What is very interesting about this is that Mack is the only guy on Wall Street the Chinese leadership really trusts. There is no real difference between Goldman Sachs, Citi-Bank (the original Black Eagle Trust holder) and Morgan, although Mack does seem considerably more classy, and perhaps more able to get a grip on reality going into the future.
Text messages sent in the hours before and during 9-11 are now becoming available for public examination.
It will take time, but a number of individuals are working through them (remember what the Iranians did with CIA's singular shredded messages) and we anticipate findings within a few months. We've also suggest a quick tag cloud cross-references to time and location.
For the text files themselves, click on Wikileaks logo. For the Reddit discussion click on the Frog.
The conspiracy behind the Anthropogenic Global Warming myth (aka AGW; aka ManBearPig) has been suddenly, brutally and quite deliciously exposed after a hacker broke into the computers at the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit (aka CRU) and released 61 megabytes of confidential files onto the internet. …
Conspiracy, collusion in exaggerating warming data, possibly illegal destruction of embarrassing information, organised resistance to disclosure, manipulation of data, private admissions of flaws in their public claims and much more. …
Unfortunately, we’ve a long, long way to go before the public mood (and scientific truth) is reflected by our policy makers. There are too many vested interests in AGW, with far too much to lose either in terms of reputation or money, for this to end without a bitter fight.
New Documentary Challenges Gore's ‘Inconvenient Truth' on Global Warming
In 2007, a British High Court judge ruled that Al Gore's global warming film contained nine significant errors and should no longer be screened in schools unless accompanied by guidance notes to balance Gore's “one-sided” views. … Buoyed by the ruling, two Irish journalists — Phelim McAleer and Ann McElhinney — released a documentary in which they gather evidence outlining the damage of global warming hysteria. In “Not Evil Just Wrong,” they challenge the claims made in Gore's film and conclude that the film is not worth screening in schools because it is shown there as “an article of science, not faith.” … The film's “apocalyptic vision” was not an impartial analysis of climate change, High Court Judge Michael Burton said, adding that the film is “substantially founded up scientific research and fact” but that the errors were made in “the context of alarmism and exaggeration.”
General comment: CIA leared how to run drugs and launder money in Viet-Nam at the same time that the Pentagon discovered the joys of a blank check. We have never recovered from that. When combined with the secret slush fund managed by the Secretary of the Treasury, the bottom line is that many things have been done “in our name” that are completely inconsistent with the Constitution, the Republic, or the rule of law. Corruption and covert action have displaced decision-support as the reason for being. Life comes down to one word: INTEGRITY. If a government lacks integrity at any level (not just honor, but inclusion, open-mindness, a grip on reality), then it will ultimately fail. Lies kill one's comrades. It is time we stop lying to one another, and it is time we stop obeying orders based on lies. Unilateral top-down short-term decisions based on flawed secrets are simply not affordable, sustainable, or–generally–honorable. The future lies in make multinational bottom-up long-term decisions that ARE affordable and sustainable precisely because they achieve a good “fit” with reality. At the end of this entry is an illustration of thise contrast. We still need spies and secrecy, but the 20-80 rule applies.
Search Tip: Old dogs remember Viet-Nam. Modern writing tends to go with Vietnam. Search for both.
Memorandum of Transmittal by Robert David STEELE Vivas
Subject: Counterinsurgency Conference Overview
Mr. Jason Liszkiewicz, Executive Director of the Earth Intelligence Network (EIN) and resident in NYC, attended the 20 November 2009 conference on counterinsurgency (speakers identified on page two), and provided me with the notes on pages 3-9. Below is my own exploitation of these notes.
IGNORANT US POLICYMAKERS. We have policymakers with crippling illusions about how the world is—worst ever—people in policy positions do not understand the problems they are making policy on—Congress is unsophisticated about Afghanistan; Washington-area decision-makers vastly misunderstand the enemy—Taliban is a super-bug adapting super-fast. This is NOT about Al Qaeda having a home base. Congress lacks next of kin engaged.
CORRUPT AFGHAN OFFICIALS. Afghan government officials own 32% of the Palm Islands in Dubai—election was “industrial-strength fraud”—tsunami of cash (US, Saudi, others) drives corruption. NOTE: No Afghans on any of the panels.
US LACKS AREA KNOWLEDGE & STRATEGY. We really do not “get” the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India context, detail, etcetera. US “strategy” of “ten cities” is a mirror of the Soviet strategy before defeat. Doctrine is not a substitute for Strategy. Water (Indus River) is central to Pakistan-India relationship (Kashmir is about water). Question NOT being asked: how do we do this without a US ground presence? “Cheap coat of paint” approach to challenges. “Tactics without strategy is noise before defeat.” Saudi money, Pakistan-Taliban axis will outlast US money and US ground presence.
COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL LACKING. Counterinsurgency manual is not realistic and warps policy debate—the reality of poppy crops is not in the manual, not in the “strategy/doctrine”
UN, AID, NGO OOB NOT WORKNG. UN not working, its role not thought out, shortfalls in specialized everything. Local corruption and family-political angling for contracts lead to some IED’s intended to block or redirect contract funds. AID giving contracts to Americans, not Afghans. US has no ability to create ministries from scratch. Civilian capabilities non-existent or not understood by military when they do show up. No inter-agency planning in part because the civilians have no idea why they are there or what they should do.
LOST IN TRANSLATION. Continue to lack Pashto translators. More Pashto speakers within NYPD than in all US forces across Afghanistan
EXIT OPPORTUNITIES. Afghan Army most respected institution in country, best fighters but worst policemen. US ground presence makes things worse. Solutions have to be Afghan. Afghan population wants sovereignty and independence. US troops simply surviving, not campaigning.
On page 10 I provide the “Lessons Learned” from my 1992 study of USMC operations.