ABSTRACT: In his book, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What it Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi gives us a detailed analysis of the typology of the WWW. In so doing, he makes many errors from which we can derive important lessons about ways not to study the WWW or complex networks in general. These lessons are crucial from the point of view of the philosophy of science, and suggest that more care and reflecivity is called for in pursuing WWW research. This paper is intended to provided imputus for meaningful thought and further discussion.
Introduction: Quality and Quantity
Network Analysis (Analytical Dimensioins of Networks, Robot Typology, Network Density, Assessing the Value of Hubs and Non-Hubs, The Effect of Search Engines on Typology)
Static Quality (Proportional Linkage, Website Design, Valuable Referrers, The Effect of Closeness)
Dynamic Quality (The Myth of Fitness, Competition is Cooperation, Survival of the Fitters, Innovation Changes the Landscape, Limits to Growth, Alternative Norms to Preferential Treatment
ABSTRACT: The Information Revolution combined with connective technologies creates a unique global social network. This network is vulnerable to cascades of information, norms, and coordinated action. The inherent unpredictability of the information society demands new kinds of governance that focus on rapid network-coordinated response over centralized predictive planning.
CORE QUOTE: “Power, as the capacity to impose behavior, lies in the networks of information exchange and symbol manipulation, which relate social actors, institutions, and cultural movements.” Citing M. Castells, End of Millenium (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 379.
Although I had long recognized that intelligence at the national level is remedial education for policy-makers and their staff who live in a “closed circle,” it was the juxtaposition of Derek Bok’s review of education with my own on intelligence in the same issue that made me realize we need a Deputy Vice President for Education, Intelligence, and Research. I tried to get Colin Powell interested in the idea, to no avail. In my view, we will always need spies and secrets, but they must be cast in the context of a Smart Nation, and our secret intelligence budget is so large now that it can safely afford to become a modest bill-payer for advances in education and research that are part of the Smart Nation triad.
It is not for me to do anything other than champion the idea–others actually manage the money and it is they who decide how the taxpayer dollar is spent.
Summary: The rigid hierarchy that characterizes state bureaucracies has also been embedded into internaitonal institutions, and it is this architecture that can be vastly improved by restructuring it into a multiscale network. There are both descriptive and prescriptive reasons for doing so: 1) increases in functional efficiency and robustness, and 2) improvements from a normative perspective. As we enter the 21st century, the international system already exhibits many aspects of multiscale networks, but there are typically seen as liabilities and not assets. By providing a richer understanding of multiscale networks, this paper proposes an alternative to Cox’s “with them or against them” ultimatum.
ABSTRACT: The primary hyposthesis that I will endeavor to support is that leveraging the benefits of network organization constitutes a new source of power and a new way of accomplishing global governance.
Complexity + Networks + Connectivity = Panarchy
CONCLUSION: In this paper I have shown that the convergence of processes crosses a critical threshhold to create new possibilities for governance. The result is a new system. The key distinction between the old system and the new lies in the fact that governance in the old system was achieved through states, whereas in the new system it is not only achieved outside of hierarchies through horizontal networks, but is in fact often achieved in spite of hierarchies.
Ralph Peters stands out in Phi Beta Iota’s tag cloud because among the 2000 or so authors represented here, he has both multiple non-fictions books to his name that we have reviewed, and he has given provocative presentations on more than one occasion to the multinational public intelligence audience that we began nurturing in 1992. Below by Shane Harris is both a PDF for retension assurance, and at the logo, the original online article from Government Executive.
The below reference and article was drafted by Robert Steele with some editorial assistance from Mark Lowenthal, who was briefly an employee of OSS before jumping to SRA International. The article draws on the experience of the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC) that was established by General Al Gray, USMC, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, largely to support expeditionary acquisition. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are all “big system” services, and while the Army has begun to learn how to “eat the tail” and reduce the logistics footprint (as well as the ground convey exposure and expense), the reality is that DoD acquisition remains totally hosed today, and 20,000 new people (as planned by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) are not going to be effecive for three reasons:
1. DoD makes policy without regard to strategy or intelligence
2. DoD acquires systems without regard to strategy, lacking a strategic analytic model
3. DoD is long over-due for massive changes to Title 109 such that we have four proponents for Big War, Small War, Peace War, and Homeland Defense (each of the Services could be redirected appropriately) but–big but–the regional combatant commanders become BOTH the hubs for Whole of Government inter-agency planning, programming, and budgeting AND the primary proponents for what is needed in their theaters.
Should it not be crystal clear, the “butts in seats” approach in which contractors cost the taxpayer 250% of their salary is not sanctioned by this early article on how to fix intelligence support to acquisition. Small cells, a global grid of multinational sharing and sense-making partners, and the ability to “know who knows,” to apply strategic analytic tradecraft, and to produce “just enough, just in time, just right” Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) that either stands on its own or radically enhances all-source intelligence production, are the way to go. No one now providing OSINT under OMB Code M320 understaqnds how to do that.