At the outbreak of World War 2, the Council on Foreign Relations began making plans for the post-war world.
The question it posed was this: could America exist as a self-sufficient nation, or would it have to go outside its borders for vital resources?
Predictably, the answer was: imperial empire.
The US would not only need to obtain natural resources abroad, it would have to embark on endless conquest to assure continued access.
The CFR, of course, wasn’t just some think tank. It was connected to the highest levels of US government, through the State Department. A front for Rockefeller interests, it actually stood above the government.
Behind all its machinations was the presumption that planned societies were the future of the planet. Not open societies.
Through wars, clandestine operations, legislation, treaties, manipulation of nations’ debt, control of banks and money supplies, countries could be turned into “managed units.”
Increasingly, the populations of countries would be regulated and directed and held in thrall to the State.
Some weeks ago I wrote Carriers Of The Pacific, a comparison of the U.S. fleet vs. other countries, prompted by the U.S. “pivot to the east”.
One Chart Shows The Magnitude Of U.S. Naval Dominance provides an infographic that makes things crystal clear. Two thirds of all carriers belong to the U.S. Seven of the other twelve belong to our NATO allies, three of the others belong to nations with whom we have good diplomatic relations.
Thirty one carriers in good working order belong to NATO, three are in the hands of nations that have good relations with NATO, leaving just two in the hands of others. Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov is functional, China has not fully commissioned its sister ship, which they’ve named Liaoning.
Japan, also a U.S. ally, is currently building two ships they refer to as “helicopter destroyers”, vessels the U.S. navy would call assault ships. We have twelve of them in the 40,000 ton displacement range, Japan’s ships will be half that size.
During World War II the U.S. built 24 Essex class carriers, all of which survived the conflict, and two of our three Yorktown class ships were lost, leaving only our most decorated ship, U.S.S. Enterprise CV-6 to finish the war. We had 120 lesser ships, most numerous were the fifty Casablanca class escort carriers.
Click on Image to Enlarge
The Cold War has been over for twenty years. We have two thirds of the world’s aircraft carriers, three times more than all of our allies combined. Our only plausible geopolitical rivals have one operational carrier and one that is being slowly commissioned. Our finances, our environment, and our energy supplies can not support maintaining a fleet ready for two wars when we have no plausible geopolitical rival that could start a conflict where they would be required.
The United States has global commitments which we can and should honor, but continuing to maintain a massive fleet when there is no foreseeable purpose for it does not enhance our security, it takes resources away from preventative measures best executed by the State Department and USAID.
Dr. Laura DeNardis
American University; Yale Information Society Project
Mark Raymond
Centre for International Governance Innovation
November 14, 2013
Dr. Mark Raymond
Abstract:
Efforts to study and practice Internet governance start, virtually without exception, from the premise that the Internet is governed by an innovative, unusual (perhaps unique) ‘multistakeholder’ model. Preserving that model is a primary goal for the broader Internet community as well as for many governments, though not for all. Viewing multistakeholderism as a teleological goal for Internet governance creates several problems. First, multistakeholderism is often elevated as a value in itself rather than as a possible approach to meeting more salient public interest objectives such as preserving Internet interoperability, stability, security, and openness. Second, multistakeholder governance may not be appropriate in every functional area of Internet governance. Internet coordination is not a monolithic practice but rather a multilayered series of tasks of which some are appropriately relegated to the private sector, some the purview of traditional nation-state governance or international treaty negotiations, and some more appropriately multistakeholder. It is a misnomer to speak not only of multistakeholder governance but also of Internet governance as a single thing.The concept of multistakeholderism can also serve as a proxy for broader political struggles or be deployed as an impediment to the types of Internet coordination necessary to promote conditions of responsible governance. For example, governments with repressive information policies can advocate for top-down and formalized multistakeholderism to gain additional power in areas in which they have traditionally not had jurisdiction. These types of efforts can result in multilateral rather than multistakeholder approaches with non-governmental actors limited from participating in formal deliberations and lacking any meaningful voting power. Alternatively, companies and other actors with vested interests in current governance arrangements can deploy multistakeholderism in a manner either meant to exclude new entrants (whether public or private) with incommensurate interests and values or to preserve incumbent market advantage.
This paper suggests that multistakeholderism should not be viewed as a value in itself applied homogenously to all Internet governance functions. Rather, the appropriate approach to responsible Internet governance requires determining what types of administration are optimal for promoting a balance of interoperability, innovation, free expression and operational stability in any particular functional and political context. Doing so requires conceptual and theoretical tools that have not yet been developed. Accordingly, the paper proceeds in three parts. First, it presents a more granular taxonomy and understanding of Internet governance functions – differentiating between, for example, cybersecurity governance, Internet standards setting, and the policymaking function of private information intermediaries. Second, it performs the same task of disaggregation with respect to multistakeholderism. It presents distinct varieties of multistakeholder Internet governance (which differ according to the varieties of actors involved and the nature of authority relations between them) and sets these arrangements in a broader context of modalities for accomplishing global governance in other issue areas. Such an approach contributes both to the study and practice of Internet governance, and to scholarship in International Relations and global governance.
Keywords: Internet governance, multistakeholder governance, international relations, Internet policy, ICANN, ITU, IETF, cybersecurity, Internet standards, information intermediaries, critical Internet resources
Saudi Arabia’s public anger against the United States masks the kingdom’s growing concern about its diminishing influence in the Persian Gulf and the wider Arab world.
It has nothing to do with U.S. policy toward the Palestinians, Washington’s seeming oscillation toward Syria, or President Barack Obama’s support for democratic transitions in “Arab Spring” countries and his hesitancy to support Mohamed Morsi’s removal from Egypt’s presidency through a military coup.
The Saudis are lashing out because they fear a possible U.S.-Iranian rapprochement would elevate Iran’s rightful position as the key power in the Persian Gulf and correspondingly reduce Saudi Arabia to a secondary role. The Saudi Kingdom would resist playing a second fiddle to Iran.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement — an international trade agreement some years in the making between major world powers including the U.S., Canada and Japan — has seemed in some minor jeopardy over revelations that the NSA has secretly been spying on ally world leaders. Secretary of State John Kerry has been in damage control mode to keep the deal afloat and on schedule.
On Tuesday, WikiLeaks offered a peak into the trade agreement, publishing a leaked draft chapter. Predictably, the TPP promises to be a deal in the interest of major corporations above consumers. Having received an exclusive early view of the draft from WikiLeaks, the Sydney Morning Herald called it a “bitter medicine.”
Introduction | The Deterioration of Government John j. Hamre
PART 1: GETTING OUR HOUSE IN ORDER
Can We Rebuild a National Security Consensus? Kathleen h. Hicks
The Snowden Effect: Can We Undo the Damage to American Power? James a. Lewis
What Battlefield Lessons Have We Learned from 12 Years of War? Maren Leed
What Has Syria Taught Us about the Right Time to Use Force? Clark a. Murdock
How Can We Develop a Sustainable Resource Strategy for Defense? David j. Berteau
PART 2: THE CHANGING ORDER IN THE MIDDLE EAST
What Should the United States and its Allies Expect from the Middle East? Anthony h. Cordesman
What Should the Middle East Expect from the United States and its Allies? Jon b. Alterman
Is Russia Back as a Power in the Middle East? Andrew c. Kuchins
Can We Stop Violent Extremism from Going Mainstream in North Africa? Haim Malka
PART 3: SUSTAINING THE RE BALANCE
Should We Change Our Security Approach in Asia? A conversation with Michael j. Green , Victor Cha, and Christopher k. Johnson moderated by Zack Cooper
How Important Is TPP to Our Asia Policy? A conversation with Ernest z. Bower ,
Matthew Goodman , and Scott Miller moderated by Murray Hiebert
How Will the Shifting Energy Landscape in Asia Impact Geopolitics? Sarah o. Ladislaw
How Should We Address Nuclear Risks in Asia? Sharon Squassoni
PART 4: NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY APPROACHES
Are There Opportunities to Bolster Regional Security Cooperation? A conversation with Heather a. Conley, Jennifer G. Cooke , Carl Meacham , aram nerguizian, and Ralph a. Cossa moderated by Samuel Brannen
What Can Civilian Power Accomplish in Foreign Crises? A conversation with j. Stephen Morrison, Daniel f. Runde, and Johanna Nesseth tuttle moderated by Robert d. Lamb
Can We Adapt to the Changing Nature of Power in the 21st Century? Juan Zarate
Phi Beta Iota: CSIS means well, but it does not know what it does not know, and that makes its “analysis” inherently unreliable. By this point in time CSIS could — if it wanted to — have a holistic analytic model (ten threats, twelve policies, eight demographics), and also have embraced a cradle to grave true cost economic methodology. This is a mixed group of essays, some of which are outrageously out of touch with both ethics and reality.
