well join the supply command.

Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., a retired colonel who was Director for Psychological Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1986 to 1988, said the term has always had some baggage and been difficult to explain.

“Somehow it gives a nefarious connotation, but I think that this baggage can be overcome,” said Paddock, who also served three combat tours with Special Forces in Laos and Vietnam.

He said the military was giving in to political correctness by changing the name.

Psychological operations have been cast as spooky in movies and books over the years portraying the soldiers as master manipulators. The 2009 movie “The Men Who Stare at Goats,” staring George Clooney, was about an army unit that trains psychic spies, based on Jon Ronson’s nonfiction account of the U.S. military’s hush-hush research into psychic warfare and espionage.

But the real mission is far more mundane. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, psychological operations units dropped leaflets urging Iraqis to surrender.

In Vietnam, a psychological operations effort called the Open Arms Program bombarded Viet Cong units with surrender appeals written by former members. The program got approximately 200,000 Viet Cong fighters to defect.

McGraw said the name change was approved by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Eric Olson, the Special Operations commander, in mid-June.

Many in the psychological operations community, including Paddock, dislike the new name.

“Military Information Support Operations, or MISO, is not something that rolls off the tip of your tongue,” Paddock said. “It makes it even more difficult for psychological operations personnel to explain what they do. That they still have the capability to employ programs and themes designed to influence the behavior of foreign target audiences.”

Original Source

Phi Beta Iota: PSYOP is 80% fraud, waste, and abuse, and that percentage is kind.  They are still teaching enlisted people at Fort Bragg how to load aircraft propaganda cannisters to deliver leaflets to people who by and large cannot read.  80% of PSYOP billets, dollars, and facilities should be immediately transferred to the Civil Affairs Corps, and used to transition to the regional brigades that include a single multinational Civil Affairs Brigade for each region, along with direct support multinational battalions for military police, combat engineers, medical, and organic land, sea, and air units, all built around a US C4I hub with both regional and donor country (e.g. Nordics) participation.

Reference: Invisible Empire New World Order DVD + RECAP

08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, DHS, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, Government, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), IO Deeds of War, Methods & Process, Military, Movies, Officers Call, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests, Secrecy & Politics of Secrecy, Strategy, United Nations & NGOs, Waste (materials, food, etc)

Invisible Empire A New World Order Defined Full

2 hours, 14 minutes, 1 second — free online, click on title above

Jason Bermas [creator or Loose Change movie] presents Invisible Empire: A New World Order Defined produced by Alex Jones. The film can be ordered here http://infowars-shop.stores.yahoo.net/inemnewwoord.html or viewed free online (click on title above).

Summary and See Also Below the Line.

Continue reading “Reference: Invisible Empire New World Order DVD + RECAP”

Journal: Comment on DIA Potential

Ethics, Key Players, Methods & Process, Military, Mobile, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence, Policies, Real Time, Reform, Strategy, Threats
Richard Wright

The QDR slides got me thinking about the fact that DIA could be a really first rate intelligence agency and an effective counter to ODNI and CIA for the SecDef, JCS, and the military services, especially field commanders.

Although badly executed, DIA has two vitally important missions: support to military operations; and support to military strategy formulation. Unfortunately, DIA has always suffered from unimaginative senior leadership and the worst form of military thinking whereby rank trumps truth and an incompetent major trumps a competent lieutenant.

If DIA is going to achieve its potential and rally to provide the best intelligence possible to the SecDef, JCS, and service field commanders it needs to break free from the military hierarchical thinking and its influences on intelligence judgments.

In point of fact DIA has and has always had an excellent group of military and civilian analysts working there although there is a constant churn due to service requirements and limited prospects for civilians.

So what does DIA need? It needs an influx of original (out of the box) strategists who can visualize and articulate the multi-level threats to U.S. National Security, who understand the phenomenon of globalization and its effect on DOD strategic thinking, and can effectively relate such 21st Century phenomenon as trans-national asymmetric warfare to U.S. force and command structures.

Perhaps most importantly, DIA needs to build a capability to exploit the fact that increasing amounts of information relative to DOD concerns that are actually available from open sources. At the same time DIA needs to introduce much more effective information management systems to support its intelligence production.

Phi Beta Iota: This  comment is repeated from the QDR OSINT thread.  We've been saying this for 21 years.  Perhaps we should have shouted.   The two DoD OSINT briefings and the future of OSINT material are now circulating among presidential staffs of a handful of other countries.  They get it, we don't.  How sad is that?

Officers Call: A Conversation About Iraq II

02 China, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 05 Iran, 10 Security, Analysis, Ethics, IO Sense-Making, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence
Officers Call on Iraq II
Officers Call on Iraq II

Sir,

There's nothing inherently wrong with the analysis of Al Qaeda (I just glanced at it, if you wish I can read in detail today).  The PROBLEM lies not so much in how we analyze support to terrorism (state, crime, other) but rather in the way we analyze (or rather do NOT analyze) EVERYTHING.

Here's what I have thrown together for you, in six pages with links.

Summary of Contents (OC Iraq II)

  • Why We Missed the Threat
  • Terrorism is Threat Number Nine Out of Ten
  • Terrorism is a Tactic, Al Qaeda an Interest Group
  • Without Legitimacy Forget About Stabilization
  • Rebalancing the Instruments of National Power
  • Three Things Secret Intelligence Cannot Do
  • Advise & Assist Transition to Exit Menu
    • Strategic Communications
    • Inter-Agency Professionals
    • Regional Concordat
    • Faith Brigades
    • Redirect Funds Toward Waging Peace
    • Contain Israel
    • Make Nice with China

Officers Call on Iraq I

Semper Fidelis,  Robert