Josh Kilbourn: Overspending in Three Charts

Commerce, Corruption, Government, Military
Josh Kilbourn

Everything You Need To Know About Europe In Three Charts

Tyler Durden

Zero Hedge, 30 January 2012

Juxtaposing Merkel's (righteous and principally correct) insistence on debt brakes and fiscal discipline with the socialist tendencies of her European (let us print) comrades is at the heart of the crisis in Europe.

Click on Image to Enlarge

Nowhere is that more apparent than in these three charts, from the World Bank, which highlight just how large in absolute and relative terms Europe's social protection based government spending has become. This situation will only get more demanding as by 2060 almost a third of Europeans will be over 65 years old. While there was a belief that Europeans were willing to accept less growth for better growth (cleaner, smarter, kinder?), in order to meet the needs of an increasingly heavy ‘social' burden, government debt brakes will clearly have to be unhitched further, no matter what Merkel demands (increasing tensions), or the ‘new growth model' that is heralded but not yet substantive will have to be a miracle.

 

Click on Image to Enlarge

World Bank: THE PRECIPITATE PROMISE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION

Europe will have to make big changes in how it organizes labor and government. The reasons are becoming ever more obvious: the labor force is shrinking, societies are aging, social security is already a large part of government spending, and fiscal deficits and public debt are often already onerous.

In dealing with government spending, deficits, and debt, it is sensible to start by asking whether European governments are too big; that is, whether they spend too much. They are obviously bigger than their peers. In the EU15, governments spent 50 percent of GDP in 2009; in much of the rest of Europe, this share was about 45 percent—versus less than 40 percent in the United States and Japan, 33 percent in Latin America, and about 25 percent in emerging East Asia. A map of the world resized to reflect government spending instead of land area shows how Europe might look to outsiders (figure 16 below).

Read rest of article, see additional chart.

Phi Beta Iota:  Three themes jump out.  First, governments are too big, will fail, the era of small government leveraging new tools and new ways and new mindsets is emergent.  Second, the US overspends on the military and Europe overspends on social protection–both of these are culturally-insulated forms of corruption.  Third, the Industrial Era model of making decisions and allocating resources is no longer affordable and needs to be abandoned.  Assuming that national government refuse to heal themselves, we see local and state jurisdictions becoming very aggressive about resilience and sustainability, to the point of nullifying national regulations and if necessary declaring secession.  It is noteworthy that those governments that refused to bail out the banks and instead turned to their public for common sense solutions, are now the strongest governments.

David Isenberg: Iran Prepared for the Worst with A2/AD

03 Economy, 04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Iran, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Justice, 10 Security, 10 Transnational Crime, 11 Society, Analysis, Commercial Intelligence, Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), Government, IO Deeds of War, Military, Misinformation & Propaganda, Money, Banks & Concentrated Wealth, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests
David Isenberg

Iran well prepared for the worst

David Isenberg

31 January 2012

Most discussions of possible United States military operations in the Persian Gulf, should Iran try to prevent maritime traffic from going through the Strait of Hormuz, generally say that while it would not be a cakewalk, it would not be an enormously difficult task either.

But that conventional wisdom is wrong, according to a recent report issued by an independent, non-profit public policy research institute in Washington DC. The report found that the traditional post-Cold War US military ability to project power overseas with few serious challenges to its freedom of action may be rapidly drawing to a close.

. . . . . . .

It stressed that “a Strait of Hormuz closure could trigger a much larger price spike, including by limiting offsetting supplies from other producers in the region”.

Read full article.

Phi Beta Iota:  Two themes are emerging in the open source world.  First, the depth and breadth of Israel's clandestine agreements with its Arab neighbors is not clearly understood–a National Intelligence Estimate is required, but the collection, processing, and analysis capabilities are simply not there, and the management will to do this as a multinational task is not there either.  Second, as the US loses its ability to actually project force, the finance of war is being replaced by the theater of war, such that oil prices can still be manipulated, but at a fraction of the blood, sweat, and tears previously mobilized – financial fraud on the cheap, as it were.

 

 

Chuck Spinney: F-35 Out of Everything Except Money

Commerce, Corruption, DoD, Government, Military
Chuck Spinney

F-35: Out of Altitude, Airspeed, and Ideas — But Never Money

Chuck Spinney

TIME, 30 January 2012

No program better illustrates the pathologies of the weapons acquisition process as it is currently practiced by the Military – Industrial – Congressional Complex (MICC) than the entirely predictable, and in this case, predicted, problems dragging the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter into a dead man’s spiral.

The F-35 in on track to be the most expensive program in the history of the Defense Department, and it has repeated just about every mistake we invented since Robert McNamara concocted the multimission, multi-service  TFX — a program conceived with the same kind of fanciful one-shoe fits all imaginings as the F-35.

Read full article.

Read USMC Boats Against the Current and Comments

Robert Steele

For reflection.  When I created the strategic generalizations in the first edition of the Expeditionary Factors study, that was responding to General Gray's guidance that we be relevant to USMC acquisition–that was actually his primary focus, we lost our integrity by the third generation of leadership and went into production for the sake of production, without a genuine understanding of either the craft of intelligence or the mission needs of the USMC.  That was enabled by flag officers who have no clue what it means to integrate true cost economics with strategic generalizations to arrive at a force that has a very low logistics foot-print, a very high availability ratio, and a very low cost in relation to all the crap that the big three services sign for without thinking.

1990 Expeditionary Environment Analytic Model
1991 MCG Intelligence Support for Expeditionary Planners
2008 U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century
2009 Perhaps We Should Have Shouted: A Twenty-Year Retrospective

Chuck Spinney: Should We Fear Nuclear Iran or Nuclear Israel?

05 Iran, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Wild Cards, Corruption, Government, IO Deeds of War, Military, Peace Intelligence
Chuck Spinney

Fact #1: Only one country in the Middle East has nuclear weapons – Israel.  The quantity is unknown, with estimates of the Israeli arsenal range between 60 and 400 bombs, the upper range of 200-400 being the most often cited.  Fact #2: Only one country in the Middle East has refused to the sign the Non Proliferation Treaty – Israel.  These two facts are not in dispute.

While most observers (except for the leadership of Israel and its agents of influence in the west, especially the US) believe making the Middle East a nuclear free zone would be a positive step toward peace, no one is pressuring Israel to give up its weapons.  The goal of a nuclear free zone may be great for raising grant money, but without a commitment to pressure Israel into giving up its weapons, it will remain a pipe dream.
On the other hand, Israel and the US claim the unilateral right to insure that all of the Middle East other than Israel remains a nuclear free zone, by preemptive military action, if either country deems it to be necessary.   To this end Israel, attacked the Osirak reactor without warning in Iraq (1981) and an alleged Syrian nuclear site without warning in 2007.  Ironically, at the time of the Osirak attack, the Iraqi program was moribund and going nowhere, but the attack spurred Saddam into developing a more vigorous covert program. [Pillar]  The real purpose of the alleged “nuclear” site in Syria remains in dispute, with some arguing that recent evidence proves it was a textile factory.  Ironically, the Osirak attack set in course a chain of events that eventually combined to lead to the US attacking and destroying Iraq in 2003, justified primarily by false claims that Saddam Hussein was close to fielding nuclear weapons.
Now Iran is in the crosshairs for the same reason, although Iran is complying with IAEA nuclear safeguards and inspection requirements.  Given the sorry history of “nuclear preemption,” perhaps it is time to ask the unmentionable question: So what?  What is the debate really about?  The attached essay by William Pfaff takes a stab at this question.  One interesting point, an Israeli general indirectly confirmed Pfaff's hypothesis about Israel's real reason for going beserk over the possibility of Iran getting a nuclear weapon — you can find it here, but read Pfaff's op-ed first.

By William Pfaff,

Tribune Media Services, 01/24/2012

PARIS — The obsession of the American foreign policy community, as well as most American (and a good many international) politicians, by the myth of Iran's “existential” threat to Israel, brings the world steadily closer to another war in the Middle East.

Read full article.

Marcus Aurelius: Five Articles on Defense Reductions

Military
Marcus Aurelius

Five press articles follow. First four describe efforts DoD and Army senior leaders to paint force reductions as good and necessary things. If you believe that reducing DoD is keystone to saving Nation, some of what leaders are saying possibly sounds plausible. As a private citizen, I don't believe that White House, Congress, or DoD have done right thing so I don't subscribe to what is being said in support of it. I'm glad my job does not, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's and Chief of Staff, Army's do, require that I give public statements supporting this stuff. Wonder how they sleep at night…

Fifth article, by SmallWarsJournal.com, presents probably best summary of impacts of DoD's actions I have seen. They seem to endorse necessity of DoD's actions, so I disagree there.

Army Chief Sees Greater Role For Guard And Reserves

Army's Top General Backs Troop Rollback

Army Must Cut Energy Costs To Balance Budget

How Pentagon Budget Cuts Will Reshape The Army

Winners And Losers Of The Defense Budget

Phi Beta Iota:  4% of the force (the infantry) take 80% of the casualties and cost 1% of the total military budget.  In this context, the only winners are members of the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex.

Berto Jongman: US National Supply Chain Security

Corruption, Government, IO Impotency, Military
Berto Jongman

US strategy with respect to supply chain security.

PDF (16 pages)

Phi Beta Iota:  Delusional fluff.  The good news is that most of the stuff that is vulnerable to single point of failure interruptions is not all that important if you have a proper strategy that is based on reality and true cost information.  What they do not get is the urgent need to create jobs that are directly related to resilience and sustainability from the local level up.

Berto Jongman: Russian Sixth Generation Warfare and Role of Openness

Advanced Cyber/IO, Commerce, Commercial Intelligence, Earth Intelligence, Government, Military
Berto Jongman

Russian Sixth Generation Warfare And Recent Developments

Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 17

While press attention on developments in Russia focused on the disputed parliamentary elections and the following protests, which seemed to revive political activism in Moscow and other urban centers, there have been some military developments that deserve some attention. One such theme is an old topic, sixth generation warfare and its impact upon the nuclear threshold – do advanced conventional systems, which approach nuclear effects, blur the line on nuclear deterrence? The Russian press has had several recent articles that suggest this issue is becoming more acute.

In the aftermath of Desert Storm in 1991, the late Major-General Vladimir Slipchenko coined the phrase “sixth generation warfare” to refer to the “informatization” of conventional warfare and the development of precision strike systems which could make the massing of forces in the conventional sense an invitation to disaster and demand the development of the means to mass effects through depth to fight systems versus systems warfare. Slipchenko looked back at Ogarkov’s “revolution in military affairs” with “weapons based on new physical principles” and saw “Desert Storm” as a first indication of the appearance of such capabilities. He did not believe that sixth generation warfare had yet manifested its full implications (Vladimir Slipchenko, Voina budushchego. Moscow: Moskovskii Obshchestvennyi Nauchnyi Fond, 1999).

Click on Image to Enlarge

However, Slipchenko did believe that sixth generation warfare would replace fifth generation warfare, which he identified as thermonuclear war, and had evolved into a strategic stalemate, making nuclear first use an inevitable road to destruction (from the end of the Soviet Union until his death in 2005, he had analyzed combat experience abroad to further refine his conception until he began to speak of the emergence of “no-contact warfare” as the optimal form for sixth generation warfare; Vladimir Slipchenko, Beskontaktnye voiny. Moscow: Izdatel’skii dom: Gran-Press,” 2001). In his final volume, Slipchenko redefined sixth generation warfare as involving the capacity to conduct distant, no-contact operations and suggested that such conflict would demand major military reforms. Slipchenko made a compelling case for the enhanced role of C4ISR in conducting such operations (Vladimir Slipchenko,Voina novogo pokoleniia: Distantsionnye i beskontaktaktnye, Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2004).

Continue reading “Berto Jongman: Russian Sixth Generation Warfare and Role of Openness”