Taliban commanders in Afghanistan reacted with amusement this weekend to
news of an impostor who, by claiming he was a senior Taliban leader,
managed to fool NATO officials and get invited to high-level peace talks.
“Imagine,” Mohammad Hafiz, a senior Taliban commander, told The Daily
Beast, “if a shopkeeper from Quetta can make a fool of them and keep them
engaged in talks for months, how do they believe they can defeat the
Taliban?”
NOTE: I always find it amusing that reporters can get access to these guys
on a regular basis but our IC could not find them if their lives depended
upon it…. DefDog Sends
The U.S. government’s crackdown on file sharing and counterfeiting has
taken a new and disturbing turn.
Yesterday, we reported that the Department of Homeland Security’s
Immigration and Customs Enforcement office had seized Torrent-Finder.com,
a site that linked to other sites that hosted and shared torrent files of
copyrighted material. The news itself was not too unusual; what struck us
as out of order was that the site had been shut down without the owner
being notified and without a court conviction or, to our knowledge, any
other legal proceedings.
Phi Beta Iota: In addition, we wonder what this has to do with Homeland Security. The incoherence and lack of holistic integrity of US plans, programs, policies, and spending continue to astound.
In 1997, Colonel Douglas Macgregor provided a well thought out blueprint for affecting a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) within the U.S. Army, and to a lesser extent the entire U.S. Armed Forces. The blueprint, as detailed in this book, apparently served as an inspiration for the restructuring of the U.S. Army from an organization based on stand alone divisions to its current brigade structure. Yet apparently neither the Defense Department (DOD) nor the Army fully accepted Macgregor's remarkably prescient thinking. His goal in this book was to demonstrate the Army's strategic relevance in the 21st Century as force to counter the bewildering multiplication of threats to U.S. National Security that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Macgregor noted that “military strategy” really refers to the use of military power to achieve strategic goals, but how effective that military power would be is a function of force structure, tactical and operational doctrine, and training. He also persuavely argues that RMA is not a matter of mere technological innovation, but rather concerns the willingness of the armed forces to “devise new ways to incorporate new technology by changing their organization, their tactics, and sometimes their whole concept of war.”
Rather interestingly Macgregor adopted two of the then prevalent concepts of `Network Centric Warfare” (although he never uses this term) as the basis for his proposal to restructure the army. He argued that the newly conceived command system known as C4I [SR] (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence [Surveillance, Reconnaissance] ) offered the means to build a new ground force structure based on smaller more flexible units which he calls “Combat Groups.” He also argued that the Army should adopt a `networked type' of organizational structure based on a C4I system that would have a much flatter command structure than the traditional army hierarchical structure. His argument was centered on historical examples that demonstrated that when command authority was dispersed to smaller units, warfare by maneuver and adaptable tactics leading to battlefield success became possible. This latter was probably one reason why the Army only adopted his force structure concept and not his C4I proposal.
Macgregor also argued that the perennially out of control DOD budget could be brought under control by the sensible method of tying force structure and weapons procurement to actual strategic needs based on a rational analysis of real and potential threats to national security. Although DOD would claim that it always does just this, the evidence suggests otherwise as demonstrated most recently F35 strike fighter.
A remarkable book that is as relevant today as when it was written and is for the shelf of anyone seriously interested in military reform.
From Bill Clinton’s bridge to the 21st century to President Obama’s new foundation, the next American century is often described vaguely. Here’s why. November 9, 2010
Phi Beta Iota: In a very generic sense, what David Brooks proposes is perfectly aligned with the concept of a Smart Nation and the need to nurture a World Brain and Global Game.
In this address, Bruce examined the future of cyber war and cyber security. Mr. Schneier explored the current debate on the threat of cyber war, asking whether or not the threat had been over-stated. He then explored the range of attacks that have taken place, including the Latvian DOS attack and the Stuxnet worm. The address concluded with an exploration of the future of international treaties on cyber war.
Phi Beta Iota: This is utterly brilliant stuff, a historical contribution. A power struggle between military and police over cyber-security, in US military won–this has consequences. The weak aspect is the proponency for treaties among states–states are but one of the eight tribes, any “treaty” environment that does not adapt to the reality of eight tribes and hybrid networks is not serious.
Phi Beta Iota: More than six minutes–a special with decisive commentary on the government's failure to save the economy, choosing instead to save the financial super-parasites that fund the campaigns of the political parasites. Junk math, junk derivatives, junk politics…. Defense Budget & the Deficit: A Comparison of Reduction Scenarios
Several plans for cutting back the defense budget are floating around Versailles on the Potomac. These have taken the form of unsolicited proposals made to the Simpson-Bowles deficit commission. In this important CP report, Winslow Wheeler, a former staffer on the Senate Budget Committee cuts through the rhetoric surrounding these plans and places their budget scenarios in an apples versus apples comparison. Chuck
In some respects, the anguish exhibited by Ahmed Rashid in the attached report (Rashid is a supporter of the Afghan intervention) suggests that the situation in Afghanistan is beginning to look a little like Vietnam in 1963 before the assassination of Diem. We are faced with an escalating rural guerrilla war, where the guerrillas have the initiative. Our strategy to regain the initiative by winning the hearts and minds of a disaffected predominantly rural population focuses again on controlling urban areas. In a xenophobic society that traditionally picks its leaders and evolves its patterns of governance from the bottom up, we have maneuvered ourselves into a position of outsiders trying to redesign that traditional society from the top down by imposing our choices for leaders and our visions for building “democratic” institutions. Metrics of success in this kind of conflicted effort, naturally, devolve into a reflection of the lack of success in overcoming the insurmountable contradiction.
Inevitably, once again, we focus on our inputs rather that outputs — as can be seen in an increasing reliance on Taliban body counts, the number of Afghan troops we have trained, the size of the “surge,” etc.
Local security forces are corrupt and incompetent, and they are led by rapacious leaders and warlords more interested in feathering their own nests than in building a viable nation. Violence is escalating almost everywhere, yet that violence is itself being being touted as a sign of progress. In short, like Vietnam, the tunnel of Afghanistan is getting longer and darker. Like Vietnam, the political urge to find a neat, clean solution to an intractable problem made worse by the arrogance of our ignorance is increasing.
It is against this backdrop that political pressures are building to dump the corrupt stooge we put into place and replace him with a more pliable corrupt stooge, if only to justify a the war's continuation by providing a patina of progress to an increasingly war-weary Americans on the home front.
So, we face the same question we faced in Vietnam in the fall of 1963: If we dump our stooge because he is becoming uncooperative, who do we put in his place? The only comfortable options for our political leaders are once again the leaders (warlords) of the corrupt and rapacious groups we have promoted. Rashid ends his essay by saying that the US and Karzai will not not part ways. I am not so sure. But whatever the case, the name of the game is to buy time in a guerrilla war where time is on the side of the guerrilla. Like Sir Douglas Haig's decision to pour in reinforcements and continue the battle of the Somme for four months after taking 60,000 casualties the first day, a strategy to buy time by promoting more of the same is a strategy to reinforce failure that will eventually sputter out ineffectually at very high cost. Chuck
